CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42268 – net/mlx5: Fix missing lock on sync reset reload
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42268
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5: Fix missing lock on sync reset reload On sync reset reload work, when remote host updates devlink on reload actions performed on that host, it misses taking devlink lock before calling devlink_remote_reload_actions_performed() which results in triggering lock assert like the following: WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 1164 at net/devlink/core.c:261 devl_assert_locked+0x3e/0x50 … CPU: 4 PID: 1164 Comm: kworker/u96:6 Tainted: G S W 6.10.0-rc2+ #116 Hardware name: Supermicro SYS-2028TP-DECTR/X10DRT-PT, BIOS 2.0 12/18/2015 Workqueue: mlx5_fw_reset_events mlx5_sync_reset_reload_work [mlx5_core] RIP: 0010:devl_assert_locked+0x3e/0x50 … Call Trace: <TASK> ? __warn+0xa4/0x210 ? devl_assert_locked+0x3e/0x50 ? report_bug+0x160/0x280 ? handle_bug+0x3f/0x80 ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84a433a40d0ebf3bbf36b8bfa58c6f45dc782344 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d07d1d40aabfd61bab21115639bd4f641db6002 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98884e89c90d077f6fe6ba18e6cf6f914642f04e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/091268f3c27a5b6d7858a3bb2a0dbcc9cd26ddb5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/572f9caa9e7295f8c8822e4122c7ae8f1c412ff9 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42267 – riscv/mm: Add handling for VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV in mm_fault_error()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42267
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: riscv/mm: Add handling for VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV in mm_fault_error() Handle VM_FAULT_SIGSEGV in the page fault path so that we correctly kill the process and we don't BUG() the kernel. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07037db5d479f90377c998259a4f9a469c404edf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/59be4a167782d68e21068a761b90b01fadc09146 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20dbdebc5580cd472a310d56a6e252275ee4c864 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7ccf2ca772bfe33e2c53ef80fa20d2d87eb6144 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/917f598209f3f5e4ab175d5079d8aeb523e58b1f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4e7db757e2d7f4c407a007e92c98477eab215d2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c710050c47d45eb77b28c271cddefc5c785cb40 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42266 – btrfs: make cow_file_range_inline() honor locked_page on error
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42266
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: make cow_file_range_inline() honor locked_page on error The btrfs buffered write path runs through __extent_writepage() which has some tricky return value handling for writepage_delalloc(). Specifically, when that returns 1, we exit, but for other return values we continue and end up calling btrfs_folio_end_all_writers(). If the folio has been unlocked (note that we check the PageLocked bit at the start of __extent_writepage()), this results in an assert panic like this one from syzbot: BTRFS: error (device loop0 state EAL) in free_log_tree:3267: errno=-5 IO failure BTRFS warning (device loop0 state EAL): Skipping commit of aborted transaction. BTRFS: error (device loop0 state EAL) in cleanup_transaction:2018: errno=-5 IO failure assertion failed: folio_test_locked(folio), in fs/btrfs/subpage.c:871 ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/subpage.c:871! Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI CPU: 1 PID: 5090 Comm: syz-executor225 Not tainted 6.10.0-syzkaller-05505-gb1bc554e009e #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/27/2024 RIP: 0010:btrfs_folio_end_all_writers+0x55b/0x610 fs/btrfs/subpage.c:871 Code: e9 d3 fb ff ff e8 25 22 c2 fd 48 c7 c7 c0 3c 0e 8c 48 c7 c6 80 3d 0e 8c 48 c7 c2 60 3c 0e 8c b9 67 03 00 00 e8 66 47 ad 07 90 <0f> 0b e8 6e 45 b0 07 4c 89 ff be 08 00 00 00 e8 21 12 25 fe 4c 89 RSP: 0018:ffffc900033d72e0 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000045 RBX: 00fff0000000402c RCX: 663b7a08c50a0a00 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000080000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: ffffc900033d73b0 R08: ffffffff8176b98c R09: 1ffff9200067adfc R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffff5200067adfd R12: 0000000000000001 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffea0001cbee80 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880b9500000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f5f076012f8 CR3: 000000000e134000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: <TASK> __extent_writepage fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:1597 [inline] extent_write_cache_pages fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2251 [inline] btrfs_writepages+0x14d7/0x2760 fs/btrfs/extent_io.c:2373 do_writepages+0x359/0x870 mm/page-writeback.c:2656 filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x125/0x180 mm/filemap.c:397 __filemap_fdatawrite_range mm/filemap.c:430 [inline] __filemap_fdatawrite mm/filemap.c:436 [inline] filemap_flush+0xdf/0x130 mm/filemap.c:463 btrfs_release_file+0x117/0x130 fs/btrfs/file.c:1547 __fput+0x24a/0x8a0 fs/file_table.c:422 task_work_run+0x24f/0x310 kernel/task_work.c:222 exit_task_work include/linux/task_work.h:40 [inline] do_exit+0xa2f/0x27f0 kernel/exit.c:877 do_group_exit+0x207/0x2c0 kernel/exit.c:1026 __do_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1037 [inline] __se_sys_exit_group kernel/exit.c:1035 [inline] __x64_sys_exit_group+0x3f/0x40 kernel/exit.c:1035 x64_sys_call+0x2634/0x2640 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:232 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f5f075b70c9 Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f5f075b709f. I was hitting the same issue by doing hundreds of accelerated runs of generic/475, which also hits IO errors by design. I instrumented that reproducer with bpftrace and found that the undesirable folio_unlock was coming from the following callstack: folio_unlock+5 __process_pages_contig+475 cow_file_range_inline.constprop.0+230 cow_file_range+803 btrfs_run_delalloc_range+566 writepage_delalloc+332 __extent_writepage # inlined in my stacktrace, but I added it here extent_write_cache_pages+622 Looking at the bisected-to pa ---truncated--- • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0586d0a89e77d717da14df42648ace4a9fd67981 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/061e41581606000a83ce0f0f01d6ad338f3704e9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/478574370bef7951fbd9ef5155537d6cbed49472 •
CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42265 – protect the fetch of ->fd[fd] in do_dup2() from mispredictions
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42265
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: protect the fetch of ->fd[fd] in do_dup2() from mispredictions both callers have verified that fd is not greater than ->max_fds; however, misprediction might end up with tofree = fdt->fd[fd]; being speculatively executed. That's wrong for the same reasons why it's wrong in close_fd()/file_close_fd_locked(); the same solution applies - array_index_nospec(fd, fdt->max_fds) could differ from fd only in case of speculative execution on mispredicted path. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed42e8ff509d2a61c6642d1825032072dab79f26 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41a6c31df77bd8e050136b0a200b537da9e1084a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08775b3d6ed117cf4518754ec7300ee42b6a5368 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f480493550b6a23d3a65d095d6569d4a7f56a0f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5db999fff545b924b24c9afd368ef5c17279b176 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da72e783afd27d9f487836b2e6738146c0edd149 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1171ceccabfd596ca370c5d2cbb47d110c3f2fe1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8aa37bde1a7b645816cda8b80df4753ec •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0CVE-2024-42264 – drm/v3d: Prevent out of bounds access in performance query extensions
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-42264
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/v3d: Prevent out of bounds access in performance query extensions Check that the number of perfmons userspace is passing in the copy and reset extensions is not greater than the internal kernel storage where the ids will be copied into. (cherry picked from commit f32b5128d2c440368b5bf3a7a356823e235caabb) • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bae7cb5d68001a8d4ceec5964dda74bb9aab7220 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/73ad583bd4938bf37d2709fc36901eb6f22f2722 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6ce9efd12ae81cf46bf44eb0348594558dfbb9d2 •