Page 440 of 3015 results (0.024 seconds)

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: stmmac: Clear variable when destroying workqueue Currently when suspending driver and stopping workqueue it is checked whether workqueue is not NULL and if so, it is destroyed. Function destroy_workqueue() does drain queue and does clear variable, but it does not set workqueue variable to NULL. This can cause kernel/module panic if code attempts to clear workqueue that was not initialized. This scenario is possible when resuming suspended driver in stmmac_resume(), because there is no handling for failed stmmac_hw_setup(), which can fail and return if DMA engine has failed to initialize, and workqueue is initialized after DMA engine. Should DMA engine fail to initialize, resume will proceed normally, but interface won't work and TX queue will eventually timeout, causing 'Reset adapter' error. This then does destroy workqueue during reset process. And since workqueue is initialized after DMA engine and can be skipped, it will cause kernel/module panic. To secure against this possible crash, set workqueue variable to NULL when destroying workqueue. Log/backtrace from crash goes as follows: [88.031977]------------[ cut here ]------------ [88.031985]NETDEV WATCHDOG: eth0 (sxgmac): transmit queue 1 timed out [88.032017]WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at net/sched/sch_generic.c:477 dev_watchdog+0x390/0x398 <Skipping backtrace for watchdog timeout> [88.032251]---[ end trace e70de432e4d5c2c0 ]--- [88.032282]sxgmac 16d88000.ethernet eth0: Reset adapter. [88.036359]------------[ cut here ]------------ [88.036519]Call trace: [88.036523] flush_workqueue+0x3e4/0x430 [88.036528] drain_workqueue+0xc4/0x160 [88.036533] destroy_workqueue+0x40/0x270 [88.036537] stmmac_fpe_stop_wq+0x4c/0x70 [88.036541] stmmac_release+0x278/0x280 [88.036546] __dev_close_many+0xcc/0x158 [88.036551] dev_close_many+0xbc/0x190 [88.036555] dev_close.part.0+0x70/0xc0 [88.036560] dev_close+0x24/0x30 [88.036564] stmmac_service_task+0x110/0x140 [88.036569] process_one_work+0x1d8/0x4a0 [88.036573] worker_thread+0x54/0x408 [88.036578] kthread+0x164/0x170 [88.036583] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 [88.036588]---[ end trace e70de432e4d5c2c1 ]--- [88.036597]Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000004 En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: stmmac: Borrar variable al destruir la cola de trabajo Actualmente, al suspender el controlador y detener la cola de trabajo, se verifica si la cola de trabajo no es NULL y, de ser así, se destruye. La función destroy_workqueue() drena la cola y borra la variable, pero no establece la variable de la cola de trabajo en NULL. Esto puede causar pánico en el núcleo/módulo si el código intenta borrar la cola de trabajo que no se inicializó. Este escenario es posible al reanudar el controlador suspendido en stmmac_resume(), porque no hay control para stmmac_hw_setup() fallido, que puede fallar y regresar si el motor DMA no se pudo inicializar y la cola de trabajo se inicializa después del motor DMA. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a5586112b929546e16029261a987c9197bfdfa2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e99556301172465c8fe33c7f78c39a3d4ce8462 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17ccd9798fe0beda3db212cfa3ebe373f605cbd6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/699b103e48ce32d03fc86c35b37ee8ae4288c7e3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f72cf22dccc94038cbbaa1029cb575bf52e5cbc8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8af411bbba1f457c33734795f024d0ef26d0963f https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-26802 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2273427 • CWE-416: Use After Free •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: Avoid potential use-after-free in hci_error_reset While handling the HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR event, if the underlying BT controller is not responding, the GPIO reset mechanism would free the hci_dev and lead to a use-after-free in hci_error_reset. Here's the call trace observed on a ChromeOS device with Intel AX201: queue_work_on+0x3e/0x6c __hci_cmd_sync_sk+0x2ee/0x4c0 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a6>] ? init_wait_entry+0x31/0x31 __hci_cmd_sync+0x16/0x20 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a 6>] hci_error_reset+0x4f/0xa4 [bluetooth <HASH:3b4a 6>] process_one_work+0x1d8/0x33f worker_thread+0x21b/0x373 kthread+0x13a/0x152 ? pr_cont_work+0x54/0x54 ? kthread_blkcg+0x31/0x31 ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 This patch holds the reference count on the hci_dev while processing a HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR event to avoid potential crash. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: Bluetooth: evite el posible use-after-free en hci_error_reset Mientras se maneja el evento HCI_EV_HARDWARE_ERROR, si el controlador BT subyacente no responde, el mecanismo de reinicio de GPIO liberaría hci_dev y provocaría un error. use-after-free en hci_error_reset. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7741d16a57cbf97eebe53f27e8216b1ff20e20c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e0b278650f07acf2e0932149183458468a731c03 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98fb98fd37e42fd4ce13ff657ea64503e24b6090 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6dd0a9dfa99f8990a08eb8fdd8e79bee31c7d8e2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da4569d450b193e39e87119fd316c0291b585d14 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45085686b9559bfbe3a4f41d3d695a520668f5e1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ab9a19d896f5a0dd386e1f001c5309bc35f433b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd594cdc24f2e48dab441732e6dfcafd6 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fbcon: always restore the old font data in fbcon_do_set_font() Commit a5a923038d70 (fbdev: fbcon: Properly revert changes when vc_resize() failed) started restoring old font data upon failure (of vc_resize()). But it performs so only for user fonts. It means that the "system"/internal fonts are not restored at all. So in result, the very first call to fbcon_do_set_font() performs no restore at all upon failing vc_resize(). This can be reproduced by Syzkaller to crash the system on the next invocation of font_get(). It's rather hard to hit the allocation failure in vc_resize() on the first font_set(), but not impossible. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ebd6f886aa2447fcfcdce5450c9e1028e1d681bb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5a923038d70d2d4a86cb4e3f32625a5ee6e7e24 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f08ccb792d3eaf1dc62d8cbf6a30d6522329f660 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20a4b5214f7bee13c897477168c77bbf79683c3d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f91a96b892fab2f2543b4a55740c5bee36b1a6b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/73a6bd68a1342f3a44cac9dffad81ad6a003e520 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2c881413dcc5d801bdc9535e51270cc88cb9cd8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00d6a284fcf3fad1b7e1b5bc3cd87cbfb •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv: Sparse-Memory/vmemmap out-of-bounds fix Offset vmemmap so that the first page of vmemmap will be mapped to the first page of physical memory in order to ensure that vmemmap’s bounds will be respected during pfn_to_page()/page_to_pfn() operations. The conversion macros will produce correct SV39/48/57 addresses for every possible/valid DRAM_BASE inside the physical memory limits. v2:Address Alex's comments En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: riscv: Sparse-Memory/vmemmap fuera de los límites corrige Offset vmemmap para que la primera página de vmemmap se asigne a la primera página de la memoria física para garantizar que vmemmap Los límites se respetarán durante las operaciones pfn_to_page()/page_to_pfn(). Las macros de conversión producirán direcciones SV39/48/57 correctas para cada DRAM_BASE posible/válida dentro de los límites de la memoria física. v2: Abordar los comentarios de Alex • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d95f1a542c3df396137afa217ef9bd39cb8931ca https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8af1c121b0102041809bc137ec600d1865eaeedd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5941a90c55d3bfba732b32208d58d997600b44ef https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8310080799b40fd9f2a8b808c657269678c149af https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a278d5c60f21aa15d540abb2f2da6e6d795c3e6e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a1728c15ec4f45ed9248ae22f626541c179bfbe https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a11dd49dcb9376776193e15641f84fcc1e5980c9 https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/ •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: gtp: fix use-after-free and null-ptr-deref in gtp_newlink() The gtp_link_ops operations structure for the subsystem must be registered after registering the gtp_net_ops pernet operations structure. Syzkaller hit 'general protection fault in gtp_genl_dump_pdp' bug: [ 1010.702740] gtp: GTP module unloaded [ 1010.715877] general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 1010.715888] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] [ 1010.715895] CPU: 1 PID: 128616 Comm: a.out Not tainted 6.8.0-rc6-std-def-alt1 #1 [ 1010.715899] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.0-alt1 04/01/2014 [ 1010.715908] RIP: 0010:gtp_newlink+0x4d7/0x9c0 [gtp] [ 1010.715915] Code: 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 41 04 00 00 48 8b bb d8 05 00 00 e8 ed f6 ff ff 48 89 c2 48 89 c5 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 4f 04 00 00 4c 89 e2 4c 8b 6d 00 48 b8 00 00 00 [ 1010.715920] RSP: 0018:ffff888020fbf180 EFLAGS: 00010203 [ 1010.715929] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: ffff88800399c000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 1010.715933] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffffffff84805280 RDI: 0000000000000282 [ 1010.715938] RBP: 000000000000000d R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 1010.715942] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff88800399cc80 [ 1010.715947] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000400 [ 1010.715953] FS: 00007fd1509ab5c0(0000) GS:ffff88805b300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 1010.715958] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 1010.715962] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000001c07a000 CR4: 0000000000750ee0 [ 1010.715968] PKRU: 55555554 [ 1010.715972] Call Trace: [ 1010.715985] ? __die_body.cold+0x1a/0x1f [ 1010.715995] ? die_addr+0x43/0x70 [ 1010.716002] ? exc_general_protection+0x199/0x2f0 [ 1010.716016] ? asm_exc_general_protection+0x1e/0x30 [ 1010.716026] ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/459aa660eb1d8ce67080da1983bb81d716aa5a69 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01129059d5141d62fae692f7a336ae3bc712d3eb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec92aa2cab6f0048f10d6aa4f025c5885cb1a1b6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e668b92a3a01429923fd5ca13e99642aab47de69 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9376d059a705c5dfaac566c2d09891242013ae16 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abd32d7f5c0294c1b2454c5a3b13b18446bac627 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/93dd420bc41531c9a31498b9538ca83ba6ec191e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5366969a19a8a0d2ffb3d27ef6e8905e5 •