CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0CVE-2021-47229 – PCI: aardvark: Fix kernel panic during PIO transfer
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2021-47229
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI: aardvark: Fix kernel panic during PIO transfer Trying to start a new PIO transfer by writing value 0 in PIO_START register when previous transfer has not yet completed (which is indicated by value 1 in PIO_START) causes an External Abort on CPU, which results in kernel panic: SError Interrupt on CPU0, code 0xbf000002 -- SError Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt To prevent kernel panic, it is required to reject a new PIO transfer when previous one has not finished yet. If previous PIO transfer is not finished yet, the kernel may issue a new PIO request only if the previous PIO transfer timed out. In the past the root cause of this issue was incorrectly identified (as it often happens during link retraining or after link down event) and special hack was implemented in Trusted Firmware to catch all SError events in EL3, to ignore errors with code 0xbf000002 and not forwarding any other errors to kernel and instead throw panic from EL3 Trusted Firmware handler. Links to discussion and patches about this issue: https://git.trustedfirmware.org/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a.git/commit/?id=3c7dcdac5c50 https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/20190316161243.29517-1-repk@triplefau.lt/ https://lore.kernel.org/linux-pci/971be151d24312cc533989a64bd454b4@www.loen.fr/ https://review.trustedfirmware.org/c/TF-A/trusted-firmware-a/+/1541 But the real cause was the fact that during link retraining or after link down event the PIO transfer may take longer time, up to the 1.44s until it times out. This increased probability that a new PIO transfer would be issued by kernel while previous one has not finished yet. After applying this change into the kernel, it is possible to revert the mentioned TF-A hack and SError events do not have to be caught in TF-A EL3. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: PCI: aardvark: solucionó el pánico del kernel durante la transferencia de PIO. Intentar iniciar una nueva transferencia de PIO escribiendo el valor 0 en el registro PIO_START cuando la transferencia anterior aún no se ha completado (que se indica con el valor 1). en PIO_START) provoca un aborto externo en la CPU, lo que resulta en pánico del kernel: Interrupción de SError en CPU0, código 0xbf000002 - Pánico del kernel de SError - no se sincroniza: Interrupción de SError asincrónica Para evitar el pánico del kernel, es necesario rechazar una nueva transferencia de PIO cuando el anterior aún no ha terminado. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/400e6b1860c8be61388d0b77814c53260f96e17a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b00a9aaa4be20ad6e3311fb78a485eae0899e89a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c90f90a91d75c3c73dd633827c90e8746d9f54d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a1dbc4473974867fe8c5f195c17b341c8e82867 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d213a4ddf49a860be6e795482c17f87e0c82b2a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f18139966d072dab8e4398c95ce955a9742e04f7 •
CVSS: 6.2EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0CVE-2021-47224 – net: ll_temac: Make sure to free skb when it is completely used
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2021-47224
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ll_temac: Make sure to free skb when it is completely used With the skb pointer piggy-backed on the TX BD, we have a simple and efficient way to free the skb buffer when the frame has been transmitted. But in order to avoid freeing the skb while there are still fragments from the skb in use, we need to piggy-back on the TX BD of the skb, not the first. Without this, we are doing use-after-free on the DMA side, when the first BD of a multi TX BD packet is seen as completed in xmit_done, and the remaining BDs are still being processed. En el kernel de Linux se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: net:ll_temac: Asegúrate de liberar skb cuando esté completamente utilizado. Con el puntero skb acoplado en la BD TX, tenemos una forma sencilla y eficaz de liberar el buffer skb. cuando la trama ha sido transmitida. Pero para evitar liberar el skb mientras todavía hay fragmentos del skb en uso, debemos aprovechar el BD TX del skb, no el primero. Sin esto, estamos haciendo use after free en el lado DMA, cuando el primer BD de un paquete BD de transmisión múltiple se considera completado en xmit_done y los BD restantes todavía se están procesando. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6d120ab4dc39a543c6b63361e1d0541c382900a3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/019ab7d044d0ebf97e1236bb8935b7809be92358 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e8afe05bd359ebe12a61dbdc94c06c00ea3e8d4b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6aa32217a9a446275440ee8724b1ecaf1838df47 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0CVE-2021-47223 – net: bridge: fix vlan tunnel dst null pointer dereference
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2021-47223
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: fix vlan tunnel dst null pointer dereference This patch fixes a tunnel_dst null pointer dereference due to lockless access in the tunnel egress path. When deleting a vlan tunnel the tunnel_dst pointer is set to NULL without waiting a grace period (i.e. while it's still usable) and packets egressing are dereferencing it without checking. Use READ/WRITE_ONCE to annotate the lockless use of tunnel_id, use RCU for accessing tunnel_dst and make sure it is read only once and checked in the egress path. The dst is already properly RCU protected so we don't need to do anything fancy than to make sure tunnel_id and tunnel_dst are read only once and checked in the egress path. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: net: bridge: corrige la desreferencia del puntero null del túnel vlan dst Este parche corrige una desreferencia del puntero null de Tunnel_dst debido al acceso sin bloqueo en la ruta de salida del túnel. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11538d039ac6efcf4f1a6c536e1b87cd3668a9fd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad7feefe7164892db424c45687472db803d87f79 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24a6e55f17aa123bc1fc54b7d3c410b41bc16530 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2241e62f6b4a774d8a92048fdf59c45f6c2fe5c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe0448a3fad365a747283a00a1d1ad5e8d6675b7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/abb02e05cb1c0a30dd873a29f33bc092067dc35d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/58e2071742e38f29f051b709a5cca014ba51166f •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0CVE-2021-47222 – net: bridge: fix vlan tunnel dst refcnt when egressing
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2021-47222
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: fix vlan tunnel dst refcnt when egressing The egress tunnel code uses dst_clone() and directly sets the result which is wrong because the entry might have 0 refcnt or be already deleted, causing number of problems. It also triggers the WARN_ON() in dst_hold()[1] when a refcnt couldn't be taken. Fix it by using dst_hold_safe() and checking if a reference was actually taken before setting the dst. [1] dmesg WARN_ON log and following refcnt errors WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 38 at include/net/dst.h:230 br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel+0x10b/0x134 [bridge] Modules linked in: 8021q garp mrp bridge stp llc bonding ipv6 virtio_net CPU: 5 PID: 38 Comm: ksoftirqd/5 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W 5.13.0-rc3+ #360 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.14.0-1.fc33 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:br_handle_egress_vlan_tunnel+0x10b/0x134 [bridge] Code: e8 85 bc 01 e1 45 84 f6 74 90 45 31 f6 85 db 48 c7 c7 a0 02 19 a0 41 0f 94 c6 31 c9 31 d2 44 89 f6 e8 64 bc 01 e1 85 db 75 02 <0f> 0b 31 c9 31 d2 44 89 f6 48 c7 c7 70 02 19 a0 e8 4b bc 01 e1 49 RSP: 0018:ffff8881003d39e8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffffffffa01902a0 RBP: ffff8881040c6700 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: 2ce93d0054fe0d00 R11: 54fe0d00000e0000 R12: ffff888109515000 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 0000000000000401 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88822bf40000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f42ba70f030 CR3: 0000000109926000 CR4: 00000000000006e0 Call Trace: br_handle_vlan+0xbc/0xca [bridge] __br_forward+0x23/0x164 [bridge] deliver_clone+0x41/0x48 [bridge] br_handle_frame_finish+0x36f/0x3aa [bridge] ? skb_dst+0x2e/0x38 [bridge] ? br_handle_ingress_vlan_tunnel+0x3e/0x1c8 [bridge] ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11538d039ac6efcf4f1a6c536e1b87cd3668a9fd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42020f7f37a90d24b9551f5f7eba3f7c7c102968 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84fc1c944e45ab317e2e70a0e7f76fa2a5e43b6e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/79855be6445b6592bddb7bd7167083ec8cdbd73f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc7fdd8c5c2ad2fe3e297698be9d4dbe4a4e0579 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/25053a8404ba17ca48f5553d487afc1882e9f56c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cfc579f9d89af4ada58c69b03bcaa4887840f3b3 •
CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-36004 – i40e: Do not use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag for workqueue
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-36004
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i40e: Do not use WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag for workqueue Issue reported by customer during SRIOV testing, call trace: When both i40e and the i40iw driver are loaded, a warning in check_flush_dependency is being triggered. This seems to be because of the i40e driver workqueue is allocated with the WQ_MEM_RECLAIM flag, and the i40iw one is not. Similar error was encountered on ice too and it was fixed by removing the flag. Do the same for i40e too. [Feb 9 09:08] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ +0.000004] workqueue: WQ_MEM_RECLAIM i40e:i40e_service_task [i40e] is flushing !WQ_MEM_RECLAIM infiniband:0x0 [ +0.000060] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 937 at kernel/workqueue.c:2966 check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000007] Modules linked in: snd_seq_dummy snd_hrtimer snd_seq snd_timer snd_seq_device snd soundcore nls_utf8 cifs cifs_arc4 nls_ucs2_utils rdma_cm iw_cm ib_cm cifs_md4 dns_resolver netfs qrtr rfkill sunrpc vfat fat intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common irdma intel_uncore_frequency intel_uncore_frequency_common ice ipmi_ssif isst_if_common skx_edac nfit libnvdimm x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp gnss coretemp ib_uverbs rapl intel_cstate ib_core iTCO_wdt iTCO_vendor_support acpi_ipmi mei_me ipmi_si intel_uncore ioatdma i2c_i801 joydev pcspkr mei ipmi_devintf lpc_ich intel_pch_thermal i2c_smbus ipmi_msghandler acpi_power_meter acpi_pad xfs libcrc32c ast sd_mod drm_shmem_helper t10_pi drm_kms_helper sg ixgbe drm i40e ahci crct10dif_pclmul libahci crc32_pclmul igb crc32c_intel libata ghash_clmulni_intel i2c_algo_bit mdio dca wmi dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod fuse [ +0.000050] CPU: 0 PID: 937 Comm: kworker/0:3 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.8.0-rc2-Feb-net_dev-Qiueue-00279-gbd43c5687e05 #1 [ +0.000003] Hardware name: Intel Corporation S2600BPB/S2600BPB, BIOS SE5C620.86B.02.01.0013.121520200651 12/15/2020 [ +0.000001] Workqueue: i40e i40e_service_task [i40e] [ +0.000024] RIP: 0010:check_flush_dependency+0x10b/0x120 [ +0.000003] Code: ff 49 8b 54 24 18 48 8d 8b b0 00 00 00 49 89 e8 48 81 c6 b0 00 00 00 48 c7 c7 b0 97 fa 9f c6 05 8a cc 1f 02 01 e8 35 b3 fd ff <0f> 0b e9 10 ff ff ff 80 3d 78 cc 1f 02 00 75 94 e9 46 ff ff ff 90 [ +0.000002] RSP: 0018:ffffbd294976bcf8 EFLAGS: 00010282 [ +0.000002] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff94d4c483c000 RCX: 0000000000000027 [ +0.000001] RDX: ffff94d47f620bc8 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff94d47f620bc0 [ +0.000001] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffff7fff [ +0.000001] R10: ffffbd294976bb98 R11: ffffffffa0be65e8 R12: ffff94c5451ea180 [ +0.000001] R13: ffff94c5ab5e8000 R14: ffff94c5c20b6e05 R15: ffff94c5f1330ab0 [ +0.000001] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff94d47f600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ +0.000002] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ +0.000001] CR2: 00007f9e6f1fca70 CR3: 0000000038e20004 CR4: 00000000007706f0 [ +0.000000] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ +0.000001] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ +0.000001] PKRU: 55555554 [ +0.000001] Call Trace: [ +0.000001] <TASK> [ +0.000002] ? __warn+0x80/0x130 [ +0.000003] ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d5957cbdecdbb77d24c1465caadd801c07afa4a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09b54d29f05129b092f7c793a70b689ffb3c7b2c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/546d0fe9d76e8229a67369f9cb61e961d99038bd https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fbbb2404340dd6178e281bd427c271f7d5ec1d22 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ff7431f898dd00892a545b7d0ce7adf5b926944f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/152ed360cf2d273f88fc99a518b7eb868aae2939 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8d6105f637883c8c09825e962308c06e977de4f0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1594dac8b1ed78f9e75c263327e198a2e •