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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 7EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: fix use-after-free in __nf_register_net_hook() We must not dereference @new_hooks after nf_hook_mutex has been released, because other threads might have freed our allocated hooks already. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in nf_hook_entries_get_hook_ops include/linux/netfilter.h:130 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in hooks_validate net/netfilter/core.c:171 [inline] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in __nf_register_net_hook+0x77a/0x820 net/netfilter/core.c:438 Read of size 2 at addr ffff88801c1a8000 by task syz-executor237/4430 CPU: 1 PID: 4430 Comm: syz-executor237 Not tainted 5.17.0-rc5-syzkaller-00306-g2293be58d6a1 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xcd/0x134 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x8d/0x336 mm/kasan/report.c:255 __kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:442 [inline] kasan_report.cold+0x83/0xdf mm/kasan/report.c:459 nf_hook_entries_get_hook_ops include/linux/netfilter.h:130 [inline] hooks_validate net/netfilter/core.c:171 [inline] __nf_register_net_hook+0x77a/0x820 net/netfilter/core.c:438 nf_register_net_hook+0x114/0x170 net/netfilter/core.c:571 nf_register_net_hooks+0x59/0xc0 net/netfilter/core.c:587 nf_synproxy_ipv6_init+0x85/0xe0 net/netfilter/nf_synproxy_core.c:1218 synproxy_tg6_check+0x30d/0x560 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_SYNPROXY.c:81 xt_check_target+0x26c/0x9e0 net/netfilter/x_tables.c:1038 check_target net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:530 [inline] find_check_entry.constprop.0+0x7f1/0x9e0 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:573 translate_table+0xc8b/0x1750 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:735 do_replace net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1153 [inline] do_ip6t_set_ctl+0x56e/0xb90 net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:1639 nf_setsockopt+0x83/0xe0 net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101 ipv6_setsockopt+0x122/0x180 net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c:1024 rawv6_setsockopt+0xd3/0x6a0 net/ipv6/raw.c:1084 __sys_setsockopt+0x2db/0x610 net/socket.c:2180 __do_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2191 [inline] __se_sys_setsockopt net/socket.c:2188 [inline] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0xba/0x150 net/socket.c:2188 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 [inline] do_syscall_64+0x35/0xb0 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae RIP: 0033:0x7f65a1ace7d9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 71 15 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f65a1a7f308 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000036 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000006 RCX: 00007f65a1ace7d9 RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000029 RDI: 0000000000000003 RBP: 00007f65a1b574c8 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000020000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f65a1b55130 R13: 00007f65a1b574c0 R14: 00007f65a1b24090 R15: 0000000000022000 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the page: page:ffffea0000706a00 refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x1c1a8 flags: 0xfff00000000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x7ff) raw: 00fff00000000000 ffffea0001c1b108 ffffea000046dd08 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected page_owner tracks the page as freed page last allocated via order 2, migratetype Unmovable, gfp_mask 0x52dc0(GFP_KERNEL|__GFP_NOWARN|__GFP_NORETRY|__GFP_COMP|__GFP_ZERO), pid 4430, ts 1061781545818, free_ts 1061791488993 prep_new_page mm/page_alloc.c:2434 [inline] get_page_from_freelist+0xa72/0x2f50 mm/page_alloc.c:4165 __alloc_pages+0x1b2/0x500 mm/page_alloc.c:5389 __alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:572 [inline] alloc_pages_node include/linux/gfp.h:595 [inline] kmalloc_large_node+0x62/0x130 mm/slub.c:4438 __kmalloc_node+0x35a/0x4a0 mm/slub. ---truncated--- • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2420b79f8c18a75ee2417cace381f4604b9b4365 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/05f7927b25d2635e87267ff6c79db79fb46cf313 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bdd8fc1b826e6f23963f5bef3f7431c6188ec954 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49c24579cec41e32f13d57b337fd28fb208d4a5b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b0142c4143c1ca297dcf2c0cdd045d65dae2344 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bd61f192a339b1095dfd6d56073a5265934c2979 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a8076e98dde17224dd47283b894a8b1dbe1bc72 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56763f12b0f02706576a088e85ef856de •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_queue: fix possible use-after-free Eric Dumazet says: The sock_hold() side seems suspect, because there is no guarantee that sk_refcnt is not already 0. On failure, we cannot queue the packet and need to indicate an error. The packet will be dropped by the caller. v2: split skb prefetch hunk into separate change • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/271b72c7fa82c2c7a795bc16896149933110672d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21b27b2baa27423286e9b8d3f0b194d587083d95 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef97921ccdc243170fcef857ba2a17cf697aece5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/34dc4a6a7f261736ef7183868a5bddad31c7f9e3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43c25da41e3091b31a906651a43e80a2719aa1ff https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d05239203fa38ea8a6f31e228460da4cb17a71a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd648bd1b33a828f62befa696b206c688da0ec43 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dcc3cb920bf7ba66ac5e9272293a9ba5f •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ipv6: ensure we call ipv6_mc_down() at most once There are two reasons for addrconf_notify() to be called with NETDEV_DOWN: either the network device is actually going down, or IPv6 was disabled on the interface. If either of them stays down while the other is toggled, we repeatedly call the code for NETDEV_DOWN, including ipv6_mc_down(), while never calling the corresponding ipv6_mc_up() in between. This will cause a new entry in idev->mc_tomb to be allocated for each multicast group the interface is subscribed to, which in turn leaks one struct ifmcaddr6 per nontrivial multicast group the interface is subscribed to. The following reproducer will leak at least $n objects: ip addr add ff2e::4242/32 dev eth0 autojoin sysctl -w net.ipv6.conf.eth0.disable_ipv6=1 for i in $(seq 1 $n); do ip link set up eth0; ip link set down eth0 done Joining groups with IPV6_ADD_MEMBERSHIP (unprivileged) or setting the sysctl net.ipv6.conf.eth0.forwarding to 1 (=> subscribing to ff02::2) can also be used to create a nontrivial idev->mc_list, which will the leak objects with the right up-down-sequence. Based on both sources for NETDEV_DOWN events the interface IPv6 state should be considered: - not ready if the network interface is not ready OR IPv6 is disabled for it - ready if the network interface is ready AND IPv6 is enabled for it The functions ipv6_mc_up() and ipv6_down() should only be run when this state changes. Implement this by remembering when the IPv6 state is ready, and only run ipv6_mc_down() if it actually changed from ready to not ready. The other direction (not ready -> ready) already works correctly, as: - the interface notification triggered codepath for NETDEV_UP / NETDEV_CHANGE returns early if ipv6 is disabled, and - the disable_ipv6=0 triggered codepath skips fully initializing the interface as long as addrconf_link_ready(dev) returns false - calling ipv6_mc_up() repeatedly does not leak anything • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ce62a84d53cd3d3cc5377bbf339e9b08ddf9c36 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a8736b2da28b24f01707f592ff059b9f90a058c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c71bf3229f9e9dd60ba02f5a5be02066edf57012 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24888915364cfa410de62d8abb5df95c3b67455d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9588ac2eddc2f223ebcebf6e9f5caed84d32922b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f4c63b24dea9cc2043ff845dcca9aaf8109ea38a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b11781515208dd31fbcd0b664078dce5dc44523f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72124e65a70b84e6303a5cd21b0ac1f27 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: arcnet: com20020: Fix null-ptr-deref in com20020pci_probe() During driver initialization, the pointer of card info, i.e. the variable 'ci' is required. However, the definition of 'com20020pci_id_table' reveals that this field is empty for some devices, which will cause null pointer dereference when initializing these devices. The following log reveals it: [ 3.973806] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000028-0x000000000000002f] [ 3.973819] RIP: 0010:com20020pci_probe+0x18d/0x13e0 [com20020_pci] [ 3.975181] Call Trace: [ 3.976208] local_pci_probe+0x13f/0x210 [ 3.977248] pci_device_probe+0x34c/0x6d0 [ 3.977255] ? pci_uevent+0x470/0x470 [ 3.978265] really_probe+0x24c/0x8d0 [ 3.978273] __driver_probe_device+0x1b3/0x280 [ 3.979288] driver_probe_device+0x50/0x370 Fix this by checking whether the 'ci' is a null pointer first. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c14f9c70327a6fb75534c4c61d7ea9c82ccf78f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e3bc7c5bbf87e86e9cd652ca2a9166942d86206 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1ee6b9340a38bdb9e5c90f0eac5b22b122c3049 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b838add93e1dd98210482dc433768daaf752bdef https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e50c589678e50f8d574612e473ca60ef45190896 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f394102ee27dbf051a4e283390cd8d1759dacea https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea372aab54903310756217d81610901a8e66cb7d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ca0bdff4249a644f2ca7a49d410d95b8d •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: do not WARN_ON() if we have PageError set Whenever we do any extent buffer operations we call assert_eb_page_uptodate() to complain loudly if we're operating on an non-uptodate page. Our overnight tests caught this warning earlier this week WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 553508 at fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:6849 assert_eb_page_uptodate+0x3f/0x50 CPU: 1 PID: 553508 Comm: kworker/u4:13 Tainted: G W 5.17.0-rc3+ #564 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014 Workqueue: btrfs-cache btrfs_work_helper RIP: 0010:assert_eb_page_uptodate+0x3f/0x50 RSP: 0018:ffffa961440a7c68 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0017ffffc0002112 RBX: ffffe6e74453f9c0 RCX: 0000000000001000 RDX: ffffe6e74467c887 RSI: ffffe6e74453f9c0 RDI: ffff8d4c5efc2fc0 RBP: 0000000000000d56 R08: ffff8d4d4a224000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00015817fa9d1ef0 R11: 000000000000000c R12: 00000000000007b1 R13: ffff8d4c5efc2fc0 R14: 0000000001500000 R15: 0000000001cb1000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8d4dbbd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ff31d3448d8 CR3: 0000000118be8004 CR4: 0000000000370ee0 Call Trace: extent_buffer_test_bit+0x3f/0x70 free_space_test_bit+0xa6/0xc0 load_free_space_tree+0x1f6/0x470 caching_thread+0x454/0x630 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x12/0x60 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x12/0x60 ? rcu_read_lock_sched_held+0x12/0x60 ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e00077aa439f0e8f416699fa4e9600db6583db70 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9efcc83b33b576302147634eca9bece8e3737e34 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a50e1fcbc9b85fd4e95b89a75c0884cb032a3e06 •