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CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: sr: fix possible use-after-free and null-ptr-deref The pernet operations structure for the subsystem must be registered before registering the generic netlink family. En el kernel de Linux se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: ipv6:sr: corrige posible use-after-free y null-ptr-deref La estructura de operaciones pernet para el subsystem debe registrarse antes de registrar la familia netlink genérica. A use-after-free flaw was found in the Linux kernel’s IPv6 protocol functionality. This flaw allows a local user to potentially crash the system. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/915d7e5e5930b4f01d0971d93b9b25ed17d221aa https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/953f42934533c151f440cd32390044d2396b87aa https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/82831e3ff76ef09fb184eb93b79a3eb3fb284f1d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65c38f23d10ff79feea1e5d50b76dc7af383c1e6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/91b020aaa1e59bfb669d34c968e3db3d5416bcee https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8391b9b651cfdf80ab0f1dc4a489f9d67386e197 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e02973dbc6a91e40aa4f5d87b8c47446fbfce44 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/02b08db594e8218cfbc0e4680d4331b45 • CWE-416: Use After Free CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: devlink: fix possible use-after-free and memory leaks in devlink_init() The pernet operations structure for the subsystem must be registered before registering the generic netlink family. Make an unregister in case of unsuccessful registration. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: devlink: corrige posibles pérdidas de memoria y use-after-free en devlink_init() La estructura de operaciones pernet para el subSYSTEM debe registrarse antes de registrar la familia netlink genérica. Realice una cancelación del registro en caso de que el registro no sea exitoso. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/687125b5799cd5120437fa455cfccbe8537916ff https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/919092bd5482b7070ae66d1daef73b600738f3a2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e91d3561e28d7665f4f837880501dc8755f635a9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/def689fc26b9a9622d2e2cb0c4933dd3b1c8071c •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arp: Prevent overflow in arp_req_get(). syzkaller reported an overflown write in arp_req_get(). [0] When ioctl(SIOCGARP) is issued, arp_req_get() looks up an neighbour entry and copies neigh->ha to struct arpreq.arp_ha.sa_data. The arp_ha here is struct sockaddr, not struct sockaddr_storage, so the sa_data buffer is just 14 bytes. In the splat below, 2 bytes are overflown to the next int field, arp_flags. We initialise the field just after the memcpy(), so it's not a problem. However, when dev->addr_len is greater than 22 (e.g. MAX_ADDR_LEN), arp_netmask is overwritten, which could be set as htonl(0xFFFFFFFFUL) in arp_ioctl() before calling arp_req_get(). To avoid the overflow, let's limit the max length of memcpy(). Note that commit b5f0de6df6dc ("net: dev: Convert sa_data to flexible array in struct sockaddr") just silenced syzkaller. [0]: memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 16) of single field "r->arp_ha.sa_data" at net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 (size 14) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 144638 at net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 arp_req_get+0x411/0x4a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 144638 Comm: syz-executor.4 Not tainted 6.1.74 #31 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-debian-1.16.0-5 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:arp_req_get+0x411/0x4a0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1128 Code: fd ff ff e8 41 42 de fb b9 0e 00 00 00 4c 89 fe 48 c7 c2 20 6d ab 87 48 c7 c7 80 6d ab 87 c6 05 25 af 72 04 01 e8 5f 8d ad fb <0f> 0b e9 6c fd ff ff e8 13 42 de fb be 03 00 00 00 4c 89 e7 e8 a6 RSP: 0018:ffffc900050b7998 EFLAGS: 00010286 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88803a815000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8641a44a RDI: 0000000000000001 RBP: ffffc900050b7a98 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 203a7970636d656d R12: ffff888039c54000 R13: 1ffff92000a16f37 R14: ffff88803a815084 R15: 0000000000000010 FS: 00007f172bf306c0(0000) GS:ffff88805aa00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f172b3569f0 CR3: 0000000057f12005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> arp_ioctl+0x33f/0x4b0 net/ipv4/arp.c:1261 inet_ioctl+0x314/0x3a0 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:981 sock_do_ioctl+0xdf/0x260 net/socket.c:1204 sock_ioctl+0x3ef/0x650 net/socket.c:1321 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:870 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:856 [inline] __x64_sys_ioctl+0x18e/0x220 fs/ioctl.c:856 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:51 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x37/0x90 arch/x86/entry/common.c:81 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x64/0xce RIP: 0033:0x7f172b262b8d Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f172bf300b8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f172b3abf80 RCX: 00007f172b262b8d RDX: 0000000020000000 RSI: 0000000000008954 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f172b2d3493 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00007f172b3abf80 R15: 00007f172bf10000 </TASK> En el kernel de Linux se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: arp: Evita el desbordamiento en arp_req_get(). syzkaller informó una escritura desbordada en arp_req_get(). [0] Cuando se emite ioctl(SIOCGARP), arp_req_get() busca una entrada vecina y copia neigh-&gt;ha para estructurar arpreq.arp_ha.sa_data. El arp_ha aquí es struct sockaddr, no struct sockaddr_storage, por lo que el búfer sa_data tiene solo 14 bytes. En el siguiente símbolo, se desbordan 2 bytes al siguiente campo int, arp_flags. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dbc9b22d0ed319b4e29034ce0a3fe32a3ee2c587 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97eaa2955db4120ce6ec2ef123e860bc32232c50 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f119f2325ba70cbfdec701000dcad4d88805d5b0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3f2c083cb575d80a7627baf3339e78fedccbb91 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ab0d6f8289ba8402ca95a9fc61a34909d5e1f3a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7d6027790acea24446ddd6632d394096c0f4667 https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/ • CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: implement lockless setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF) syzbot reported a lockdep violation [1] involving af_unix support of SO_PEEK_OFF. Since SO_PEEK_OFF is inherently not thread safe (it uses a per-socket sk_peek_off field), there is really no point to enforce a pointless thread safety in the kernel. After this patch : - setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF) no longer acquires the socket lock. - skb_consume_udp() no longer has to acquire the socket lock. - af_unix no longer needs a special version of sk_set_peek_off(), because it does not lock u->iolock anymore. As a followup, we could replace prot->set_peek_off to be a boolean and avoid an indirect call, since we always use sk_set_peek_off(). [1] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0 Not tainted syz-executor.2/30025 is trying to acquire lock: ffff8880765e7d80 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789 but task is already holding lock: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline] ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [inline] ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193 which lock already depends on the new lock. the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is: -> #1 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 lock_sock_nested+0x48/0x100 net/core/sock.c:3524 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline] __unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x1275/0x12c0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2415 sock_recvmsg_nosec+0x18e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:1046 ____sys_recvmsg+0x3c0/0x470 net/socket.c:2801 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [inline] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [inline] __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3041 [inline] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [inline] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 -> #0 (&u->iolock){+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline] validate_chain+0x18ca/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline] __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752 unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789 sk_setsockopt+0x207e/0x3360 do_sock_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x720 net/socket.c:2307 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x250 net/socket.c:2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 other info that might help us debug this: Possible unsafe locking scenario: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX); lock(&u->iolock); lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX); lock(&u->iolock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 lock held by syz-executor.2/30025: #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [inline] #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [inline] #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193 stack backtrace: CPU: 0 PID: 30025 Comm: syz-executor.2 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0 Hardware name: Google Google C ---truncated--- En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: net: implementar lockless setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF) syzbot informó una violación de lockdep [1] que involucraba el soporte de SO_PEEK_OFF por parte de af_unix. Dado que SO_PEEK_OFF no es inherentemente seguro para subprocesos (utiliza un campo sk_peek_off por socket), realmente no tiene sentido imponer una seguridad de subprocesos inútil en el kernel. Después de este parche: - setsockopt(SO_PEEK_OFF) ya no adquiere el bloqueo del socket. - skb_consume_udp() ya no tiene que adquirir el bloqueo del socket. - af_unix ya no necesita una versión especial de sk_set_peek_off(), porque ya no bloquea u-&gt;iolock. Como seguimiento, podríamos reemplazar prot-&gt;set_peek_off para que sea booleano y evitar una llamada indirecta, ya que siempre usamos sk_set_peek_off(). [1] ADVERTENCIA: posible dependencia de bloqueo circular detectada 6.8.0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0 No contaminado syz-executor.2/30025 está intentando adquirir el bloqueo: ffff8880765e7d80 (&amp;u-&gt;iolock){+.+. }-{3:3}, en: unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789 pero la tarea ya mantiene el bloqueo: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, en: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [en línea] ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, en: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [en línea] ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, en: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193 cuyo bloqueo ya depende del nuevo bloqueo. la cadena de dependencia existente (en orden inverso) es: -&gt; #1 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}: lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 lock_sock_nested+0x48 /0x100 net/core/sock.c:3524 lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1691 [en línea] __unix_dgram_recvmsg+0x1275/0x12c0 net/unix/af_unix.c:2415 sock_recvmsg_nosec+0x18e/0x1d0 net/socket.c:1046 ____sys_recvmsg+0x3c0/0x470 net/socket.c:2801 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2845 [en línea] do_recvmmsg+0x474/0xae0 net/socket.c:2939 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3018 [en línea] __do_sy s_recvmmsg red/socket .c:3041 [en línea] __se_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:3034 [en línea] __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x199/0x250 net/socket.c:3034 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 Entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 -&gt; #0 (&amp;u-&gt;iolock) {+.+.}-{3:3}: check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [en línea] check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [en línea] validar_chain+0x18ca/0x58e0 kernel/locking/lockdep. c:3869 __lock_acquire+0x1345/0x1fd0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137 lock_acquire+0x1e3/0x530 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [en línea] __mutex_lock+0x136/0xd70 kernel /locking/mutex.c:752 unix_set_peek_off+0x26/0xa0 net/unix/af_unix.c:789 sk_setsockopt+0x207e/0x3360 do_sock_setsockopt+0x2fb/0x720 net/socket.c:2307 __sys_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x250 net/ enchufe.c: 2334 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2343 [en línea] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2340 [en línea] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xb5/0xd0 net/socket.c:2340 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entrada_SYSCALL_6 4_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 otra información que podría ayudar depuremos esto: Posible escenario de bloqueo inseguro: CPU0 CPU1 ---- ---- lock(sk_lock-AF_UNIX); bloquear(&amp;u-&gt;iolock); bloquear(sk_lock-AF_UNIX); bloquear(&amp;u-&gt;iolock); *** DEADLOCK *** 1 bloqueo retenido por syz-executor.2/30025: #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, en: lock_sock include/net/sock. h:1691 [en línea] #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock-AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, en: sockopt_lock_sock net/core/sock.c:1060 [en línea] #0: ffff8880765e7930 (sk_lock- AF_UNIX){+.+.}-{0:0}, en: sk_setsockopt+0xe52/0x3360 net/core/sock.c:1193 seguimiento de pila: CPU: 0 PID: 30025 Comm: syz-executor.2 No contaminado 6.8 .0-rc4-syzkaller-00267-g0f1dd5e91e2b #0 Nombre del hardware: Google Google C ---truncado--- • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/859051dd165ec6cc915f0f2114699021144fd249 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/897f75e2cde8a5f9f7529b55249af1fa4248c83b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56667da7399eb19af857e30f41bea89aa6fa812c •

CVSS: 5.3EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf, sockmap: Fix NULL pointer dereference in sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() syzbot reported the following NULL pointer dereference issue [1]: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [...] RIP: 0010:0x0 [...] Call Trace: <TASK> sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x232/0x340 net/core/skmsg.c:1230 unix_stream_sendmsg+0x9b4/0x1230 net/unix/af_unix.c:2293 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [inline] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net/socket.c:2667 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 If sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() and sk_psock_stop_verdict() are called concurrently, psock->saved_data_ready can be NULL, causing the above issue. This patch fixes this issue by calling the appropriate data ready function using the sk_psock_data_ready() helper and protecting it from concurrency with sk->sk_callback_lock. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: bpf, sockmap: corrigió la desreferencia del puntero NULL en sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() syzbot informó el siguiente problema de desreferencia del puntero NULL [1]: ERROR: desreferencia del puntero NULL del kernel, dirección: 0000000000000000 [... ] RIP: 0010:0x0 [...] Seguimiento de llamadas: sk_psock_verdict_data_ready+0x232/0x340 net/core/skmsg.c:1230 unix_stream_sendmsg+0x9b4/0x1230 net/unix/af_unix.c:2293 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket. c:730 [en línea] __sock_sendmsg+0x221/0x270 net/socket.c:745 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2584 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2638 [en línea] __sys_sendmsg+0x2b0/0x3a0 net /socket. c:2667 do_syscall_64+0xf9/0x240 Entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6f/0x77 Si sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() y sk_psock_stop_verdict() se llaman simultáneamente, psock-&gt;saved_data_ready puede ser NULL, causando el problema anterior. Este parche soluciona este problema llamando a la función de preparación de datos adecuada utilizando el asistente sk_psock_data_ready() y protegiéndola de la concurrencia con sk-&gt;sk_callback_lock. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd628fc697ee59b76bd3877c4bd13f07ccc3776f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6df7f764cd3cf5a03a4a47b23be47e57e41fcd85 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3cbd7c571446a876aefd8320500300b2c951c58 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4588b13abcbd561ec67f5b3c1cb2eff690990a54 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b099ed46dcaf1403c531ff02c3d7400fa37fa26 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d61608a4e394f23e0dca099df9eb8e555453d949 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cd12c6065dfcdeba10f49949bffcf383b3952d8 • CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference •