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CVSS: 0EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hsr: remove WARN_ONCE() in send_hsr_supervision_frame() Syzkaller reported [1] hitting a warning after failing to allocate resources for skb in hsr_init_skb(). Since a WARN_ONCE() call will not help much in this case, it might be prudent to switch to netdev_warn_once(). At the very least it will suppress syzkaller reports such as [1]. Just in case, use netdev_warn_once() in send_prp_supervision_frame() for similar reasons. [1] HSR: Could not send supervision frame WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 85 at net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294 send_hsr_supervision_frame+0x60a/0x810 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294 RIP: 0010:send_hsr_supervision_frame+0x60a/0x810 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294 ... Call Trace: <IRQ> hsr_announce+0x114/0x370 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:382 call_timer_fn+0x193/0x590 kernel/time/timer.c:1700 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1751 [inline] __run_timers+0x764/0xb20 kernel/time/timer.c:2022 run_timer_softirq+0x58/0xd0 kernel/time/timer.c:2035 __do_softirq+0x21a/0x8de kernel/softirq.c:553 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:427 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:632 [inline] irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:644 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x95/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1076 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:649 ... This issue is also found in older kernels (at least up to 5.10). En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: net: hsr: eliminar WARN_ONCE() en send_hsr_supervision_frame() Syzkaller informó [1] que apareció una advertencia después de no poder asignar recursos para skb en hsr_init_skb(). Dado que una llamada WARN_ONCE() no ayudará mucho en este caso, podría ser prudente cambiar a netdev_warn_once(). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/121c33b07b3127f501b366bc23d2a590e2f2b8ef https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d8011a878fdf96123bc0d6a12e2fe7ced5fddfb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de769423b2f053182a41317c4db5a927e90622a0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56440799fc4621c279df16176f83a995d056023a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/923dea2a7ea9e1ef5ac4031fba461c1cc92e32b8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/547545e50c913861219947ce490c68a1776b9b51 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37e8c97e539015637cb920d3e6f1e404f707a06e https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/ •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: parisc: Fix random data corruption from exception handler The current exception handler implementation, which assists when accessing user space memory, may exhibit random data corruption if the compiler decides to use a different register than the specified register %r29 (defined in ASM_EXCEPTIONTABLE_REG) for the error code. If the compiler choose another register, the fault handler will nevertheless store -EFAULT into %r29 and thus trash whatever this register is used for. Looking at the assembly I found that this happens sometimes in emulate_ldd(). To solve the issue, the easiest solution would be if it somehow is possible to tell the fault handler which register is used to hold the error code. Using %0 or %1 in the inline assembly is not posssible as it will show up as e.g. %r29 (with the "%r" prefix), which the GNU assembler can not convert to an integer. This patch takes another, better and more flexible approach: We extend the __ex_table (which is out of the execution path) by one 32-word. In this word we tell the compiler to insert the assembler instruction "or %r0,%r0,%reg", where %reg references the register which the compiler choosed for the error return code. In case of an access failure, the fault handler finds the __ex_table entry and can examine the opcode. The used register is encoded in the lowest 5 bits, and the fault handler can then store -EFAULT into this register. Since we extend the __ex_table to 3 words we can't use the BUILDTIME_TABLE_SORT config option any longer. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23027309b099ffc4efca5477009a11dccbdae592 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa69a8063f8b27f3c7434a0d4f464a76a62f24d2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce31d79aa1f13a2345791f84935281a2c194e003 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b1d72395635af45410b66cc4c4ab37a12c4a831 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: parisc: BTLB: Fix crash when setting up BTLB at CPU bringup When using hotplug and bringing up a 32-bit CPU, ask the firmware about the BTLB information to set up the static (block) TLB entries. For that write access to the static btlb_info struct is needed, but since it is marked __ro_after_init the kernel segfaults with missing write permissions. Fix the crash by dropping the __ro_after_init annotation. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: parisc: BTLB: soluciona el problema al configurar BTLB al iniciar la CPU. Al usar hotplug y activar una CPU de 32 bits, solicite al firmware la información de BTLB para configurar la estática ( bloque) Entradas TLB. Para eso se necesita acceso de escritura a la estructura estática btlb_info, pero como está marcada como __ro_after_init, el kernel falla por defecto y faltan permisos de escritura. Solucione el problema eliminando la anotación __ro_after_init. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5ef93d02d6c9cc3a14e7348481c9e41a528caa1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54944f45470af5965fb9c28cf962ec30f38a8f5b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa52be55276614d33f22fbe7da36c40d6432d10b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/913b9d443a0180cf0de3548f1ab3149378998486 •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix double-free of blocks due to wrong extents moved_len In ext4_move_extents(), moved_len is only updated when all moves are successfully executed, and only discards orig_inode and donor_inode preallocations when moved_len is not zero. When the loop fails to exit after successfully moving some extents, moved_len is not updated and remains at 0, so it does not discard the preallocations. If the moved extents overlap with the preallocated extents, the overlapped extents are freed twice in ext4_mb_release_inode_pa() and ext4_process_freed_data() (as described in commit 94d7c16cbbbd ("ext4: Fix double-free of blocks with EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT")), and bb_free is incremented twice. Hence when trim is executed, a zero-division bug is triggered in mb_update_avg_fragment_size() because bb_free is not zero and bb_fragments is zero. Therefore, update move_len after each extent move to avoid the issue. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: ext4: corrige la doble liberación de bloques debido a extensiones incorrectas. moving_len En ext4_move_extents(), move_len solo se actualiza cuando todos los movimientos se ejecutan exitosamente y solo descarta las preasignaciones de orig_inode y donante_inode cuando se mueve_len no es cero. Cuando el bucle no sale después de mover con éxito algunas extensiones, moving_len no se actualiza y permanece en 0, por lo que no descarta las asignaciones previas. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fcf6b1b729bcd23f2b49a84fb33ffbb44712ee6a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4fbb89d722cbb16beaaea234b7230faaaf68c71 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/afbcad9ae7d6d11608399188f03a837451b6b3a1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d033a555d9a1cf53dbf3301af7199cc4a4c8f537 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/afba9d11320dad5ce222ac8964caf64b7b4bedb1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/185eab30486ba3e7bf8b9c2e049c79a06ffd2bc1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2883940b19c38d5884c8626483811acf4d7e148f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/559ddacb90da1d8786dd8ec4fd76bbfa4 • CWE-415: Double Free •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing/timerlat: Move hrtimer_init to timerlat_fd open() Currently, the timerlat's hrtimer is initialized at the first read of timerlat_fd, and destroyed at close(). It works, but it causes an error if the user program open() and close() the file without reading. Here's an example: # echo NO_OSNOISE_WORKLOAD > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/osnoise/options # echo timerlat > /sys/kernel/debug/tracing/current_tracer # cat <<EOF > ./timerlat_load.py # !/usr/bin/env python3 timerlat_fd = open("/sys/kernel/tracing/osnoise/per_cpu/cpu0/timerlat_fd", 'r') timerlat_fd.close(); EOF # ./taskset -c 0 . • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e88ed227f639ebcb31ed4e5b88756b47d904584b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f703935fdb559642d85b2088442ee55a557ae6d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2354d29986ebd138f89c2b73fecf8237e0a4ad6b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1389358bb008e7625942846e9f03554319b7fecc •