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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix UAF in async decryption Doing an async decryption (large read) crashes with a slab-use-after-free way down in the crypto API. Reproducer: # mount.cifs -o ...,seal,esize=1 //srv/share /mnt # dd if=/mnt/largefile of=/dev/null ... [ 194.196391] ================================================================== [ 194.196844] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.197269] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888112bd0448 by task kworker/u77:2/899 [ 194.197707] [ 194.197818] CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 899 Comm: kworker/u77:2 Not tainted 6.11.0-lku-00028-gfca3ca14a17a-dirty #43 [ 194.198400] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 194.199046] Workqueue: smb3decryptd smb2_decrypt_offload [cifs] [ 194.200032] Call Trace: [ 194.200191] <TASK> [ 194.200327] dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 [ 194.200558] ? gf128mul_4k_lle+0xc1/0x110 [ 194.200809] print_report+0x174/0x505 [ 194.201040] ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 [ 194.201352] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f [ 194.201604] ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0809fb86ad13b29e1d6d491364fc7ea4fb545995 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/538c26d9bf70c90edc460d18c81008a4e555925a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0abcd65ec545701b8793e12bc27dc98042b151a •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: FIX possible deadlock in rfcomm_sk_state_change rfcomm_sk_state_change attempts to use sock_lock so it must never be called with it locked but rfcomm_sock_ioctl always attempt to lock it causing the following trace: ====================================================== WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected 6.8.0-syzkaller-08951-gfe46a7dd189e #0 Not tainted ------------------------------------------------------ syz-executor386/5093 is trying to acquire lock: ffff88807c396258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_RFCOMM){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1671 [inline] ffff88807c396258 (sk_lock-AF_BLUETOOTH-BTPROTO_RFCOMM){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: rfcomm_sk_state_change+0x5b/0x310 net/bluetooth/rfcomm/sock.c:73 but task is already holding lock: ffff88807badfd28 (&d->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: __rfcomm_dlc_close+0x226/0x6a0 net/bluetooth/rfcomm/core.c:491 • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3241ad820dbb172021e0268b5611031991431626 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef44274dae9b0a90d1a97ce8b242a3b8243a7745 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/496b2ab0fd10f205e08909a125485fdc98843dbe https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ced98072d3511b232ae1d3347945f35f30c0e303 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/38b2d5a57d125e1c17661b8308c0240c4a43b534 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cb9807c9b53bf1e5560420d26f319f528b50268 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08d1914293dae38350b8088980e59fbc699a72fe •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: accept TCA_STAB only for root qdisc Most qdiscs maintain their backlog using qdisc_pkt_len(skb) on the assumption it is invariant between the enqueue() and dequeue() handlers. Unfortunately syzbot can crash a host rather easily using a TBF + SFQ combination, with an STAB on SFQ [1] We can't support TCA_STAB on arbitrary level, this would require to maintain per-qdisc storage. [1] [ 88.796496] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000 [ 88.798611] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 88.799014] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 88.799506] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 88.799829] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 88.800569] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 2053 Comm: b371744477 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-virtme #1117 [ 88.801107] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 88.801779] RIP: 0010:sfq_dequeue (net/sched/sch_sfq.c:272 net/sched/sch_sfq.c:499) sch_sfq [ 88.802544] Code: 0f b7 50 12 48 8d 04 d5 00 00 00 00 48 89 d6 48 29 d0 48 8b 91 c0 01 00 00 48 c1 e0 03 48 01 c2 66 83 7a 1a 00 7e c0 48 8b 3a <4c> 8b 07 4c 89 02 49 89 50 08 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 00 48 c7 07 00 All code ======== 0: 0f b7 50 12 movzwl 0x12(%rax),%edx 4: 48 8d 04 d5 00 00 00 lea 0x0(,%rdx,8),%rax b: 00 c: 48 89 d6 mov %rdx,%rsi f: 48 29 d0 sub %rdx,%rax 12: 48 8b 91 c0 01 00 00 mov 0x1c0(%rcx),%rdx 19: 48 c1 e0 03 shl $0x3,%rax 1d: 48 01 c2 add %rax,%rdx 20: 66 83 7a 1a 00 cmpw $0x0,0x1a(%rdx) 25: 7e c0 jle 0xffffffffffffffe7 27: 48 8b 3a mov (%rdx),%rdi 2a:* 4c 8b 07 mov (%rdi),%r8 <-- trapping instruction 2d: 4c 89 02 mov %r8,(%rdx) 30: 49 89 50 08 mov %rdx,0x8(%r8) 34: 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 movq $0x0,0x8(%rdi) 3b: 00 3c: 48 rex.W 3d: c7 .byte 0xc7 3e: 07 (bad) ... Code starting with the faulting instruction =========================================== 0: 4c 8b 07 mov (%rdi),%r8 3: 4c 89 02 mov %r8,(%rdx) 6: 49 89 50 08 mov %rdx,0x8(%r8) a: 48 c7 47 08 00 00 00 movq $0x0,0x8(%rdi) 11: 00 12: 48 rex.W 13: c7 .byte 0xc7 14: 07 (bad) ... [ 88.803721] RSP: 0018:ffff9a1f892b7d58 EFLAGS: 00000206 [ 88.804032] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9a1f8420c800 RCX: ffff9a1f8420c800 [ 88.804560] RDX: ffff9a1f81bc1440 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 88.805056] RBP: ffffffffc04bb0e0 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 00000000ff7f9a1f [ 88.805473] R10: 000000000001001b R11: 0000000000009a1f R12: 0000000000000140 [ 88.806194] R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff9a1f886df400 R15: ffff9a1f886df4ac [ 88.806734] FS: 00007f445601a740(0000) GS:ffff9a2e7fd80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 88.807225] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 88.807672] CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 000000050cc46000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 [ 88.808165] Call Trace: [ 88.808459] <TASK> [ 88.808710] ? __die (arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434) [ 88.809261] ? page_fault_oops (arch/x86/mm/fault.c:715) [ 88.809561] ? exc_page_fault (./arch/x86/include/asm/irqflags.h:26 . • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/175f9c1bba9b825d22b142d183c9e175488b260c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/adbc3eef43fc94c7c8436da832691ae02333a972 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fb6503592d39065316f45d267c5527b4e7cd995 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76feedc74b90270390fbfdf74a2e944e96872363 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1edf039ee01788ffc25625fe58a903ae2efa213e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3dc6ee96473cc2962c6db4297d4631f261be150f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3cb7cf1540ddff5473d6baeb530228d19bc97b8a •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: xtables: avoid NFPROTO_UNSPEC where needed syzbot managed to call xt_cluster match via ebtables: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 11 at net/netfilter/xt_cluster.c:72 xt_cluster_mt+0x196/0x780 [..] ebt_do_table+0x174b/0x2a40 Module registers to NFPROTO_UNSPEC, but it assumes ipv4/ipv6 packet processing. As this is only useful to restrict locally terminating TCP/UDP traffic, register this for ipv4 and ipv6 family only. Pablo points out that this is a general issue, direct users of the set/getsockopt interface can call into targets/matches that were only intended for use with ip(6)tables. Check all UNSPEC matches and targets for similar issues: - matches and targets are fine except if they assume skb_network_header() is valid -- this is only true when called from inet layer: ip(6) stack pulls the ip/ipv6 header into linear data area. - targets that return XT_CONTINUE or other xtables verdicts must be restricted too, they are incompatbile with the ebtables traverser, e.g. EBT_CONTINUE is a completely different value than XT_CONTINUE. Most matches/targets are changed to register for NFPROTO_IPV4/IPV6, as they are provided for use by ip(6)tables. The MARK target is also used by arptables, so register for NFPROTO_ARP too. While at it, bail out if connbytes fails to enable the corresponding conntrack family. This change passes the selftests in iptables.git. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0269ea4937343536ec7e85649932bc8c9686ea78 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85ff9a0f793ca52c527e75cd40a69c948627ebde https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f482bb7e27b37f1f734bb9a8eeb28b23d59d189 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/997f67d813ce0cf5eb3cdb8f124da68141e91b6c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cdc55ec6222bb195995cc58f7cb46e4d8907056 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0bfcb7b71e735560077a42847f69597ec7dcc326 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ppp: fix ppp_async_encode() illegal access syzbot reported an issue in ppp_async_encode() [1] In this case, pppoe_sendmsg() is called with a zero size. Then ppp_async_encode() is called with an empty skb. BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ppp_async_encode drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:545 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in ppp_async_push+0xb4f/0x2660 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:675 ppp_async_encode drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:545 [inline] ppp_async_push+0xb4f/0x2660 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:675 ppp_async_send+0x130/0x1b0 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_async.c:634 ppp_channel_bridge_input drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2280 [inline] ppp_input+0x1f1/0xe60 drivers/net/ppp/ppp_generic.c:2304 pppoe_rcv_core+0x1d3/0x720 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:379 sk_backlog_rcv+0x13b/0x420 include/net/sock.h:1113 __release_sock+0x1da/0x330 net/core/sock.c:3072 release_sock+0x6b/0x250 net/core/sock.c:3626 pppoe_sendmsg+0x2b8/0xb90 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:903 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:744 ____sys_sendmsg+0x903/0xb60 net/socket.c:2602 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2656 __sys_sendmmsg+0x3c1/0x960 net/socket.c:2742 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2768 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xbc/0x120 net/socket.c:2768 x64_sys_call+0xb6e/0x3ba0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:4092 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:4135 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node_noprof+0x6bf/0xb80 mm/slub.c:4187 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:587 __alloc_skb+0x363/0x7b0 net/core/skbuff.c:678 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1322 [inline] sock_wmalloc+0xfe/0x1a0 net/core/sock.c:2732 pppoe_sendmsg+0x3a7/0xb90 drivers/net/ppp/pppoe.c:867 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:729 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:744 ____sys_sendmsg+0x903/0xb60 net/socket.c:2602 ___sys_sendmsg+0x28d/0x3c0 net/socket.c:2656 __sys_sendmmsg+0x3c1/0x960 net/socket.c:2742 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2771 [inline] __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2768 [inline] __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xbc/0x120 net/socket.c:2768 x64_sys_call+0xb6e/0x3ba0 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:308 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xcd/0x1e0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5411 Comm: syz.1.14 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1-syzkaller-00165-g360c1f1f24c6 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 09/13/2024 • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/30d91a478d58cbae3dbaa8224d17d0d839f0d71b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fadf8fdb3110d3138e05c3765f645535434f8d76 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce249a4c68d0ce27a8c5d853338d502e2711a314 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fe992ff3df493d1949922ca234419f3ede08dff https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c007a14797240607038bd3464501109f408940e2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40dddd4b8bd08a69471efd96107a4e1c73fabefc •