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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ethtool: fail closed if we can't get max channel used in indirection tables Commit 0d1b7d6c9274 ("bnxt: fix crashes when reducing ring count with active RSS contexts") proves that allowing indirection table to contain channels with out of bounds IDs may lead to crashes. Currently the max channel check in the core gets skipped if driver can't fetch the indirection table or when we can't allocate memory. Both of those conditions should be extremely rare but if they do happen we should try to be safe and fail the channel change. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/101737d8b88dbd4be6010bac398fe810f1950036 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2899d58462ba868287d6ff3acad3675e7adf934f •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hns3: void array out of bound when loop tnl_num When query reg inf of SSU, it loops tnl_num times. However, tnl_num comes from hardware and the length of array is a fixed value. To void array out of bound, make sure the loop time is not greater than the length of array • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c33a9806dc806bcb4a31dc71fb06979219181ad4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86db7bfb06704ef17340eeae71c832f21cfce35c •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: MIPS: cevt-r4k: Don't call get_c0_compare_int if timer irq is installed This avoids warning: [ 0.118053] BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:283 Caused by get_c0_compare_int on secondary CPU. We also skipped saving IRQ number to struct clock_event_device *cd as it's never used by clockevent core, as per comments it's only meant for "non CPU local devices". • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3ff0f98a52f0aafe35aa314d1c442f4318be3db https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e6cd871627abbb459d0ff6521d6bb9cf9d9f7522 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1d2051373bfc65371ce4ac8911ed984d0178c98 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32ee0520159f1e8c2d6597c19690df452c528f30 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/189d3ed3b25beee26ffe2abed278208bece13f52 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/50f2b98dc83de7809a5c5bf0ccf9af2e75c37c13 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 14EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rtmutex: Drop rt_mutex::wait_lock before scheduling rt_mutex_handle_deadlock() is called with rt_mutex::wait_lock held. In the good case it returns with the lock held and in the deadlock case it emits a warning and goes into an endless scheduling loop with the lock held, which triggers the 'scheduling in atomic' warning. Unlock rt_mutex::wait_lock in the dead lock case before issuing the warning and dropping into the schedule for ever loop. [ tglx: Moved unlock before the WARN(), removed the pointless comment, massaged changelog, added Fixes tag ] • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d5c9340d1949733eb37616abd15db36aef9a57c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95f9aded9436aa3ce714aeff3f45fcc1431df7d2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea018da95368adfb700689bd9842714f7c3db665 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1201613a70dd34bd347ba2970919b3f1d5fbfb4a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2e64fcdc83c645813f7b93e4df291841ba7c625 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb52f40e085ef4074f1335672cd62c1f832af13b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b1f3807ed9cafb59c956ce76a05d25e67103f2e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/432efdbe7da5ecfcbc0c2180cfdbab144 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched: sch_cake: fix bulk flow accounting logic for host fairness In sch_cake, we keep track of the count of active bulk flows per host, when running in dst/src host fairness mode, which is used as the round-robin weight when iterating through flows. The count of active bulk flows is updated whenever a flow changes state. This has a peculiar interaction with the hash collision handling: when a hash collision occurs (after the set-associative hashing), the state of the hash bucket is simply updated to match the new packet that collided, and if host fairness is enabled, that also means assigning new per-host state to the flow. For this reason, the bulk flow counters of the host(s) assigned to the flow are decremented, before new state is assigned (and the counters, which may not belong to the same host anymore, are incremented again). Back when this code was introduced, the host fairness mode was always enabled, so the decrement was unconditional. When the configuration flags were introduced the *increment* was made conditional, but the *decrement* was not. Which of course can lead to a spurious decrement (and associated wrap-around to U16_MAX). AFAICT, when host fairness is disabled, the decrement and wrap-around happens as soon as a hash collision occurs (which is not that common in itself, due to the set-associative hashing). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/712639929912c5eefb09facccb48d55b3f72c9f8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a4eeefa514db570be025ab46d779af180e2c9bb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7725152b54d295b7da5e34c2f419539b30d017bd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cde71a5677971f4f1b69b25e854891dbe78066a4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/549e407569e08459d16122341d332cb508024094 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4a9039a7b3d8005b90c7b1a55a306444f0e5447 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7c01c0714c04431b5e18cf17a9ea68a553d1c3c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/546ea84d07e3e324644025e2aae2d12ea •