CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42271 – net/iucv: fix use after free in iucv_sock_close()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42271
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: fix use after free in iucv_sock_close() iucv_sever_path() is called from process context and from bh context. iucv->path is used as indicator whether somebody else is taking care of severing the path (or it is already removed / never existed). This needs to be done with atomic compare and swap, otherwise there is a small window where iucv_sock_close() will try to work with a path that has already been severed and freed by iucv_callback_connrej() called by iucv_tasklet_fn(). Example: [452744.123844] Call Trace: [452744.123845] ([<0000001e87f03880>] 0x1e87f03880) [452744.123966] [<00000000d593001e>] iucv_path_sever+0x96/0x138 [452744.124330] [<000003ff801ddbca>] iucv_sever_path+0xc2/0xd0 [af_iucv] [452744.124336] [<000003ff801e01b6>] iucv_sock_close+0xa6/0x310 [af_iucv] [452744.124341] [<000003ff801e08cc>] iucv_sock_release+0x3c/0xd0 [af_iucv] [452744.124345] [<00000000d574794e>] __sock_release+0x5e/0xe8 [452744.124815] [<00000000d5747a0c>] sock_close+0x34/0x48 [452744.124820] [<00000000d5421642>] __fput+0xba/0x268 [452744.124826] [<00000000d51b382c>] task_work_run+0xbc/0xf0 [452744.124832] [<00000000d5145710>] do_notify_resume+0x88/0x90 [452744.124841] [<00000000d5978096>] system_call+0xe2/0x2c8 [452744.125319] Last Breaking-Event-Address: [452744.125321] [<00000000d5930018>] iucv_path_sever+0x90/0x138 [452744.125324] [452744.125325] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Note that bh_lock_sock() is not serializing the tasklet context against process context, because the check for sock_owned_by_user() and corresponding handling is missing. Ideas for a future clean-up patch: A) Correct usage of bh_lock_sock() in tasklet context, as described in Re-enqueue, if needed. This may require adding return values to the tasklet functions and thus changes to all users of iucv. B) Change iucv tasklet into worker and use only lock_sock() in af_iucv. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d316b9453523498246e9e19a659c423d4c5081e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84f40b46787ecb67c7ad08a5bb1376141fa10c01 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37652fbef9809411cea55ea5fa1a170e299efcd0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c65f72eec60a34ace031426e04e9aff8e5f04895 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac758e1f663fe9bc64f6b47212a2aa18697524f5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b424c9e44111c5a76f41c6b741f8d4c4179d876 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01437282fd3904810603f3dc98d2cac6b8b6fc84 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69620522c48ce8215e5eb55ffbab8cafe •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42270 – netfilter: iptables: Fix null-ptr-deref in iptable_nat_table_init().
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42270
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: iptables: Fix null-ptr-deref in iptable_nat_table_init(). We had a report that iptables-restore sometimes triggered null-ptr-deref at boot time. [0] The problem is that iptable_nat_table_init() is exposed to user space before the kernel fully initialises netns. In the small race window, a user could call iptable_nat_table_init() that accesses net_generic(net, iptable_nat_net_id), which is available only after registering iptable_nat_net_ops. Let's call register_pernet_subsys() before xt_register_template(). [0]: bpfilter: Loaded bpfilter_umh pid 11702 Started bpfilter BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000013 PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI CPU: 2 PID: 11879 Comm: iptables-restor Not tainted 6.1.92-99.174.amzn2023.x86_64 #1 Hardware name: Amazon EC2 c6i.4xlarge/, BIOS 1.0 10/16/2017 RIP: 0010:iptable_nat_table_init (net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:87 net/ipv4/netfilter/iptable_nat.c:121) iptable_nat Code: 10 4c 89 f6 48 89 ef e8 0b 19 bb ff 41 89 c4 85 c0 75 38 41 83 c7 01 49 83 c6 28 41 83 ff 04 75 dc 48 8b 44 24 08 48 8b 0c 24 <48> 89 08 4c 89 ef e8 a2 3b a2 cf 48 83 c4 10 44 89 e0 5b 5d 41 5c RSP: 0018:ffffbef902843cd0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000013 RBX: ffff9f4b052caa20 RCX: ffff9f4b20988d80 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000064 RDI: ffffffffc04201c0 RBP: ffff9f4b29394000 R08: ffff9f4b07f77258 R09: ffff9f4b07f77240 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff9f4b09635388 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff9f4b1a3c6c00 R14: ffff9f4b20988e20 R15: 0000000000000004 FS: 00007f6284340000(0000) GS:ffff9f51fe280000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000013 CR3: 00000001d10a6005 CR4: 00000000007706e0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <TASK> ? show_trace_log_lvl (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:259) ? show_trace_log_lvl (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:259) ? xt_find_table_lock (net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1259) ? __die_body.cold (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:478 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:420) ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fdacd57c79b79a03c7ca88f706ad9fb7b46831c1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b98ddb65fa1674b0e6b52de8af9103b63f51b643 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95590a4929027769af35b153645c0ab6fd22b29b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70014b73d7539fcbb6b4ff5f37368d7241d8e626 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08ed888b69a22647153fe2bec55b7cd0a46102cc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5830aa863981d43560748aa93589c0695191d95d •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42269 – netfilter: iptables: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in ip6table_nat_table_init().
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42269
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: iptables: Fix potential null-ptr-deref in ip6table_nat_table_init(). ip6table_nat_table_init() accesses net->gen->ptr[ip6table_nat_net_ops.id], but the function is exposed to user space before the entry is allocated via register_pernet_subsys(). Let's call register_pernet_subsys() before xt_register_template(). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fdacd57c79b79a03c7ca88f706ad9fb7b46831c1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/419ee6274c5153b89c4393c1946faa4c3cad4f9e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/91b6df6611b7edb28676c4f63f90c56c30d3e601 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e85b9b6a87be4cb3710082038b677e97f2389003 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87dba44e9471b79b255d0736858a897332db9226 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c22921df777de5606f1047b1345b8d22ef1c0b34 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42267 – riscv/mm: Add handling for VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV in mm_fault_error()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42267
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv/mm: Add handling for VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV in mm_fault_error() Handle VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV in the page fault path so that we correctly kill the process and we don't BUG() the kernel. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07037db5d479f90377c998259a4f9a469c404edf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59be4a167782d68e21068a761b90b01fadc09146 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20dbdebc5580cd472a310d56a6e252275ee4c864 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7ccf2ca772bfe33e2c53ef80fa20d2d87eb6144 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/917f598209f3f5e4ab175d5079d8aeb523e58b1f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4e7db757e2d7f4c407a007e92c98477eab215d2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c710050c47d45eb77b28c271cddefc5c785cb40 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42265 – protect the fetch of ->fd[fd] in do_dup2() from mispredictions
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42265
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: protect the fetch of ->fd[fd] in do_dup2() from mispredictions both callers have verified that fd is not greater than ->max_fds; however, misprediction might end up with tofree = fdt->fd[fd]; being speculatively executed. That's wrong for the same reasons why it's wrong in close_fd()/file_close_fd_locked(); the same solution applies - array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds) could differ from fd only in case of speculative execution on mispredicted path. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed42e8ff509d2a61c6642d1825032072dab79f26 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41a6c31df77bd8e050136b0a200b537da9e1084a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08775b3d6ed117cf4518754ec7300ee42b6a5368 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f480493550b6a23d3a65d095d6569d4a7f56a0f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5db999fff545b924b24c9afd368ef5c17279b176 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da72e783afd27d9f487836b2e6738146c0edd149 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1171ceccabfd596ca370c5d2cbb47d110c3f2fe1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8aa37bde1a7b645816cda8b80df4753ec •