CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42097 – ALSA: emux: improve patch ioctl data validation
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42097
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: emux: improve patch ioctl data validation In load_data(), make the validation of and skipping over the main info block match that in load_guspatch(). In load_guspatch(), add checking that the specified patch length matches the actually supplied data, like load_data() already did. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/40d7def67841343c10f8642a41031fecbb248bab https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/79d9a000f0220cdaba1682d2a23c0d0c61d620a3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d23982ea9aa438f35a8c8a6305943e98a8db90f6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7a18293fd8d8519c2f7a03753bc1583b18e3db69 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0ff2443fcbb472206d45a5d2a90cc694065804e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8f5ce3cb9adf0c72e2ad6089aba02d7a32469c2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87039b83fb7bfd7d0e0499aaa8e6c049906b4d14 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89b32ccb12ae67e630c6453d778ec30a5 •
CVSS: 5.1EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42096 – x86: stop playing stack games in profile_pc()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42096
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86: stop playing stack games in profile_pc() The 'profile_pc()' function is used for timer-based profiling, which isn't really all that relevant any more to begin with, but it also ends up making assumptions based on the stack layout that aren't necessarily valid. Basically, the code tries to account the time spent in spinlocks to the caller rather than the spinlock, and while I support that as a concept, it's not worth the code complexity or the KASAN warnings when no serious profiling is done using timers anyway these days. And the code really does depend on stack layout that is only true in the simplest of cases. We've lost the comment at some point (I think when the 32-bit and 64-bit code was unified), but it used to say: Assume the lock function has either no stack frame or a copy of eflags from PUSHF. which explains why it just blindly loads a word or two straight off the stack pointer and then takes a minimal look at the values to just check if they might be eflags or the return pc: Eflags always has bits 22 and up cleared unlike kernel addresses but that basic stack layout assumption assumes that there isn't any lock debugging etc going on that would complicate the code and cause a stack frame. It causes KASAN unhappiness reported for years by syzkaller [1] and others [2]. With no real practical reason for this any more, just remove the code. Just for historical interest, here's some background commits relating to this code from 2006: 0cb91a229364 ("i386: Account spinlocks to the caller during profiling for !FP kernels") 31679f38d886 ("Simplify profile_pc on x86-64") and a code unification from 2009: ef4512882dbe ("x86: time_32/64.c unify profile_pc") but the basics of this thing actually goes back to before the git tree. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65ebdde16e7f5da99dbf8a548fb635837d78384e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/27c3be840911b15a3f24ed623f86153c825b6b29 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49c09ca35a5f521d7fa18caf62fdf378f15e8aa4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d07fea561d64357fb7b3f3751e653bf20306d77 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/161cef818545ecf980f0e2ebaf8ba7326ce53c2b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/16222beb9f8e5ceb0beeb5cbe54bef16df501a92 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3b65c8cbc139bfce9541bc81c1bb766e5ba3f68 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/093d9603b60093a9aaae942db56107f64 • CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read •
CVSS: 5.2EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42094 – net/iucv: Avoid explicit cpumask var allocation on stack
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42094
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/iucv: Avoid explicit cpumask var allocation on stack For CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=y kernel, explicit allocation of cpumask variable on stack is not recommended since it can cause potential stack overflow. Instead, kernel code should always use *cpumask_var API(s) to allocate cpumask var in config-neutral way, leaving allocation strategy to CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK. Use *cpumask_var API(s) to address it. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b085521be5292016097b5e7ca81b26be3f7098d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/842afb47d84536fc976fece8fb6c54bea711ad1a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9dadab0db7d904413ea1cdaa13f127da05c31e71 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0af718a690acc089aa1bbb95a93df833d864ef53 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d85ca8179a54ff8cf1e1f8c3c9e3799831319bae https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/724e7965af054079242b8d6f7e50ee226730a756 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d090c7f7be3b26fcb80ac04d08a4a8062b1d959 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be4e1304419c99a164b4c0e101c7c2a75 • CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42093 – net/dpaa2: Avoid explicit cpumask var allocation on stack
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42093
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/dpaa2: Avoid explicit cpumask var allocation on stack For CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=y kernel, explicit allocation of cpumask variable on stack is not recommended since it can cause potential stack overflow. Instead, kernel code should always use *cpumask_var API(s) to allocate cpumask var in config-neutral way, leaving allocation strategy to CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK. Use *cpumask_var API(s) to address it. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2262b3be27cee334a2fa175ae3afb53f38fb0b1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/763896ab62a672d728f5eb10ac90d98c607a8509 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a55afc0f5f20ba30970aaf7271929dc00eee5e7d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/48147337d7efdea6ad6e49f5b8eb894b95868ef0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69f49527aea12c23b78fb3d0a421950bf44fb4e2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e4f25091e6d06e99a23f724c839a58a8776a527 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d33fe1714a44ff540629b149d8fab4ac6967585c •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42091 – drm/xe: Check pat.ops before dumping PAT settings
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42091
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Check pat.ops before dumping PAT settings We may leave pat.ops unset when running on brand new platform or when running as a VF. While the former is unlikely, the latter is valid (future) use case and will cause NPD when someone will try to dump PAT settings by debugfs. It's better to check pointer to pat.ops instead of specific .dump hook, as we have this hook always defined for every .ops variant. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/583ce246c7ff9edeb0de49130cdc3d45db8545cb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a918e771e6fbe1fa68932af5b0cdf473e23090cc •