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CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: core: Move scsi_host_busy() out of host lock for waking up EH handler Inside scsi_eh_wakeup(), scsi_host_busy() is called & checked with host lock every time for deciding if error handler kthread needs to be waken up. This can be too heavy in case of recovery, such as: - N hardware queues - queue depth is M for each hardware queue - each scsi_host_busy() iterates over (N * M) tag/requests If recovery is triggered in case that all requests are in-flight, each scsi_eh_wakeup() is strictly serialized, when scsi_eh_wakeup() is called for the last in-flight request, scsi_host_busy() has been run for (N * M - 1) times, and request has been iterated for (N*M - 1) * (N * M) times. If both N and M are big enough, hard lockup can be triggered on acquiring host lock, and it is observed on mpi3mr(128 hw queues, queue depth 8169). Fix the issue by calling scsi_host_busy() outside the host lock. We don't need the host lock for getting busy count because host the lock never covers that. [mkp: Drop unnecessary 'busy' variables pointed out by Bart] En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: scsi: core: Saque scsi_host_busy() del bloqueo del host para activar el controlador EH Dentro de scsi_eh_wakeup(), se llama a scsi_host_busy() y se verifica con el bloqueo del host cada vez para decidir si se produce un error. Es necesario activar el controlador kthread. Esto puede ser demasiado pesado en caso de recuperación, como por ejemplo: - N colas de hardware - la profundidad de la cola es M para cada cola de hardware - cada scsi_host_busy() itera sobre (N * M) etiquetas/solicitudes Si la recuperación se activa en caso de que todas las solicitudes están en curso, cada scsi_eh_wakeup() está estrictamente serializado, cuando se llama a scsi_eh_wakeup() para la última solicitud en curso, scsi_host_busy() se ha ejecutado (N * M - 1) veces y la solicitud se ha iterado durante ( N*M - 1) * (N * M) veces. Si tanto N como M son lo suficientemente grandes, se puede activar un bloqueo duro al adquirir el bloqueo del host, y se observa en mpi3mr (128 colas hw, profundidad de cola 8169). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6eb045e092efefafc6687409a6fa6d1dabf0fb69 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5944853f7a961fedc1227dc8f60393f8936d37c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d37c1c81419fdef66ebd0747cf76fb8b7d979059 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db6338f45971b4285ea368432a84033690eaf53c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65ead8468c21c2676d4d06f50b46beffdea69df1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07e3ca0f17f579491b5f54e9ed05173d6c1d6fcb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4373534a9850627a2695317944898eb1283a2db0 https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/ •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: llc: call sock_orphan() at release time syzbot reported an interesting trace [1] caused by a stale sk->sk_wq pointer in a closed llc socket. In commit ff7b11aa481f ("net: socket: set sock->sk to NULL after calling proto_ops::release()") Eric Biggers hinted that some protocols are missing a sock_orphan(), we need to perform a full audit. In net-next, I plan to clear sock->sk from sock_orphan() and amend Eric patch to add a warning. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in list_empty include/linux/list.h:373 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:127 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_def_write_space_wfree net/core/sock.c:3384 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_wfree+0x9a8/0x9d0 net/core/sock.c:2468 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802f4fc880 by task ksoftirqd/1/27 CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00049-g6098d87eaf31 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0xc4/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601 list_empty include/linux/list.h:373 [inline] waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:127 [inline] sock_def_write_space_wfree net/core/sock.c:3384 [inline] sock_wfree+0x9a8/0x9d0 net/core/sock.c:2468 skb_release_head_state+0xa3/0x2b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1080 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1092 [inline] napi_consume_skb+0x119/0x2b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1404 e1000_unmap_and_free_tx_resource+0x144/0x200 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:1970 e1000_clean_tx_irq drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3860 [inline] e1000_clean+0x4a1/0x26e0 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3801 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xb4/0x540 net/core/dev.c:6576 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6645 [inline] net_rx_action+0x956/0xe90 net/core/dev.c:6778 __do_softirq+0x21a/0x8de kernel/softirq.c:553 run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:921 [inline] run_ksoftirqd+0x31/0x60 kernel/softirq.c:913 smpboot_thread_fn+0x660/0xa10 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x2c6/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242 </TASK> Allocated by task 5167: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:314 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x81/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:340 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3813 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x142/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3879 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3019 [inline] sock_alloc_inode+0x25/0x1c0 net/socket.c:308 alloc_inode+0x5d/0x220 fs/inode.c:260 new_inode_pseudo+0x16/0x80 fs/inode.c:1005 sock_alloc+0x40/0x270 net/socket.c:634 __sock_create+0xbc/0x800 net/socket.c:1535 sock_create net/socket.c:1622 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1659 [inline] __sys_socket+0x14c/0x260 net/socket.c:1706 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1720 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1718 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1718 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:640 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:241 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x121/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:257 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [inlin ---truncated--- En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: llc: llame a sock_orphan() en el momento del lanzamiento syzbot informó un rastro interesante [1] causado por un puntero sk-&gt;sk_wq obsoleto en un socket llc cerrado. En El commit ff7b11aa481f ("net: socket: set sock-&gt;sk to NULL after call proto_ops::release()") Eric Biggers insinuó que a algunos protocolos les falta un sock_orphan(), necesitamos realizar una auditoría completa. En net-next, planeo borrar sock-&gt;sk de sock_orphan() y modificar el parche de Eric para agregar una advertencia. [1] ERROR: KASAN: slab-use-after-free en list_empty include/linux/list.h:373 [en línea] ERROR: KASAN: slab-use-after-free en waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:127 [en línea] ERROR: KASAN: slab-use-after-free en sock_def_write_space_wfree net/core/sock.c:3384 [en línea] ERROR: KASAN: slab-use-after-free en sock_wfree+0x9a8/0x9d0 net/core/sock .c:2468 Lectura del tamaño 8 en la dirección ffff88802f4fc880 por tarea ksoftirqd/1/27 CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00049-g6098d87eaf31 #0 Nombre de hardware: PC estándar QEMU (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 01/04/2014 Seguimiento de llamadas: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [en línea] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack .c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [en línea] print_report+0xc4/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601 list_empty include/linux/ list.h:373 [en línea] waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:127 [en línea] sock_def_write_space_wfree net/core/sock.c:3384 [en línea] sock_wfree+0x9a8/0x9d0 net/core/sock.c:2468 skb_release_head_state+ 0xa3/0x2b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1080 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1092 [en línea] napi_consume_skb+0x119/0x2b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1404 e1000_unmap_and_free_tx_resource+0x144/0x200 drivers/net/ethernet/ intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:1970 e1000_clean_tx_irq controladores/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3860 [en línea] e1000_clean+0x4a1/0x26e0 controladores/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3801 __ napi_poll. constprop.0+0xb4/0x540 net/core/dev.c:6576 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6645 [en línea] net_rx_action+0x956/0xe90 net/core/dev.c:6778 __do_softirq+0x21a/0x8de kernel/ softirq.c:553 run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:921 [en línea] run_ksoftirqd+0x31/0x60 kernel/softirq.c:913 smpboot_thread_fn+0x660/0xa10 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x2c6/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c :388 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242 Asignado por tarea 5167: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/ kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:314 [en línea] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x81/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:340 kasan_slab_alloc incluir /linux/kasan.h:201 [en línea] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3813 [en línea] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [en línea] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x142/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3879 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/ fs.h:3019 [en línea] sock_alloc_inode+0x25/0x1c0 net/socket.c:308 alloc_inode+0x5d/0x220 fs/inode.c:260 new_inode_pseudo+0x16/0x80 fs/inode.c:1005 sock_alloc+0x40/0x270 net /socket.c:634 __sock_create+0xbc/0x800 net/socket.c:1535 sock_create net/socket.c:1622 [en línea] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1659 [en línea] __sys_socket+0x14c/0x260 net/socket.c :1706 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1720 [en línea] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1718 [en línea] __x64_sys_socket+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1718 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [en línea ] do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 Entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Liberado por la tarea 0: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/ common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:640 veneno_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:241 [en línea] __kasan_slab_free+0x121/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:257 kasan_slab_free include/linux /kasan.h:184 [en línea] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [en línea ---truncado--- • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43815482370c510c569fd18edb57afcb0fa8cab6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b950c712a9a05cdda4aea7fcb2848766576c11b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/64babb17e8150771c58575d8f93a35c5296b499f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0b5b1f12429df3cd9751ab8b2f53729b77733b7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dbc1b89981f9c5360277071d33d7f04a43ffda4a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c333d9891f34cea8af1b229dc754552304c8eee https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3151051b787f7cd7e3329ea0016eb9113c248812 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e51f084b5716653f19e291ed5f026791 •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/mm: Fix null-pointer dereference in pgtable_cache_add kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory which can be NULL upon failure. Ensure the allocation was successful by checking the pointer validity. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: powerpc/mm: corrige la desreferencia del puntero nulo en pgtable_cache_add kasprintf() devuelve un puntero a la memoria asignada dinámicamente que puede ser NULL en caso de falla. Asegúrese de que la asignación se haya realizado correctamente comprobando la validez del puntero. A possible null-pointer dereference was found in pgtable_cache_add in the Linux kernel. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21e45a7b08d7cd98d6a53c5fc5111879f2d96611 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6781add1c311c17eff43e14c786004bbacf901e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa28eecb43cac6e20ef14dfc50b8892c1fbcda5b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac3ed969a40357b0542d20f096a6d43acdfa6cc7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d482d61025e303a2bef3733a011b6b740215cfa1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/145febd85c3bcc5c74d87ef9a598fc7d9122d532 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ffd29dc45bc0355393859049f6becddc3ed08f74 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f46c8a75263f97bda13c739ba1c90aced • CWE-395: Use of NullPointerException Catch to Detect NULL Pointer Dereference •

CVSS: 7.1EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/lib: Validate size for vector operations Some of the fp/vmx code in sstep.c assume a certain maximum size for the instructions being emulated. The size of those operations however is determined separately in analyse_instr(). Add a check to validate the assumption on the maximum size of the operations, so as to prevent any unintended kernel stack corruption. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: powerpc/lib: validar tamaño para operaciones vectoriales Parte del código fp/vmx en sstep.c asume un cierto tamaño máximo para las instrucciones que se emula. Sin embargo, el tamaño de esas operaciones se determina por separado en analyse_instr(). Agregue una verificación para validar la suposición sobre el tamaño máximo de las operaciones, a fin de evitar daños no deseados en la pila del kernel. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42084a428a139f1a429f597d44621e3a18f3e414 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0580f4403ad33f379eef865c2a6fe94de37febdf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/beee482cc4c9a6b1dcffb2e190b4fd8782258678 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de4f5ed63b8a199704d8cdcbf810309d7eb4b36b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abd26515d4b767ba48241eea77b28ce0872aef3e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28b8ba8eebf26f66d9f2df4ba550b6b3b136082c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/848e1d7fd710900397e1d0e7584680c1c04e3afd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f9abaa6d7de0a70fc68acaedce290c1f • CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: FS:JFS:UBSAN:array-index-out-of-bounds in dbAdjTree Syzkaller reported the following issue: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2867:6 index 196694 is out of range for type 's8[1365]' (aka 'signed char[1365]') CPU: 1 PID: 109 Comm: jfsCommit Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/04/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:217 [inline] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x11c/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:348 dbAdjTree+0x474/0x4f0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2867 dbJoin+0x210/0x2d0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2834 dbFreeBits+0x4eb/0xda0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2331 dbFreeDmap fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2080 [inline] dbFree+0x343/0x650 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:402 txFreeMap+0x798/0xd50 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2534 txUpdateMap+0x342/0x9e0 txLazyCommit fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2664 [inline] jfs_lazycommit+0x47a/0xb70 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2732 kthread+0x2d3/0x370 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x48/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304 </TASK> ================================================================================ Kernel panic - not syncing: UBSAN: panic_on_warn set ... CPU: 1 PID: 109 Comm: jfsCommit Not tainted 6.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 08/04/2023 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 panic+0x30f/0x770 kernel/panic.c:340 check_panic_on_warn+0x82/0xa0 kernel/panic.c:236 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:223 [inline] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x13c/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:348 dbAdjTree+0x474/0x4f0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2867 dbJoin+0x210/0x2d0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2834 dbFreeBits+0x4eb/0xda0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2331 dbFreeDmap fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2080 [inline] dbFree+0x343/0x650 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:402 txFreeMap+0x798/0xd50 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2534 txUpdateMap+0x342/0x9e0 txLazyCommit fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2664 [inline] jfs_lazycommit+0x47a/0xb70 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2732 kthread+0x2d3/0x370 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x48/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304 </TASK> Kernel Offset: disabled Rebooting in 86400 seconds.. The issue is caused when the value of lp becomes greater than CTLTREESIZE which is the max size of stree. Adding a simple check solves this issue. Dave: As the function returns a void, good error handling would require a more intrusive code reorganization, so I modified Osama's patch at use WARN_ON_ONCE for lack of a cleaner option. The patch is tested via syzbot. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: FS:JFS:UBSAN:array-index-out-of-bounds en dbAdjTree Syzkaller informó el siguiente problema: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds en fs/jfs /jfs_dmap.c:2867:6 el índice 196694 está fuera del rango para el tipo 's8[1365]' (también conocido como 'carácter firmado[1365]') CPU: 1 PID: 109 Comm: jfsCommit No contaminado 6.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Nombre del hardware: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/08/2023 Seguimiento de llamadas: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [en línea] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 ubsan_epilogue lib/ubsan.c:217 [en línea] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x11c/0x150 lib/ubsan.c:348 dbAdjTree+0x474/0x4f0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2867 dbJoin+0x210/0x2d0 fs/jfs/jfs _dmap.c: 2834 dbFreeBits+0x4eb/0xda0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2331 dbFreeDmap fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2080 [en línea] dbFree+0x343/0x650 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:402 txFreeMap+0x798/0xd50 fs/j fs /jfs_txnmgr.c:2534 txUpdateMap+0x342/0x9e0 txLazyCommit fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2664 [en línea] jfs_lazycommit+0x47a/0xb70 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2732 kthread+0x2d3/0x3 70 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x48/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:304 ============== ==================================================== ================ Pánico del kernel: no se sincroniza: UBSAN: pánico_on_warn configurado... CPU: 1 PID: 109 Comm: jfsCommit No contaminado 6.6.0-rc3-syzkaller #0 Hardware nombre: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 04/08/2023 Seguimiento de llamadas: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [en línea] dump_stack_lvl+0x1e7/0x2d0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 pánico+0x30f /0x770 Kernel/Panic.C: 340 check_panic_on_warn+0x82/0xa0 kernel/Panic.c: 236 UBSAN_EPILOGO LIB/UBSAN.C: 223 [Inline] __ubsan_handle_out_of_bounds+0x13c/0x150 LIB/UB/UBSAN.C: 4F0 FS /jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2867 dbJoin+0x210/0x2d0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2834 dbFreeBits+0x4eb/0xda0 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2331 dbFreeDmap fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:2080 [en línea] dbFree +0x343/0x650 fs/jfs/jfs_dmap.c:402 txFreeMap+0x798/0xd50 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2534 txUpdateMap+0x342/0x9e0 txLazyCommit fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2664 [en línea] jf s_lazycommit+0x47a/0xb70 fs/jfs/jfs_txnmgr.c:2732 kthread+0x2d3/0x370 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x48/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64. S:304 Desplazamiento del kernel: deshabilitado Reinicio en 86400 segundos. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3e95c6850661c77e6dab079d9b5374a618ebb15 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98f9537fe61b8382b3cc5dd97347531698517c56 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de34de6e57bbbc868e4fcf9e98c76b3587cabb0b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6fe8b702125aeee6ce83f20092a2341446704e7b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42f433785f108893de0dd5260bafb85d7d51db03 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a44065dd604972ec1fbcccbdc4a70d266a89cdd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59342822276f753e49d27ef5eebffbba990572b9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9862ec7ac1cbc6eb5ee4a045b5d5b8edb •