CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2024-49858 – efistub/tpm: Use ACPI reclaim memory for event log to avoid corruption
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-49858
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: efistub/tpm: Use ACPI reclaim memory for event log to avoid corruption The TPM event log table is a Linux specific construct, where the data produced by the GetEventLog() boot service is cached in memory, and passed on to the OS using an EFI configuration table. The use of EFI_LOADER_DATA here results in the region being left unreserved in the E820 memory map constructed by the EFI stub, and this is the memory description that is passed on to the incoming kernel by kexec, which is therefore unaware that the region should be reserved. Even though the utility of the TPM2 event log after a kexec is questionable, any corruption might send the parsing code off into the weeds and crash the kernel. So let's use EFI_ACPI_RECLAIM_MEMORY instead, which is always treated as reserved by the E820 conversion logic. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f76b69ab9cf04358266e3cea5748c0c2791fbb08 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11690d7e76842f29b60fbb5b35bc97d206ea0e83 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b22c038fb2757c652642933de5664da471f8cb7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/19fd2f2c5fb36b61506d3208474bfd8fdf1cada3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38d9b07d99b789efb6d8dda21f1aaad636c38993 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e6871a632a99d9b9e2ce3a7847acabe99e5a26e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77d48d39e99170b528e4f2e9fc5d1d64cdedd386 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 9EXPL: 0CVE-2024-47757 – nilfs2: fix potential oob read in nilfs_btree_check_delete()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-47757
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nilfs2: fix potential oob read in nilfs_btree_check_delete() The function nilfs_btree_check_delete(), which checks whether degeneration to direct mapping occurs before deleting a b-tree entry, causes memory access outside the block buffer when retrieving the maximum key if the root node has no entries. This does not usually happen because b-tree mappings with 0 child nodes are never created by mkfs.nilfs2 or nilfs2 itself. However, it can happen if the b-tree root node read from a device is configured that way, so fix this potential issue by adding a check for that case. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/17c76b0104e4a6513983777e1a17e0297a12b0c4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3a9859767c7aea758976f5523903d247e585129 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed76d381dae125b81d09934e365391a656249da8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d20674f31626e0596ae4c1d9401dfb6739b81b58 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c4f8554996e8ada3be872dfb8f60e93bcf15fb27 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8abfda768b9f33630cfbc4af6c4214f1e5681b0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/257f9e5185eb6de83377caea686c306e22e871f2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a33e967b681e088a125b979975c93e345 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 9EXPL: 0CVE-2024-47749 – RDMA/cxgb4: Added NULL check for lookup_atid
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-47749
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/cxgb4: Added NULL check for lookup_atid The lookup_atid() function can return NULL if the ATID is invalid or does not exist in the identifier table, which could lead to dereferencing a null pointer without a check in the `act_establish()` and `act_open_rpl()` functions. Add a NULL check to prevent null pointer dereferencing. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfdda9d764362ab77b11a410bb928400e6520d57 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b12e25d91c7f97958341538c7dc63ee49d01548f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e1fe68d695af367506ea3c794c5969630f21697 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd598ac57dcae796cb58551074660c39b43fb155 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b11318dc8a1ec565300bb1a9073095af817cc508 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39cb9f39913566ec5865581135f3e8123ad1aee1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d50ae281a1712b9b2ca72830a96b8f11882358d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54aaa3ed40972511e423b604324b88142 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0CVE-2024-47745 – mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-47745
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: call the security_mmap_file() LSM hook in remap_file_pages() The remap_file_pages syscall handler calls do_mmap() directly, which doesn't contain the LSM security check. And if the process has called personality(READ_IMPLIES_EXEC) before and remap_file_pages() is called for RW pages, this will actually result in remapping the pages to RWX, bypassing a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. So we should check prot by security_mmap_file LSM hook in the remap_file_pages syscall handler before do_mmap() is called. Otherwise, it potentially permits an attacker to bypass a W^X policy enforced by SELinux. The bypass is similar to CVE-2016-10044, which bypass the same thing via AIO and can be found in [1]. The PoC: $ cat > test.c int main(void) { size_t pagesz = sysconf(_SC_PAGE_SIZE); int mfd = syscall(SYS_memfd_create, "test", 0); const char *buf = mmap(NULL, 4 * pagesz, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_SHARED, mfd, 0); unsigned int old = syscall(SYS_personality, 0xffffffff); syscall(SYS_personality, READ_IMPLIES_EXEC | old); syscall(SYS_remap_file_pages, buf, pagesz, 0, 2, 0); syscall(SYS_personality, old); // show the RWX page exists even if W^X policy is enforced int fd = open("/proc/self/maps", O_RDONLY); unsigned char buf2[1024]; while (1) { int ret = read(fd, buf2, 1024); if (ret <= 0) break; write(1, buf2, ret); } close(fd); } $ gcc test.c -o test $ ./test | grep rwx 7f1836c34000-7f1836c35000 rwxs 00002000 00:01 2050 /memfd:test (deleted) [PM: subject line tweaks] • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f910dbf2f2a4a7820ba4bac7b280f7108aa05b1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49d3a4ad57c57227c3b0fd6cd4188b2a5ebd6178 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3393fddbfa947c8e1fdcc4509226905ffffd8b89 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce14f38d6ee9e88e37ec28427b4b93a7c33c70d3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea7e2d5e49c05e5db1922387b09ca74aa40f46e2 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 9EXPL: 0CVE-2024-47742 – firmware_loader: Block path traversal
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-47742
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware_loader: Block path traversal Most firmware names are hardcoded strings, or are constructed from fairly constrained format strings where the dynamic parts are just some hex numbers or such. However, there are a couple codepaths in the kernel where firmware file names contain string components that are passed through from a device or semi-privileged userspace; the ones I could find (not counting interfaces that require root privileges) are: - lpfc_sli4_request_firmware_update() seems to construct the firmware filename from "ModelName", a string that was previously parsed out of some descriptor ("Vital Product Data") in lpfc_fill_vpd() - nfp_net_fw_find() seems to construct a firmware filename from a model name coming from nfp_hwinfo_lookup(pf->hwinfo, "nffw.partno"), which I think parses some descriptor that was read from the device. (But this case likely isn't exploitable because the format string looks like "netronome/nic_%s", and there shouldn't be any *folders* starting with "netronome/nic_". The previous case was different because there, the "%s" is *at the start* of the format string.) - module_flash_fw_schedule() is reachable from the ETHTOOL_MSG_MODULE_FW_FLASH_ACT netlink command, which is marked as GENL_UNS_ADMIN_PERM (meaning CAP_NET_ADMIN inside a user namespace is enough to pass the privilege check), and takes a userspace-provided firmware name. (But I think to reach this case, you need to have CAP_NET_ADMIN over a network namespace that a special kind of ethernet device is mapped into, so I think this is not a viable attack path in practice.) Fix it by rejecting any firmware names containing ".." path components. For what it's worth, I went looking and haven't found any USB device drivers that use the firmware loader dangerously. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abb139e75c2cdbb955e840d6331cb5863e409d0e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1768e5535d3ded59f888637016e6f821f4e069f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b1ca33ebd05b3acef5b976c04e5e791af93ce1b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c30558e6c5c9ad6c86459d9acce1520ceeab9ea6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a77fc4acfd49fc6076e565445b2bc5fdc3244da4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d2411f4edcb649eaf232160db459bb4770b5251 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7420c1bf7fc784e587b87329cc6dfa3dca537aa4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28f1cd94d3f1092728fb775a0fe26c5f1 •