CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0CVE-2024-36023 – Julia Lawall reported this null pointer dereference, this should fix it.
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-36023
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Julia Lawall reported this null pointer dereference, this should fix it. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: Julia Lawall informó esta desreferencia de puntero nulo, esto debería solucionarlo. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e2177f94c0e0bc41323d7b6975a5f4820ed347e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/214a6c4a28c11d67044e6cf3a0ab415050d9f03a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b972e8ac3f44f693127a2806031962d100dfc4d1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9bf93dcfc453fae192fe5d7874b89699e8f800ac • CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0CVE-2024-36022 – drm/amdgpu: Init zone device and drm client after mode-1 reset on reload
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-36022
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Init zone device and drm client after mode-1 reset on reload In passthrough environment, when amdgpu is reloaded after unload, mode-1 is triggered after initializing the necessary IPs, That init does not include KFD, and KFD init waits until the reset is completed. KFD init is called in the reset handler, but in this case, the zone device and drm client is not initialized, causing app to create kernel panic. v2: Removing the init KFD condition from amdgpu_amdkfd_drm_client_create. As the previous version has the potential of creating DRM client twice. v3: v2 patch results in SDMA engine hung as DRM open causes VM clear to SDMA before SDMA init. Adding the condition to in drm client creation, on top of v1, to guard against drm client creation call multiple times. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: drm/amdgpu: dispositivo de zona de inicio y cliente drm después del restablecimiento del modo 1 al recargar. En el entorno de paso a través, cuando amdgpu se recarga después de la descarga, el modo 1 se activa después de inicializar las IP necesarias. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4f8154f775197d0021b690c2945d6a4d8094c8f6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f679fd6057fbf5ab34aaee28d58b7f81af0cbf48 •
CVSS: 6.1EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-36017 – rtnetlink: Correct nested IFLA_VF_VLAN_LIST attribute validation
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-36017
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rtnetlink: Correct nested IFLA_VF_VLAN_LIST attribute validation Each attribute inside a nested IFLA_VF_VLAN_LIST is assumed to be a struct ifla_vf_vlan_info so the size of such attribute needs to be at least of sizeof(struct ifla_vf_vlan_info) which is 14 bytes. The current size validation in do_setvfinfo is against NLA_HDRLEN (4 bytes) which is less than sizeof(struct ifla_vf_vlan_info) so this validation is not enough and a too small attribute might be cast to a struct ifla_vf_vlan_info, this might result in an out of bands read access when accessing the saved (casted) entry in ivvl. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: rtnetlink: Validación correcta del atributo IFLA_VF_VLAN_LIST anidado. Se supone que cada atributo dentro de un IFLA_VF_VLAN_LIST anidado es una estructura ifla_vf_vlan_info, por lo que el tamaño de dicho atributo debe ser al menos de sizeof(struct ifla_vf_vlan_info), que es de 14 bytes. La validación de tamaño actual en do_setvfinfo es contra NLA_HDRLEN (4 bytes), que es menor que sizeof(struct ifla_vf_vlan_info), por lo que esta validación no es suficiente y un atributo demasiado pequeño podría convertirse en una estructura ifla_vf_vlan_info, esto podría resultar en un acceso de lectura fuera de banda al acceder a la entrada guardada (transmitida) en ivvl. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/79aab093a0b5370d7fc4e99df75996f4744dc03f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8ac69ff2d0d5be9734c4402de932aa3dc8549c1a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5e7ef2d88666a0212db8c38e6703864b9ce70169 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c8f44b02500c7d14b5e6618fe4ef9a0da47b3de https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3c1bf3054f96ddeab0621d920445bada769b40e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e4c7193954f4faab92f6e8d88bc5565317b44e7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/206003c748b88890a910ef7142d18f77be57550b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4a4b9757789a1551d2df130df23bfb354 • CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read •
CVSS: 7.7EPSS: 0%CPEs: 9EXPL: 0CVE-2024-36016 – tty: n_gsm: fix possible out-of-bounds in gsm0_receive()
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-36016
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tty: n_gsm: fix possible out-of-bounds in gsm0_receive() Assuming the following: - side A configures the n_gsm in basic option mode - side B sends the header of a basic option mode frame with data length 1 - side A switches to advanced option mode - side B sends 2 data bytes which exceeds gsm->len Reason: gsm->len is not used in advanced option mode. - side A switches to basic option mode - side B keeps sending until gsm0_receive() writes past gsm->buf Reason: Neither gsm->state nor gsm->len have been reset after reconfiguration. Fix this by changing gsm->count to gsm->len comparison from equal to less than. Also add upper limit checks against the constant MAX_MRU in gsm0_receive() and gsm1_receive() to harden against memory corruption of gsm->len and gsm->mru. All other checks remain as we still need to limit the data according to the user configuration and actual payload size. En el kernel de Linux se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: tty: n_gsm: corrige posibles fuera de los límites en gsm0_receive() Suponiendo lo siguiente: - el lado A configura el n_gsm en modo de opción básica - el lado B envía el encabezado de un mensaje básico trama del modo de opción con longitud de datos 1 - el lado A cambia al modo de opción avanzada - el lado B envía 2 bytes de datos que exceden gsm->len Motivo: gsm->len no se usa en el modo de opción avanzada. - el lado A cambia al modo de opción básica - el lado B continúa enviando hasta que gsm0_receive() escribe más allá de gsm->buf Motivo: Ni gsm->state ni gsm->len se han restablecido después de la reconfiguración. Solucione este problema cambiando gsm->count a gsm->len comparación de igual a menor que. También agregue comprobaciones de límite superior contra la constante MAX_MRU en gsm0_receive() y gsm1_receive() para proteger contra la corrupción de memoria de gsm->len y gsm->mru. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e1eaea46bb4020b38a141b84f88565d4603f8dd0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9513d4148950b05bc99fa7314dc883cc0e1605e5 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b229bc6c6ea9fe459fc3fa94fd0a27a2f32aca56 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fb736c9931e02dbc7d9a75044c8e1c039e50f04 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c267110fc110390704cc065edb9817fdd10ff54 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/46f52c89a7e7d2691b97a9728e4591d071ca8abc https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/774d83b008eccb1c48c14dc5486e7aa255731350 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f126ce7305fe88f49cdabc6db4168b931 • CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write •
CVSS: 5.9EPSS: 0%CPEs: 11EXPL: 0CVE-2023-52881 – tcp: do not accept ACK of bytes we never sent
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2023-52881
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: do not accept ACK of bytes we never sent This patch is based on a detailed report and ideas from Yepeng Pan and Christian Rossow. ACK seq validation is currently following RFC 5961 5.2 guidelines: The ACK value is considered acceptable only if it is in the range of ((SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) <= SEG.ACK <= SND.NXT). All incoming segments whose ACK value doesn't satisfy the above condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back. It needs to be noted that RFC 793 on page 72 (fifth check) says: "If the ACK is a duplicate (SEG.ACK < SND.UNA), it can be ignored. If the ACK acknowledges something not yet sent (SEG.ACK > SND.NXT) then send an ACK, drop the segment, and return". The "ignored" above implies that the processing of the incoming data segment continues, which means the ACK value is treated as acceptable. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/354e4aa391ed50a4d827ff6fc11e0667d0859b25 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d15569e14cfcf9151e9e3b4c0cb98369943a2bb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e252bbd8c87b95e9cecdc01350fbb0b46a0f9bf1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2ee4432e82437a7c051c254b065fbf5d4581e1a3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69eae75ca5255e876628ac5cee9eaab31f644b57 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/458f07ffeccd17f99942311e09ef574ddf4a414a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ffff0cc929fdfc62a74b384c4903d6496c910f0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b17a886ed29f3b70b78ccf632dad03e0c •