CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-46739 – uio_hv_generic: Fix kernel NULL pointer dereference in hv_uio_rescind
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-46739
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: uio_hv_generic: Fix kernel NULL pointer dereference in hv_uio_rescind For primary VM Bus channels, primary_channel pointer is always NULL. This pointer is valid only for the secondary channels. Also, rescind callback is meant for primary channels only. Fix NULL pointer dereference by retrieving the device_obj from the parent for the primary channel. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca3cda6fcf1e922213a0cc58e708ffb999151db3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d414b64ecf6fd717d7510ffb893c6f23acbf50e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f38f46da80a2ab7d1b2f8fcb444c916034a2dac4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d8e020e51ab07e40f9dd00b52f1da7d96fec04c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3005091cd537ef8cdb7530dcb2ecfba8d2ef475c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2be373469be1774bbe03b0fa7e2854e65005b1cc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de6946be9c8bc7d2279123433495af7c21011b99 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/928e399e84f4e80307dce44e89415115c •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-46738 – VMCI: Fix use-after-free when removing resource in vmci_resource_remove()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-46738
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: VMCI: Fix use-after-free when removing resource in vmci_resource_remove() When removing a resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(), the search is performed using the resource handle by comparing context and resource fields. It is possible though to create two resources with different types but same handle (same context and resource fields). When trying to remove one of the resources, vmci_resource_remove() may not remove the intended one, but the object will still be freed as in the case of the datagram type in vmci_datagram_destroy_handle(). vmci_resource_table will still hold a pointer to this freed resource leading to a use-after-free vulnerability. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88801c16d800 by task syz-executor197/1592 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x82/0xa9 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x21/0x366 mm/kasan/report.c:239 __kasan_report.cold+0x7f/0x132 mm/kasan/report.c:425 kasan_report+0x38/0x51 mm/kasan/report.c:442 vmci_handle_is_equal include/linux/vmw_vmci_defs.h:142 [inline] vmci_resource_remove+0x3a1/0x410 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_resource.c:147 vmci_qp_broker_detach+0x89a/0x11b9 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_queue_pair.c:2182 ctx_free_ctx+0x473/0xbe1 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:444 kref_put include/linux/kref.h:65 [inline] vmci_ctx_put drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:497 [inline] vmci_ctx_destroy+0x170/0x1d6 drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_context.c:195 vmci_host_close+0x125/0x1ac drivers/misc/vmw_vmci/vmci_host.c:143 __fput+0x261/0xa34 fs/file_table.c:282 task_work_run+0xf0/0x194 kernel/task_work.c:164 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline] exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x184/0x189 kernel/entry/common.c:187 exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11b/0x123 kernel/entry/common.c:220 __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:302 [inline] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x18/0x42 kernel/entry/common.c:313 do_syscall_64+0x41/0x85 arch/x86/entry/common.c:86 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x0 This change ensures the type is also checked when removing the resource from vmci_resource_table in vmci_resource_remove(). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc63dedb7d46a7d690c6b6edf69136b88af06cc6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6365931bf7c07b2b397dbb06a4f6573cc9fae73 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b243d52b5f6f59f9d39e69b191fb3d58b94a43b1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c563a29857aa8053b67ee141191f69757f27f6e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef5f4d0c5ee22d4f873116fec844ff6edaf3fa7d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9efdf333174468651be40390cbc79c9f55d9cce https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/39e7e593418ccdbd151f2925fa6be1a616d16c96 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00fe5292f081f8d773e572df8e03bf6e1 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0CVE-2024-46737 – nvmet-tcp: fix kernel crash if commands allocation fails
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-46737
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nvmet-tcp: fix kernel crash if commands allocation fails If the commands allocation fails in nvmet_tcp_alloc_cmds() the kernel crashes in nvmet_tcp_release_queue_work() because of a NULL pointer dereference. nvmet: failed to install queue 0 cntlid 1 ret 6 Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000008 Fix the bug by setting queue->nr_cmds to zero in case nvmet_tcp_alloc_cmd() fails. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/872d26a391da92ed8f0c0f5cb5fef428067b7f30 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/03e1fd0327fa5e2174567f5fe9290fe21d21b8f4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/50632b877ce55356f5d276b9add289b1e7ddc683 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/91dad30c5607e62864f888e735d0965567827bdf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7957c731fc2b23312f8935812dee5a0b14b04e2d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/489f2913a63f528cfe3f21722583fb981967ecda https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c04d1e3ab22cc5394ef656429638a5947f87244 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5572a55a6f830ee3f3a994b6b962a5c32 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0CVE-2024-46735 – ublk_drv: fix NULL pointer dereference in ublk_ctrl_start_recovery()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-46735
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ublk_drv: fix NULL pointer dereference in ublk_ctrl_start_recovery() When two UBLK_CMD_START_USER_RECOVERY commands are submitted, the first one sets 'ubq->ubq_daemon' to NULL, and the second one triggers WARN in ublk_queue_reinit() and subsequently a NULL pointer dereference issue. Fix it by adding the check in ublk_ctrl_start_recovery() and return immediately in case of zero 'ub->nr_queues_ready'. BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000028 RIP: 0010:ublk_ctrl_start_recovery.constprop.0+0x82/0x180 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die+0x20/0x70 ? page_fault_oops+0x75/0x170 ? exc_page_fault+0x64/0x140 ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30 ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c732a852b419fa057b53657e2daaf9433940391c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca249435893dda766f3845c15ca77ca5672022d8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/136a29d8112df4ea0a57f9602ddf3579e04089dc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c890ef60bf417d3fe5c6f7a9f6cef0e1d77f74f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e58f5142f88320a5b1449f96a146f2f24615c5c7 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0CVE-2024-46734 – btrfs: fix race between direct IO write and fsync when using same fd
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-46734
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix race between direct IO write and fsync when using same fd If we have 2 threads that are using the same file descriptor and one of them is doing direct IO writes while the other is doing fsync, we have a race where we can end up either: 1) Attempt a fsync without holding the inode's lock, triggering an assertion failures when assertions are enabled; 2) Do an invalid memory access from the fsync task because the file private points to memory allocated on stack by the direct IO task and it may be used by the fsync task after the stack was destroyed. The race happens like this: 1) A user space program opens a file descriptor with O_DIRECT; 2) The program spawns 2 threads using libpthread for example; 3) One of the threads uses the file descriptor to do direct IO writes, while the other calls fsync using the same file descriptor. 4) Call task A the thread doing direct IO writes and task B the thread doing fsyncs; 5) Task A does a direct IO write, and at btrfs_direct_write() sets the file's private to an on stack allocated private with the member 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true; 6) Task B enters btrfs_sync_file() and sees that there's a private structure associated to the file which has 'fsync_skip_inode_lock' set to true, so it skips locking the inode's VFS lock; 7) Task A completes the direct IO write, and resets the file's private to NULL since it had no prior private and our private was stack allocated. Then it unlocks the inode's VFS lock; 8) Task B enters btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging(), then the assertion that checks the inode's VFS lock is held fails, since task B never locked it and task A has already unlocked it. The stack trace produced is the following: assertion failed: inode_is_locked(&inode->vfs_inode), in fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:983! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI CPU: 9 PID: 5072 Comm: worker Tainted: G U OE 6.10.5-1-default #1 openSUSE Tumbleweed 69f48d427608e1c09e60ea24c6c55e2ca1b049e8 Hardware name: Acer Predator PH315-52/Covini_CFS, BIOS V1.12 07/28/2020 RIP: 0010:btrfs_get_ordered_extents_for_logging.cold+0x1f/0x42 [btrfs] Code: 50 d6 86 c0 e8 (...) RSP: 0018:ffff9e4a03dcfc78 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000054 RBX: ffff9078a9868e98 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff907dce4a7800 RDI: ffff907dce4a7800 RBP: ffff907805518800 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff9e4a03dcfb38 R10: ffff9e4a03dcfb30 R11: 0000000000000003 R12: ffff907684ae7800 R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff90774646b600 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f04b96006c0(0000) GS:ffff907dce480000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f32acbfc000 CR3: 00000001fd4fa005 CR4: 00000000003726f0 Call Trace: <TASK> ? __die_body.cold+0x14/0x24 ? die+0x2e/0x50 ? do_trap+0xca/0x110 ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4e17707035a65f6e5b2a4d987a308cf8ed8c5ad1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6cae8d04d8b3d1ecfadcaa989e673f6f73349ed5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a108bde616a7017653385b5a12111015051a294 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3831170f740685fddc8f6aa57a83ad0fef4711bf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d116a0b0e02f395cedfb8c725bd67480aa7c428c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd3087582e4fa36e89be4e6f859e75a4400292b4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b5595f33c3c273613b590892a578d78186bb400 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01681aa609b5f110502f56c4e3b2938ef •