CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2024-49867 – btrfs: wait for fixup workers before stopping cleaner kthread during umount
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-49867
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: wait for fixup workers before stopping cleaner kthread during umount During unmount, at close_ctree(), we have the following steps in this order: 1) Park the cleaner kthread - this doesn't destroy the kthread, it basically halts its execution (wake ups against it work but do nothing); 2) We stop the cleaner kthread - this results in freeing the respective struct task_struct; 3) We call btrfs_stop_all_workers() which waits for any jobs running in all the work queues and then free the work queues. Syzbot reported a case where a fixup worker resulted in a crash when doing a delayed iput on its inode while attempting to wake up the cleaner at btrfs_add_delayed_iput(), because the task_struct of the cleaner kthread was already freed. This can happen during unmount because we don't wait for any fixup workers still running before we call kthread_stop() against the cleaner kthread, which stops and free all its resources. Fix this by waiting for any fixup workers at close_ctree() before we call kthread_stop() against the cleaner and run pending delayed iputs. The stack traces reported by syzbot were the following: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x77/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5065 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880272a8a18 by task kworker/u8:3/52 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 52 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Workqueue: btrfs-fixup btrfs_work_helper Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 __lock_acquire+0x77/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5065 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 class_raw_spinlock_irqsave_constructor include/linux/spinlock.h:551 [inline] try_to_wake_up+0xb0/0x1480 kernel/sched/core.c:4154 btrfs_writepage_fixup_worker+0xc16/0xdf0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:2842 btrfs_work_helper+0x390/0xc50 fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:314 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa63/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Allocated by task 2: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:319 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:345 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:247 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4086 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4135 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x16b/0x320 mm/slub.c:4187 alloc_task_struct_node kernel/fork.c:180 [inline] dup_task_struct+0x57/0x8c0 kernel/fork.c:1107 copy_process+0x5d1/0x3d50 kernel/fork.c:2206 kernel_clone+0x223/0x880 kernel/fork.c:2787 kernel_thread+0x1bc/0x240 kernel/fork.c:2849 create_kthread kernel/kthread.c:412 [inline] kthreadd+0x60d/0x810 kernel/kthread.c:765 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Freed by task 61: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:230 [inline] slab_free_h ---truncated--- • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70b60c8d9b42763d6629e44f448aa5d8ae477d61 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c98fe0dfa2ae83c4631699695506d8941db4bfe https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9da40aea63f8769f28afb91aea0fac4cf6fbbb65 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed87190e9d9c80aad220fb6b0b03a84d22e2c95b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf0de0f9a0544c11f96f93206da04ab87dcea1f4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65d11eb276836d49003a8060cf31fa2284ad1047 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41fd1e94066a815a7ab0a7025359e9b40e4b3576 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0CVE-2024-49866 – tracing/timerlat: Fix a race during cpuhp processing
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-49866
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing/timerlat: Fix a race during cpuhp processing There is another found exception that the "timerlat/1" thread was scheduled on CPU0, and lead to timer corruption finally: ``` ODEBUG: init active (active state 0) object: ffff888237c2e108 object type: hrtimer hint: timerlat_irq+0x0/0x220 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 426 at lib/debugobjects.c:518 debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 426 Comm: timerlat/1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7+ #45 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x7c/0x110 ? debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0 ? report_bug+0xf1/0x1d0 ? prb_read_valid+0x17/0x20 ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8895e271f7994a3ecb13b8a280e39aa53879545 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/322920b53dc11f9c2b33397eb3ae5bc6a175b60d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce25f33ba89d6eefef64157655d318444580fa14 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6e9849063a6c8f4cb2f652a437e44e3ed24356c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a0d9c0cd5856191e095cf43a2e141b73945b7716 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f72b451dc75578f644a3019c1489e9ae2c14e6c4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/829e0c9f0855f26b3ae830d17b24aec103f7e915 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0CVE-2024-49864 – rxrpc: Fix a race between socket set up and I/O thread creation
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-49864
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix a race between socket set up and I/O thread creation In rxrpc_open_socket(), it sets up the socket and then sets up the I/O thread that will handle it. This is a problem, however, as there's a gap between the two phases in which a packet may come into rxrpc_encap_rcv() from the UDP packet but we oops when trying to wake the not-yet created I/O thread. As a quick fix, just make rxrpc_encap_rcv() discard the packet if there's no I/O thread yet. A better, but more intrusive fix would perhaps be to rearrange things such that the socket creation is done by the I/O thread. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a275da62e8c111b897b9cb73eb91df2f4e475ca5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cdf4bbbdb956d7426f687f38757ebca2a2759a0f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56e415202b8a17de6496f4023e545fcb66f118ec https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c64f5fc95e9612fdf75587c8e21e494e614c18e2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc212465326e8587325f520a052346f0b57360e6 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2024-49863 – vhost/scsi: null-ptr-dereference in vhost_scsi_get_req()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-49863
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vhost/scsi: null-ptr-dereference in vhost_scsi_get_req() Since commit 3f8ca2e115e5 ("vhost/scsi: Extract common handling code from control queue handler") a null pointer dereference bug can be triggered when guest sends an SCSI AN request. In vhost_scsi_ctl_handle_vq(), `vc.target` is assigned with `&v_req.tmf.lun[1]` within a switch-case block and is then passed to vhost_scsi_get_req() which extracts `vc->req` and `tpg`. However, for a `VIRTIO_SCSI_T_AN_*` request, tpg is not required, so `vc.target` is set to NULL in this branch. Later, in vhost_scsi_get_req(), `vc->target` is dereferenced without being checked, leading to a null pointer dereference bug. This bug can be triggered from guest. When this bug occurs, the vhost_worker process is killed while holding `vq->mutex` and the corresponding tpg will remain occupied indefinitely. Below is the KASAN report: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] CPU: 1 PID: 840 Comm: poc Not tainted 6.10.0+ #1 Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:vhost_scsi_get_req+0x165/0x3a0 Code: 00 fc ff df 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 2b 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4d 8b 65 30 4c 89 e2 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 4c 89 e2 83 e2 07 38 d0 7f 08 84 c0 0f 85 be 01 00 00 RSP: 0018:ffff888017affb50 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88801b000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff888017affcb8 RBP: ffff888017affb80 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff888017affc88 R14: ffff888017affd1c R15: ffff888017993000 FS: 000055556e076500(0000) GS:ffff88806b100000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000200027c0 CR3: 0000000010ed0004 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_regs+0x86/0xa0 ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f8ca2e115e55af4c15d97dda635e948d2e380be https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6592347f06e2b19a624270a85ad4b3ae48c3b241 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46128370a72c431df733af5ebb065c4d48c9ad39 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ace9c778a214da9c98d7b69d904d1b0816f4f681 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25613e6d9841a1f9fb985be90df921fa99f800de https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00fb5b23e1c9cdbe496f5cd6b40367cb895f6c93 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/61517f33e76d2c5247c1e61e668693afe5b67e6f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/221af82f606d928ccef19a16d35633c63 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0CVE-2024-49862 – powercap: intel_rapl: Fix off by one in get_rpi()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-49862
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powercap: intel_rapl: Fix off by one in get_rpi() The rp->priv->rpi array is either rpi_msr or rpi_tpmi which have NR_RAPL_PRIMITIVES number of elements. Thus the > needs to be >= to prevent an off by one access. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98ff639a7289067247b3ef9dd5d1e922361e7365 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/288cbc505e2046638c615c36357cb78bc9fee1e0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/851e7f7f14a15f4e47b7d0f70d5c4a2b95b824d6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a34f3b0d7f11fb6ed72da315fd2360abd9c0737 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95f6580352a7225e619551febb83595bcb77ab17 •