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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: adp5589-keys - fix NULL pointer dereference We register a devm action to call adp5589_clear_config() and then pass the i2c client as argument so that we can call i2c_get_clientdata() in order to get our device object. However, i2c_set_clientdata() is only being set at the end of the probe function which means that we'll get a NULL pointer dereference in case the probe function fails early. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/30df385e35a48f773b85117fc490152c2395e45b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4449fedb8a710043fc0925409eba844c192d4337 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/34e304cc53ae5d3c8e3f08b41dd11e0d4f3e01ed https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c3f04223aaf82489472d614c6decee5a1ce8d7f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a38791ee79bd17d225c15a6d1479448be127a59 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/122b160561f6429701a0559a0f39b0ae309488c6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb5cc65f973661241e4a2b7390b429aa7b330c69 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cachefiles: fix dentry leak in cachefiles_open_file() A dentry leak may be caused when a lookup cookie and a cull are concurrent: P1 | P2 ----------------------------------------------------------- cachefiles_lookup_cookie cachefiles_look_up_object lookup_one_positive_unlocked // get dentry cachefiles_cull inode->i_flags |= S_KERNEL_FILE; cachefiles_open_file cachefiles_mark_inode_in_use __cachefiles_mark_inode_in_use can_use = false if (!(inode->i_flags & S_KERNEL_FILE)) can_use = true return false return false // Returns an error but doesn't put dentry After that the following WARNING will be triggered when the backend folder is umounted: ================================================================== BUG: Dentry 000000008ad87947{i=7a,n=Dx_1_1.img} still in use (1) [unmount of ext4 sda] WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 359261 at fs/dcache.c:1767 umount_check+0x5d/0x70 CPU: 4 PID: 359261 Comm: umount Not tainted 6.6.0-dirty #25 RIP: 0010:umount_check+0x5d/0x70 Call Trace: <TASK> d_walk+0xda/0x2b0 do_one_tree+0x20/0x40 shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x2c/0x90 generic_shutdown_super+0x20/0x160 kill_block_super+0x1a/0x40 ext4_kill_sb+0x22/0x40 deactivate_locked_super+0x35/0x80 cleanup_mnt+0x104/0x160 ================================================================== Whether cachefiles_open_file() returns true or false, the reference count obtained by lookup_positive_unlocked() in cachefiles_look_up_object() should be released. Therefore release that reference count in cachefiles_look_up_object() to fix the above issue and simplify the code. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f08c925e7a38002bde509e66f6f891468848511 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d32ff64c872d7e08e893c32ba6a2374583444410 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c7d10fa7d7691558ff967668494672415f5fa151 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e4a28489b310339b2b8187bec0a437709be551c1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7fa2382f97421978514a419c93054eca69f5247b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da6ef2dffe6056aad3435e6cf7c6471c2a62187c •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix a NULL pointer dereference when failed to start a new trasacntion [BUG] Syzbot reported a NULL pointer dereference with the following crash: FAULT_INJECTION: forcing a failure. start_transaction+0x830/0x1670 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:676 prepare_to_relocate+0x31f/0x4c0 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3642 relocate_block_group+0x169/0xd20 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3678 ... BTRFS info (device loop0): balance: ended with status: -12 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000cc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000660-0x0000000000000667] RIP: 0010:btrfs_update_reloc_root+0x362/0xa80 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:926 Call Trace: <TASK> commit_fs_roots+0x2ee/0x720 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1496 btrfs_commit_transaction+0xfaf/0x3740 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:2430 del_balance_item fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3678 [inline] reset_balance_state+0x25e/0x3c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3742 btrfs_balance+0xead/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4574 btrfs_ioctl_balance+0x493/0x7c0 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3673 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] __se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [CAUSE] The allocation failure happens at the start_transaction() inside prepare_to_relocate(), and during the error handling we call unset_reloc_control(), which makes fs_info->balance_ctl to be NULL. Then we continue the error path cleanup in btrfs_balance() by calling reset_balance_state() which will call del_balance_item() to fully delete the balance item in the root tree. However during the small window between set_reloc_contrl() and unset_reloc_control(), we can have a subvolume tree update and created a reloc_root for that subvolume. Then we go into the final btrfs_commit_transaction() of del_balance_item(), and into btrfs_update_reloc_root() inside commit_fs_roots(). That function checks if fs_info->reloc_ctl is in the merge_reloc_tree stage, but since fs_info->reloc_ctl is NULL, it results a NULL pointer dereference. [FIX] Just add extra check on fs_info->reloc_ctl inside btrfs_update_reloc_root(), before checking fs_info->reloc_ctl->merge_reloc_tree. That DEAD_RELOC_TREE handling is to prevent further modification to the reloc tree during merge stage, but since there is no reloc_ctl at all, we do not need to bother that. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1282f001cbf56e5dd6e90a18e205a566793f4be0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d73d48acf36f57362df7e4f9d76568168bf5e944 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37fee9c220b92c3b7bf22b51c51dde5364e7590b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d13249c0df7aab885acb149695f82c54c0822a70 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ad0c5868f2f0418619089513d95230c66cb7eb4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc02c1440705e3451abd1c2c8114a5c1bb188e9f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39356ec0e319ed07627b3a0f402d0608546509e6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c3b47f49e83197e8dffd023ec568403bc •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 9EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: wait for fixup workers before stopping cleaner kthread during umount During unmount, at close_ctree(), we have the following steps in this order: 1) Park the cleaner kthread - this doesn't destroy the kthread, it basically halts its execution (wake ups against it work but do nothing); 2) We stop the cleaner kthread - this results in freeing the respective struct task_struct; 3) We call btrfs_stop_all_workers() which waits for any jobs running in all the work queues and then free the work queues. Syzbot reported a case where a fixup worker resulted in a crash when doing a delayed iput on its inode while attempting to wake up the cleaner at btrfs_add_delayed_iput(), because the task_struct of the cleaner kthread was already freed. This can happen during unmount because we don't wait for any fixup workers still running before we call kthread_stop() against the cleaner kthread, which stops and free all its resources. Fix this by waiting for any fixup workers at close_ctree() before we call kthread_stop() against the cleaner and run pending delayed iputs. The stack traces reported by syzbot were the following: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __lock_acquire+0x77/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5065 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880272a8a18 by task kworker/u8:3/52 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 52 Comm: kworker/u8:3 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-syzkaller #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 Workqueue: btrfs-fixup btrfs_work_helper Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 __lock_acquire+0x77/0x2050 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5065 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5825 __raw_spin_lock_irqsave include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:110 [inline] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0xd5/0x120 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:162 class_raw_spinlock_irqsave_constructor include/linux/spinlock.h:551 [inline] try_to_wake_up+0xb0/0x1480 kernel/sched/core.c:4154 btrfs_writepage_fixup_worker+0xc16/0xdf0 fs/btrfs/inode.c:2842 btrfs_work_helper+0x390/0xc50 fs/btrfs/async-thread.c:314 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3229 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa63/0x1850 kernel/workqueue.c:3310 worker_thread+0x870/0xd30 kernel/workqueue.c:3391 kthread+0x2f0/0x390 kernel/kthread.c:389 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 </TASK> Allocated by task 2: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:319 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x66/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:345 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:247 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4086 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4135 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x16b/0x320 mm/slub.c:4187 alloc_task_struct_node kernel/fork.c:180 [inline] dup_task_struct+0x57/0x8c0 kernel/fork.c:1107 copy_process+0x5d1/0x3d50 kernel/fork.c:2206 kernel_clone+0x223/0x880 kernel/fork.c:2787 kernel_thread+0x1bc/0x240 kernel/fork.c:2849 create_kthread kernel/kthread.c:412 [inline] kthreadd+0x60d/0x810 kernel/kthread.c:765 ret_from_fork+0x4b/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244 Freed by task 61: kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline] kasan_save_track+0x3f/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 mm/kasan/generic.c:579 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:247 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x59/0x70 mm/kasan/common.c:264 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:230 [inline] slab_free_h ---truncated--- • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd686dfff63f27d712877aef5b962fbf6b8bc264 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a71349b692ab34ea197949e13e3cc42570fe73d9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70b60c8d9b42763d6629e44f448aa5d8ae477d61 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c98fe0dfa2ae83c4631699695506d8941db4bfe https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9da40aea63f8769f28afb91aea0fac4cf6fbbb65 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed87190e9d9c80aad220fb6b0b03a84d22e2c95b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf0de0f9a0544c11f96f93206da04ab87dcea1f4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65d11eb276836d49003a8060cf31fa228 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing/timerlat: Fix a race during cpuhp processing There is another found exception that the "timerlat/1" thread was scheduled on CPU0, and lead to timer corruption finally: ``` ODEBUG: init active (active state 0) object: ffff888237c2e108 object type: hrtimer hint: timerlat_irq+0x0/0x220 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 426 at lib/debugobjects.c:518 debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 426 Comm: timerlat/1 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7+ #45 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1ubuntu1.1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0 ... Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0x7c/0x110 ? debug_print_object+0x7d/0xb0 ? report_bug+0xf1/0x1d0 ? prb_read_valid+0x17/0x20 ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c8895e271f7994a3ecb13b8a280e39aa53879545 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/322920b53dc11f9c2b33397eb3ae5bc6a175b60d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce25f33ba89d6eefef64157655d318444580fa14 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6e9849063a6c8f4cb2f652a437e44e3ed24356c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a0d9c0cd5856191e095cf43a2e141b73945b7716 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f72b451dc75578f644a3019c1489e9ae2c14e6c4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/829e0c9f0855f26b3ae830d17b24aec103f7e915 •