CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 10EXPL: 0CVE-2024-49949 – net: avoid potential underflow in qdisc_pkt_len_init() with UFO
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-49949
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: avoid potential underflow in qdisc_pkt_len_init() with UFO After commit 7c6d2ecbda83 ("net: be more gentle about silly gso requests coming from user") virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() had sanity check to detect malicious attempts from user space to cook a bad GSO packet. Then commit cf9acc90c80ec ("net: virtio_net_hdr_to_skb: count transport header in UFO") while fixing one issue, allowed user space to cook a GSO packet with the following characteristic : IPv4 SKB_GSO_UDP, gso_size=3, skb->len = 28. When this packet arrives in qdisc_pkt_len_init(), we end up with hdr_len = 28 (IPv4 header + UDP header), matching skb->len Then the following sets gso_segs to 0 : gso_segs = DIV_ROUND_UP(skb->len - hdr_len, shinfo->gso_size); Then later we set qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len to back to zero :/ qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len += (gso_segs - 1) * hdr_len; This leads to the following crash in fq_codel [1] qdisc_pkt_len_init() is best effort, we only want an estimation of the bytes sent on the wire, not crashing the kernel. This patch is fixing this particular issue, a following one adds more sanity checks for another potential bug. [1] [ 70.724101] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 70.724561] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 70.724561] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 70.724561] PGD 10ac61067 P4D 10ac61067 PUD 107ee2067 PMD 0 [ 70.724561] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 70.724561] CPU: 11 UID: 0 PID: 2163 Comm: b358537762 Not tainted 6.11.0-virtme #991 [ 70.724561] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 70.724561] RIP: 0010:fq_codel_enqueue (net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:120 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:168 net/sched/sch_fq_codel.c:230) sch_fq_codel [ 70.724561] Code: 24 08 49 c1 e1 06 44 89 7c 24 18 45 31 ed 45 31 c0 31 ff 89 44 24 14 4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 eb 04 39 ca 73 37 4d 8b 39 83 c7 01 <49> 8b 17 49 89 11 41 8b 57 28 45 8b 5f 34 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 49 All code ======== 0: 24 08 and $0x8,%al 2: 49 c1 e1 06 shl $0x6,%r9 6: 44 89 7c 24 18 mov %r15d,0x18(%rsp) b: 45 31 ed xor %r13d,%r13d e: 45 31 c0 xor %r8d,%r8d 11: 31 ff xor %edi,%edi 13: 89 44 24 14 mov %eax,0x14(%rsp) 17: 4c 03 8b 90 01 00 00 add 0x190(%rbx),%r9 1e: eb 04 jmp 0x24 20: 39 ca cmp %ecx,%edx 22: 73 37 jae 0x5b 24: 4d 8b 39 mov (%r9),%r15 27: 83 c7 01 add $0x1,%edi 2a:* 49 8b 17 mov (%r15),%rdx <-- trapping instruction 2d: 49 89 11 mov %rdx,(%r9) 30: 41 8b 57 28 mov 0x28(%r15),%edx 34: 45 8b 5f 34 mov 0x34(%r15),%r11d 38: 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 movq $0x0,(%r15) 3f: 49 rex.WB Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 49 8b 17 mov (%r15),%rdx 3: 49 89 11 mov %rdx,(%r9) 6: 41 8b 57 28 mov 0x28(%r15),%edx a: 45 8b 5f 34 mov 0x34(%r15),%r11d e: 49 c7 07 00 00 00 00 movq $0x0,(%r15) 15: 49 rex.WB [ 70.724561] RSP: 0018:ffff95ae85e6fb90 EFLAGS: 00000202 [ 70.724561] RAX: 0000000002000000 RBX: ffff95ae841de000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 70.724561] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000001 [ 70.724561] RBP: ffff95ae85e6fbf8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff95b710a30000 [ 70.724561] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: bdf289445ce31881 R12: ffff95ae85e6fc58 [ 70.724561] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000040 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 70.724561] FS: 000000002c5c1380(0000) GS:ffff95bd7fcc0000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 70.724561] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 C ---truncated--- • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e6bae950da9dc2d2c6c18b1c6b206dc00dc8772 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f810d06b507aa40fef8d1ac0a88e6d0590dbfc3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf9acc90c80ecbee00334aa85d92f4e74014bcff https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2128303bff700c857739a0af8cc39c1a41840650 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/960b360ca7463921c1a6b72e7066a706d6406223 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb2dbc124a7f800cd0e4f901a1bbb769a017104c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba26060a29d3ca1bfc737aa79f7125128f35147c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/939c88cbdc668dadd8cfa7a35d9066331 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2024-49948 – net: add more sanity checks to qdisc_pkt_len_init()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-49948
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: add more sanity checks to qdisc_pkt_len_init() One path takes care of SKB_GSO_DODGY, assuming skb->len is bigger than hdr_len. virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() does not fully dissect TCP headers, it only make sure it is at least 20 bytes. It is possible for an user to provide a malicious 'GSO' packet, total length of 80 bytes. - 20 bytes of IPv4 header - 60 bytes TCP header - a small gso_size like 8 virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() would declare this packet as a normal GSO packet, because it would see 40 bytes of payload, bigger than gso_size. We need to make detect this case to not underflow qdisc_skb_cb(skb)->pkt_len. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1def9238d4aa2146924994aa4b7dc861f03b9362 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/566a931a1436d0e0ad13708ea55479b95426213c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2415f465730e48b6e38da1c7c097317bf5dd2d20 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27a8fabc54d2f960d47bdfbebf2bdc6e8a92a4c4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b0ee571d20a238a22722126abdfde61f1b2bdd0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff1c3cadcf405ab37dd91418a62a7acecf3bc5e2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1eebe602a8d8264a12e35e39d0645fa88dbbacdd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ab9a9a9e9647392a19e7a885b08000e89 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0CVE-2024-49947 – net: test for not too small csum_start in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-49947
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: test for not too small csum_start in virtio_net_hdr_to_skb() syzbot was able to trigger this warning [1], after injecting a malicious packet through af_packet, setting skb->csum_start and thus the transport header to an incorrect value. We can at least make sure the transport header is after the end of the network header (with a estimated minimal size). [1] [ 67.873027] skb len=4096 headroom=16 headlen=14 tailroom=0 mac=(-1,-1) mac_len=0 net=(16,-6) trans=10 shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=1 gso(size=0 type=0 segs=0)) csum(0xa start=10 offset=0 ip_summed=3 complete_sw=0 valid=0 level=0) hash(0x0 sw=0 l4=0) proto=0x0800 pkttype=0 iif=0 priority=0x0 mark=0x0 alloc_cpu=10 vlan_all=0x0 encapsulation=0 inner(proto=0x0000, mac=0, net=0, trans=0) [ 67.877172] dev name=veth0_vlan feat=0x000061164fdd09e9 [ 67.877764] sk family=17 type=3 proto=0 [ 67.878279] skb linear: 00000000: 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 0f 00 00 00 08 00 [ 67.879128] skb frag: 00000000: 0e 00 07 00 00 00 28 00 08 80 1c 00 04 00 00 02 [ 67.879877] skb frag: 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.880647] skb frag: 00000020: 00 00 02 00 00 00 08 00 1b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.881156] skb frag: 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.881753] skb frag: 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.882173] skb frag: 00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.882790] skb frag: 00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.883171] skb frag: 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.883733] skb frag: 00000080: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.884206] skb frag: 00000090: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 69 70 76 6c 61 6e [ 67.884704] skb frag: 000000a0: 31 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2b 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.885139] skb frag: 000000b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.885677] skb frag: 000000c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.886042] skb frag: 000000d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.886408] skb frag: 000000e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.887020] skb frag: 000000f0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 67.887384] skb frag: 00000100: 00 00 [ 67.887878] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 67.887908] offset (-6) >= skb_headlen() (14) [ 67.888445] WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 2088 at net/core/dev.c:3332 skb_checksum_help (net/core/dev.c:3332 (discriminator 2)) [ 67.889353] Modules linked in: macsec macvtap macvlan hsr wireguard curve25519_x86_64 libcurve25519_generic libchacha20poly1305 chacha_x86_64 libchacha poly1305_x86_64 dummy bridge sr_mod cdrom evdev pcspkr i2c_piix4 9pnet_virtio 9p 9pnet netfs [ 67.890111] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 2088 Comm: b363492833 Not tainted 6.11.0-virtme #1011 [ 67.890183] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 67.890309] RIP: 0010:skb_checksum_help (net/core/dev.c:3332 (discriminator 2)) [ 67.891043] Call Trace: [ 67.891173] <TASK> [ 67.891274] ? __warn (kernel/panic.c:741) [ 67.891320] ? skb_checksum_help (net/core/dev.c:3332 (discriminator 2)) [ 67.891333] ? report_bug (lib/bug.c:180 lib/bug.c:219) [ 67.891348] ? handle_bug (arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:239) [ 67.891363] ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/342c88f406c2acd3dd00767aeacafe883cebb374 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9181d6f8a2bb32d158de66a84164fac05e3ddd18 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/765290b628c2fb764bdfaf8088754439665751e8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d9dfd41e32ccc5198033ddd1ff1516822dfefa5a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cc0648e9e3240496835dc698ace1d046d8d57ea https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7711c419a915ee0dd91c125d2b967bbf2a72e9ac https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49d14b54a527289d09a9480f214b8c586322310a •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0CVE-2024-49946 – ppp: do not assume bh is held in ppp_channel_bridge_input()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-49946
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ppp: do not assume bh is held in ppp_channel_bridge_input() Networking receive path is usually handled from BH handler. However, some protocols need to acquire the socket lock, and packets might be stored in the socket backlog is the socket was owned by a user process. In this case, release_sock(), __release_sock(), and sk_backlog_rcv() might call the sk->sk_backlog_rcv() handler in process context. sybot caught ppp was not considering this case in ppp_channel_bridge_input() : WARNING: inconsistent lock state 6.11.0-rc7-syzkaller-g5f5673607153 #0 Not tainted -------------------------------- inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage. ksoftirqd/1/24 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE1:SE0] takes: ffff0000db7f11e0 (&pch->downl){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ffff0000db7f11e0 (&pch->downl){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: ppp_channel_bridge_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2272 [inline] ffff0000db7f11e0 (&pch->downl){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: ppp_input+0x16c/0x854 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2304 {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at: lock_acquire+0x240/0x728 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5759 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline] _raw_spin_lock+0x48/0x60 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline] ppp_channel_bridge_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2272 [inline] ppp_input+0x16c/0x854 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2304 pppoe_rcv_core+0xfc/0x314 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:379 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1111 [inline] __release_sock+0x1a8/0x3d8 net/core/sock.c:3004 release_sock+0x68/0x1b8 net/core/sock.c:3558 pppoe_sendmsg+0xc8/0x5d8 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:903 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg net/socket.c:745 [inline] __sys_sendto+0x374/0x4f4 net/socket.c:2204 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2216 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2212 [inline] __arm64_sys_sendto+0xd8/0xf8 net/socket.c:2212 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598 irq event stamp: 282914 hardirqs last enabled at (282914): [<ffff80008b42e30c>] __raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:151 [inline] hardirqs last enabled at (282914): [<ffff80008b42e30c>] _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x38/0x98 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:194 hardirqs last disabled at (282913): [<ffff80008b42e13c>] __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:108 [inline] hardirqs last disabled at (282913): [<ffff80008b42e13c>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x2c/0x7c kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 softirqs last enabled at (282904): [<ffff8000801f8e88>] softirq_handle_end kernel/softirq.c:400 [inline] softirqs last enabled at (282904): [<ffff8000801f8e88>] handle_softirqs+0xa3c/0xbfc kernel/softirq.c:582 softirqs last disabled at (282909): [<ffff8000801fbdf8>] run_ksoftirqd+0x70/0x158 kernel/softirq.c:928 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 ---- lock(&pch->downl); <Interrupt> lock(&pch->downl); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by ksoftirqd/1/24: #0: ffff80008f74dfa0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire+0x10/0x4c include/linux/rcupdate.h:325 stack backtrace: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 24 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7-syzkaller-g5f5673607153 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/06/2024 Call trace: dump_backtrace+0x1b8/0x1e4 arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:319 show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:326 __dump_sta ---truncated--- • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cf476ced45d7f12df30a68e833b263e7a2202d1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/176dd41e8c2bd997ed3d66568a3362e69ecce99b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/635deca1800a68624f185dc1e04a8495b48cf185 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f9620e2a665aa642625bd2501282bbddff556bd7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/efe9cc0f7c0279216a5522271ec675b8288602e4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c837f8583535f094a39386308c2ccfd92c8596cd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aec7291003df78cb71fd461d7b672912bde55807 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0CVE-2024-49945 – net/ncsi: Disable the ncsi work before freeing the associated structure
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-49945
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/ncsi: Disable the ncsi work before freeing the associated structure The work function can run after the ncsi device is freed, resulting in use-after-free bugs or kernel panic. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d283bdd079c0ad4da020bbc9e9c2a4280823098 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6ca58696749268181f43150b3553f2bafd71e42 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd41dab62f32d9e9e0669af8459d12a93834b238 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a0ffa68c70b367358b2672cdab6fa5bc4c40de2c •