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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: closures: Change BUG_ON() to WARN_ON() If a BUG_ON() can be hit in the wild, it shouldn't be a BUG_ON() For reference, this has popped up once in the CI, and we'll need more info to debug it: 03240 ------------[ cut here ]------------ 03240 kernel BUG at lib/closure.c:21! 03240 kernel BUG at lib/closure.c:21! 03240 Internal error: Oops - BUG: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP 03240 Modules linked in: 03240 CPU: 15 PID: 40534 Comm: kworker/u80:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc4-ktest-ga56da69799bd #25570 03240 Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) 03240 Workqueue: btree_update btree_interior_update_work 03240 pstate: 00001005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) 03240 pc : closure_put+0x224/0x2a0 03240 lr : closure_put+0x24/0x2a0 03240 sp : ffff0000d12071c0 03240 x29: ffff0000d12071c0 x28: dfff800000000000 x27: ffff0000d1207360 03240 x26: 0000000000000040 x25: 0000000000000040 x24: 0000000000000040 03240 x23: ffff0000c1f20180 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff0000c1f20168 03240 x20: 0000000040000000 x19: ffff0000c1f20140 x18: 0000000000000001 03240 x17: 0000000000003aa0 x16: 0000000000003ad0 x15: 1fffe0001c326974 03240 x14: 0000000000000a1e x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 1fffe000183e402d 03240 x11: ffff6000183e402d x10: dfff800000000000 x9 : ffff6000183e402e 03240 x8 : 0000000000000001 x7 : 00009fffe7c1bfd3 x6 : ffff0000c1f2016b 03240 x5 : ffff0000c1f20168 x4 : ffff6000183e402e x3 : ffff800081391954 03240 x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000a8000000 03240 Call trace: 03240 closure_put+0x224/0x2a0 03240 bch2_check_for_deadlock+0x910/0x1028 03240 bch2_six_check_for_deadlock+0x1c/0x30 03240 six_lock_slowpath.isra.0+0x29c/0xed0 03240 six_lock_ip_waiter+0xa8/0xf8 03240 __bch2_btree_node_lock_write+0x14c/0x298 03240 bch2_trans_lock_write+0x6d4/0xb10 03240 __bch2_trans_commit+0x135c/0x5520 03240 btree_interior_update_work+0x1248/0x1c10 03240 process_scheduled_works+0x53c/0xd90 03240 worker_thread+0x370/0x8c8 03240 kthread+0x258/0x2e8 03240 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 03240 Code: aa1303e0 d63f0020 a94363f7 17ffff8c (d4210000) 03240 ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- 03240 Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception 03240 SMP: stopping secondary CPUs 03241 SMP: failed to stop secondary CPUs 13,15 03241 Kernel Offset: disabled 03241 CPU features: 0x00,00000003,80000008,4240500b 03241 Memory Limit: none 03241 ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Oops - BUG: Fatal exception ]--- 03246 ========= FAILED TIMEOUT copygc_torture_no_checksum in 7200s En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: cierres: Cambie BUG_ON() a WARN_ON() Si se puede acceder a un BUG_ON() en estado salvaje, no debería ser un BUG_ON() Como referencia, ha aparecido esto una vez en el CI, y necesitaremos más información para depurarlo: 03240 ------------[ cortar aquí ]------------ 03240 ERROR del kernel en lib /cierre.c:21! 03240 ERROR del kernel en lib/closure.c:21! 03240 Error interno: Ups - ERROR: 00000000f2000800 [#1] SMP 03240 Módulos vinculados en: 03240 CPU: 15 PID: 40534 Comm: kworker/u80:1 No contaminado 6.10.0-rc4-ktest-ga56da69799bd #25570 Nombre del hardware: linux,dummy-virt (DT) 03240 Cola de trabajo: btree_update btree_interior_update_work 03240 pstate: 00001005 (nzcv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT +SSBS BTYPE=--) 03240 pc: cierre_put+0x224/0x2a0 03240 lr: cierre_put+0x24/ 0x2a0 03240 sp: ffff0000d12071c0 03240 x29: ffff0000d12071c0 x28: dfff800000000000 x27: ffff0000d1207360 03240 x26: 0000000000000040 0000000000000040 x24: 0000000000000040 03240 x23: ffff0000c1f20180 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff0000c1f20168 03240 x20: 000000 x19: ffff0000c1f20140 x18: 0000000000000001 03240 x17: 0000000000003aa0 x16 : 0000000000003ad0 x15: 1fffe0001c326974 03240 x14: 0000000000000a1e x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 1fffe000183e402d 03240 x11: e402d x10: dfff800000000000 x9: ffff6000183e402e 03240 x8: 0000000000000001 x7: 00009fffe7c1bfd3 x6: ffff0000c1f2016b 03240 x5: 0168 x4: ffff6000183e402e x3: ffff800081391954 03240 x2: 0000000000000001 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : 00000000a8000000 03240 Rastreo de llamadas: 03240 cierre_put+0x224/0x2a0 03240 bch2_check_for_deadlock+0x910/0x1028 03240 bch2_six_check_for_deadlock+0x1c /0x30 03240 six_lock_slowpath.isra.0+0x29c/0xed0 03240 six_lock_ip_waiter+0xa8/0xf8 03240 __bch2_btree_node_lock_write+0x14c/0x298 03240 bch2_trans_lock_write+0x6d4/0xb10 03240 __bch2_trans_commit+0x135c/0x5520 03240 btree_interior_update_work+0x1248/0x1c10 03240 Process_scheduled_works+0x53c/0xd90 03240 trabajador_thread+0x37 0/0x8c8 03240 kthread+0x258/0x2e8 03240 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 03240 Código: aa1303e0 d63f0020 a94363f7 17ffff8c (d4210000 ) 03240 ---[ seguimiento final 0000000000000000 ]--- 03240 Pánico del kernel - no se sincroniza: Ups - ERROR: Excepción fatal 03240 SMP: deteniendo las CPU secundarias 03241 SMP: no se pudieron detener las CPU secundarias 13,15 03241 Desplazamiento del kernel: deshabilitado 03241 CPU características: 0x00,00000003,80000008,4240500b 03241 Límite de memoria: ninguno 03241 ---[ fin del pánico del kernel - no se sincroniza: Ups - ERROR: excepción fatal ]--- 03246 ========= TIEMPO DE ESPERA FALLIDO copygc_torture_no_checksum en 7200 • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d85f2ab79d5918a66539ebf046c099f7448db8d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/339b84ab6b1d66900c27bd999271cb2ae40ce812 •

CVSS: 4.4EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: USB: serial: mos7840: fix crash on resume Since commit c49cfa917025 ("USB: serial: use generic method if no alternative is provided in usb serial layer"), USB serial core calls the generic resume implementation when the driver has not provided one. This can trigger a crash on resume with mos7840 since support for multiple read URBs was added back in 2011. Specifically, both port read URBs are now submitted on resume for open ports, but the context pointer of the second URB is left set to the core rather than mos7840 port structure. Fix this by implementing dedicated suspend and resume functions for mos7840. Tested with Delock 87414 USB 2.0 to 4x serial adapter. [ johan: analyse crash and rewrite commit message; set busy flag on resume; drop bulk-in check; drop unnecessary usb_kill_urb() ] • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d83b405383c965498923f3561c3321e2b5df5727 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/932a86a711c722b45ed47ba2103adca34d225b33 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b14aa5673e0a8077ff4b74f0bb260735e7d5e6a4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1094ed500987e67a9d18b0f95e1812f1cc720856 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ae6a64f18211851c8df6b4221381c438b9a7348 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/553e67dec846323b5575e78a776cf594c13f98c4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c15a688e49987385baa8804bf65d570e362f8576 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2024-42244 • CWE-99: Improper Control of Resource Identifiers ('Resource Injection') •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: configfs: Prevent OOB read/write in usb_string_copy() Userspace provided string 's' could trivially have the length zero. Left unchecked this will firstly result in an OOB read in the form `if (str[0 - 1] == '\n') followed closely by an OOB write in the form `str[0 - 1] = '\0'`. There is already a validating check to catch strings that are too long. Let's supply an additional check for invalid strings that are too short. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a444c3fc264119801575ab086e03fb4952f23fd0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c95fbdde87e39e5e0ae27f28bf6711edfb985caa https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8474a10c535e6a2024c3b06e37e4a3a23beb490 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72b8ee0d9826e8ed00e0bdfce3e46b98419b37ce https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d16f63d8030903e5031853e79d731ee5d474e70 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1205033e912f9332c1dbefa812e6ceb0575ce0a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eecfefad0953b2f31aaefa058f7f348ff39c4bba https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d3c721e686ea6c59e18289b400cc95c7 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: fix race between delayed_work() and ceph_monc_stop() The way the delayed work is handled in ceph_monc_stop() is prone to races with mon_fault() and possibly also finish_hunting(). Both of these can requeue the delayed work which wouldn't be canceled by any of the following code in case that happens after cancel_delayed_work_sync() runs -- __close_session() doesn't mess with the delayed work in order to avoid interfering with the hunting interval logic. This part was missed in commit b5d91704f53e ("libceph: behave in mon_fault() if cur_mon < 0") and use-after-free can still ensue on monc and objects that hang off of it, with monc->auth and monc->monmap being particularly susceptible to quickly being reused. To fix this: - clear monc->cur_mon and monc->hunting as part of closing the session in ceph_monc_stop() - bail from delayed_work() if monc->cur_mon is cleared, similar to how it's done in mon_fault() and finish_hunting() (based on monc->hunting) - call cancel_delayed_work_sync() after the session is closed • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1177afeca833174ba83504688eec898c6214f4bf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63e5d035e3a7ab7412a008f202633c5e6a0a28ea https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/34b76d1922e41da1fa73d43b764cddd82ac9733c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20cf67dcb7db842f941eff1af6ee5e9dc41796d7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2d33654d40a05afd91ab24c9a73ab512a0670a9a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9525af1f58f67df387768770fcf6d6a8f23aee3d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/33d38c5da17f8db2d80e811b7829d2822c10625e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69c7b2fe4c9cc1d3b1186d1c5606627ec •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: aead,cipher - zeroize key buffer after use I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that previously held the private key. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89b9b6fa4463daf820e6a5ef65c3b0c2db239513 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b716e9c3603ee95ed45e938fe47227d22cf3ec35 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9db8c299a521813630fcb4154298cb60c37f3133 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71dd428615375e36523f4d4f7685ddd54113646d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/28c8d274848feba552e95c5c2a7e3cfe8f15c534 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b502d4a08875ea2b4ea5d5b28dc7c991c8b90cfb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f58679996a831754a356974376f248aa0af2eb8e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23e4099bdc3c8381992f9eb975c79196d •