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CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: smbus: fix NULL function pointer dereference Baruch reported an OOPS when using the designware controller as target only. Target-only modes break the assumption of one transfer function always being available. Fix this by always checking the pointer in __i2c_transfer. [wsa: dropped the simplification in core-smbus to avoid theoretical regressions] En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: i2c: smbus: corrige la desreferencia del puntero de función NULL. Baruch informó de un OOPS al usar el controlador de designware como destino únicamente. Los modos de solo objetivo rompen el supuesto de que siempre hay una función de transferencia disponible. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63453b59e41173241c4efe9335815f6432fa8586 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40f1d79f07b49c8a64a861706e5163f2db4bd95d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad3c3ac7a03be3697114f781193dd3e9d97e6e23 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5fd72404587d7db4acb2d241fd8c387afb0a7aec https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a09eae9a7db597fe0c1fc91636205b4a25d2620 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e75e222d397c6752b229ed72fc4644c8c36ecde https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3425674ff68dc521c57c6eabad0cbd20a027d85 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/357c64ef1ef39b1e7cd91ab6bdd304d04 • CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bounds: Use the right number of bits for power-of-two CONFIG_NR_CPUS bits_per() rounds up to the next power of two when passed a power of two. This causes crashes on some machines and configurations. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: límites: utilice el número correcto de bits para potencia de dos CONFIG_NR_CPUS bits_per() redondea a la siguiente potencia de dos cuando se pasa una potencia de dos. Esto provoca fallos en algunas máquinas y configuraciones. A vulnerability was found in the Linux kernel related to the improper handling of power-of-two values for `CONFIG_NR_CPUS`. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d6077e0d38b4953c863d0db4a5b3f41d21e0d546 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/83a2275f9d3230c761014b1467888b1ef469be74 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2a7a81088c6abe778b0a93a7eeb79487a943818 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/428ca0000f0abd5c99354c52a36becf2b815ca21 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b46c822f8b555b9513df44047b0e72c06720df62 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf778fff03be1ee88c49b72959650147573c3301 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2e1b090a590d41abe647eadb6bf2a5dc47b63ab https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d34a516f2635090d36a306f84573e8de3 •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 9EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: Avoid infinite loop trying to resize local TT If the MTU of one of an attached interface becomes too small to transmit the local translation table then it must be resized to fit inside all fragments (when enabled) or a single packet. But if the MTU becomes too low to transmit even the header + the VLAN specific part then the resizing of the local TT will never succeed. This can for example happen when the usable space is 110 bytes and 11 VLANs are on top of batman-adv. In this case, at least 116 byte would be needed. There will just be an endless spam of batman_adv: batadv0: Forced to purge local tt entries to fit new maximum fragment MTU (110) in the log but the function will never finish. Problem here is that the timeout will be halved all the time and will then stagnate at 0 and therefore never be able to reduce the table even more. There are other scenarios possible with a similar result. The number of BATADV_TT_CLIENT_NOPURGE entries in the local TT can for example be too high to fit inside a packet. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a19d3d85e1b854e4a483a55d740a42458085560d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5eaeaa72113865661568002bb57d611492451d3e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04720ea2e6c64459a90ca28570ea78335eccd924 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3ddf6904073990492454b1dd1c10a24be8c74c6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70a8be9dc2fb65d67f8c1e0c88c587e08e2e575d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87b6af1a7683e021710c08fc0551fc078346032f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3fe79b2c83461edbbf86ed8a6f3924820ff89259 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ca2a5fb54ea2cc43edea614207fcede5 • CWE-835: Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio_net: Do not send RSS key if it is not supported There is a bug when setting the RSS options in virtio_net that can break the whole machine, getting the kernel into an infinite loop. Running the following command in any QEMU virtual machine with virtionet will reproduce this problem: # ethtool -X eth0 hfunc toeplitz This is how the problem happens: 1) ethtool_set_rxfh() calls virtnet_set_rxfh() 2) virtnet_set_rxfh() calls virtnet_commit_rss_command() 3) virtnet_commit_rss_command() populates 4 entries for the rss scatter-gather 4) Since the command above does not have a key, then the last scatter-gatter entry will be zeroed, since rss_key_size == 0. sg_buf_size = vi->rss_key_size; 5) This buffer is passed to qemu, but qemu is not happy with a buffer with zero length, and do the following in virtqueue_map_desc() (QEMU function): if (!sz) { virtio_error(vdev, "virtio: zero sized buffers are not allowed"); 6) virtio_error() (also QEMU function) set the device as broken vdev->broken = true; 7) Qemu bails out, and do not repond this crazy kernel. 8) The kernel is waiting for the response to come back (function virtnet_send_command()) 9) The kernel is waiting doing the following : while (!virtqueue_get_buf(vi->cvq, &tmp) && !virtqueue_is_broken(vi->cvq)) cpu_relax(); 10) None of the following functions above is true, thus, the kernel loops here forever. Keeping in mind that virtqueue_is_broken() does not look at the qemu `vdev->broken`, so, it never realizes that the vitio is broken at QEMU side. Fix it by not sending RSS commands if the feature is not available in the device. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7114b1249fa3b5f3a434606ba4cc89c4a27d618 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/539a2b995a4ed93125cb0efae0f793b00ab2158b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43a71c1b4b3a6d4db857b1435d271540279fc7de https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28e9a64638cd16bc1ecac9ff74ffeacb9fb652de https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/059a49aa2e25c58f90b50151f109dd3c4cdb3a47 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: tlb: Fix TLBI RANGE operand KVM/arm64 relies on TLBI RANGE feature to flush TLBs when the dirty pages are collected by VMM and the page table entries become write protected during live migration. Unfortunately, the operand passed to the TLBI RANGE instruction isn't correctly sorted out due to the commit 117940aa6e5f ("KVM: arm64: Define kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range()"). It leads to crash on the destination VM after live migration because TLBs aren't flushed completely and some of the dirty pages are missed. For example, I have a VM where 8GB memory is assigned, starting from 0x40000000 (1GB). Note that the host has 4KB as the base page size. In the middile of migration, kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range() is executed to flush TLBs. It passes MAX_TLBI_RANGE_PAGES as the argument to __kvm_tlb_flush_vmid_range() and __flush_s2_tlb_range_op(). SCALE#3 and NUM#31, corresponding to MAX_TLBI_RANGE_PAGES, isn't supported by __TLBI_RANGE_NUM(). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/117940aa6e5f8308f1529e1313660980f1dae771 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac4ad513de4fba18b4ac0ace132777d0910e8cfa https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/944db7b536baaf49d7e576af36a94f4719552b07 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3ba51ab24fddef79fc212f9840de54db8fd1685 •