Page 648 of 4523 results (0.015 seconds)

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix bug on in ext4_es_cache_extent as ext4_split_extent_at failed We got follow bug_on when run fsstress with injecting IO fault: [130747.323114] kernel BUG at fs/ext4/extents_status.c:762! [130747.323117] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] SMP ...... [130747.334329] Call trace: [130747.334553] ext4_es_cache_extent+0x150/0x168 [ext4] [130747.334975] ext4_cache_extents+0x64/0xe8 [ext4] [130747.335368] ext4_find_extent+0x300/0x330 [ext4] [130747.335759] ext4_ext_map_blocks+0x74/0x1178 [ext4] [130747.336179] ext4_map_blocks+0x2f4/0x5f0 [ext4] [130747.336567] ext4_mpage_readpages+0x4a8/0x7a8 [ext4] [130747.336995] ext4_readpage+0x54/0x100 [ext4] [130747.337359] generic_file_buffered_read+0x410/0xae8 [130747.337767] generic_file_read_iter+0x114/0x190 [130747.338152] ext4_file_read_iter+0x5c/0x140 [ext4] [130747.338556] __vfs_read+0x11c/0x188 [130747.338851] vfs_read+0x94/0x150 [130747.339110] ksys_read+0x74/0xf0 This patch's modification is according to Jan Kara's suggestion in: https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/project/linux-ext4/patch/20210428085158.3728201-1-yebin10@huawei.com/ "I see. Now I understand your patch. Honestly, seeing how fragile is trying to fix extent tree after split has failed in the middle, I would probably go even further and make sure we fix the tree properly in case of ENOSPC and EDQUOT (those are easily user triggerable). Anything else indicates a HW problem or fs corruption so I'd rather leave the extent tree as is and don't try to fix it (which also means we will not create overlapping extents)." • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e33bafad30d34cfa5e9787cb099cab05e2677fcb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b3a9a2be59478b013a430ac57b0f3d65471b071 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8116743ef5432336289256b2f7c117299213eb9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/569496aa3776eea1ff0d49d0174ac1b7e861e107 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/920697b004e49cb026e2e15fe91be065bf0741b7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3b668b96ad3192c0581a248ae2f596cd054792a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/48105dc98c9ca35af418746277b087cb2bc6df7c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/082cd4ec240b8734a82a89ffb890216ac •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix memory leak in ext4_mb_init_backend on error path. Fix a memory leak discovered by syzbot when a file system is corrupted with an illegally large s_log_groups_per_flex. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: ext4: corrige la pérdida de memoria en ext4_mb_init_backend en la ruta de error. Solucione una pérdida de memoria descubierta por syzbot cuando un sistema de archivos está dañado con un s_log_groups_per_flex ilegalmente grande. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2050c6e5b161e5e25ce3c420fef58b24fa388a49 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/04fb2baa0b147f51db065a1b13a11954abe592d0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8867f4e3809050571c98de7a2d465aff5e4daf5 •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix data corruption by fallocate When fallocate punches holes out of inode size, if original isize is in the middle of last cluster, then the part from isize to the end of the cluster will be zeroed with buffer write, at that time isize is not yet updated to match the new size, if writeback is kicked in, it will invoke ocfs2_writepage()->block_write_full_page() where the pages out of inode size will be dropped. That will cause file corruption. Fix this by zero out eof blocks when extending the inode size. Running the following command with qemu-image 4.2.1 can get a corrupted coverted image file easily. qemu-img convert -p -t none -T none -f qcow2 $qcow_image \ -O qcow2 -o compat=1.1 $qcow_image.conv The usage of fallocate in qemu is like this, it first punches holes out of inode size, then extend the inode size. fallocate(11, FALLOC_FL_KEEP_SIZE|FALLOC_FL_PUNCH_HOLE, 2276196352, 65536) = 0 fallocate(11, 0, 2276196352, 65536) = 0 v1: https://www.spinics.net/lists/linux-fsdevel/msg193999.html v2: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/20210525093034.GB4112@quack2.suse.cz/T/ En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: ocfs2: corrige la corrupción de datos por fallocate Cuando fallocate perfora agujeros en el tamaño del inodo, si el isize original está en el medio del último clúster, entonces la parte desde isize hasta el final del clúster se pondrá a cero con la escritura en el búfer, en ese momento isize aún no se ha actualizado para que coincida con el nuevo tamaño, si se activa la reescritura, invocará ocfs2_writepage()->block_write_full_page() donde se eliminarán las páginas fuera del tamaño del inodo. Eso causará corrupción de archivos. Solucione este problema poniendo a cero los bloques eof al extender el tamaño del inodo. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/624fa7baa3788dc9e57840ba5b94bc22b03cda57 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33e03adafb29eedae1bae9cdb50c1385279fcf65 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a1700479524bb9cb5e8ae720236a6fabd003acae https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cec4e857ffaa8c447f51cd8ab4e72350077b6770 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc2edb99ea606a45182b5ea38cc8f4e583aa0774 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8d5faee46242c3f33b8a71a4d7d52214785bfcc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a31dd6fd2f4e7db538fb6eb1f06973d81f8dd3b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6bba4471f0cc1296fe3c2089b9e52442d •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: abort in rename_exchange if we fail to insert the second ref Error injection stress uncovered a problem where we'd leave a dangling inode ref if we failed during a rename_exchange. This happens because we insert the inode ref for one side of the rename, and then for the other side. If this second inode ref insert fails we'll leave the first one dangling and leave a corrupt file system behind. Fix this by aborting if we did the insert for the first inode ref. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: btrfs: abortar en rename_exchange si no logramos insertar la segunda referencia. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0df50d47d17401f9f140dfbe752a65e5d72f9932 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff8de2cec65a8c8521faade12a31b39c80e49f5b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc09ef3562726cd520c8338c1640872a60187af5 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/kvm: Teardown PV features on boot CPU as well Various PV features (Async PF, PV EOI, steal time) work through memory shared with hypervisor and when we restore from hibernation we must properly teardown all these features to make sure hypervisor doesn't write to stale locations after we jump to the previously hibernated kernel (which can try to place anything there). For secondary CPUs the job is already done by kvm_cpu_down_prepare(), register syscore ops to do the same for boot CPU. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: x86/kvm: Desmontaje de funciones PV también en la CPU de arranque Varias funciones PV (Async PF, PV EOI, tiempo de robo) funcionan a través de la memoria compartida con el hipervisor y cuando restauramos desde la hibernación Debemos eliminar adecuadamente todas estas características para asegurarnos de que el hipervisor no escriba en ubicaciones obsoletas después de saltar al kernel previamente hibernado (que puede intentar colocar cualquier cosa allí). Para las CPU secundarias, el trabajo ya lo realiza kvm_cpu_down_prepare(), registre syscore ops para hacer lo mismo para la CPU de arranque. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7620a669111b52f224d006dea9e1e688e2d62c54 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38b858da1c58ad46519a257764e059e663b59ff2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1629b5b925de9b27979e929dae7fcb766daf6b6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b79feffeca28c5459458fe78676b081e87c93a4 •