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CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 10EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: geneve: fix header validation in geneve[6]_xmit_skb syzbot is able to trigger an uninit-value in geneve_xmit() [1] Problem : While most ip tunnel helpers (like ip_tunnel_get_dsfield()) uses skb_protocol(skb, true), pskb_inet_may_pull() is only using skb->protocol. If anything else than ETH_P_IPV6 or ETH_P_IP is found in skb->protocol, pskb_inet_may_pull() does nothing at all. If a vlan tag was provided by the caller (af_packet in the syzbot case), the network header might not point to the correct location, and skb linear part could be smaller than expected. Add skb_vlan_inet_prepare() to perform a complete mac validation. Use this in geneve for the moment, I suspect we need to adopt this more broadly. v4 - Jakub reported v3 broke l2_tos_ttl_inherit.sh selftest - Only call __vlan_get_protocol() for vlan types. v2,v3 - Addressed Sabrina comments on v1 and v2 [1] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:910 [inline] BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in geneve_xmit+0x302d/0x5420 drivers/net/geneve.c:1030 geneve_xmit_skb drivers/net/geneve.c:910 [inline] geneve_xmit+0x302d/0x5420 drivers/net/geneve.c:1030 __netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4903 [inline] netdev_start_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:4917 [inline] xmit_one net/core/dev.c:3531 [inline] dev_hard_start_xmit+0x247/0xa20 net/core/dev.c:3547 __dev_queue_xmit+0x348d/0x52c0 net/core/dev.c:4335 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3091 [inline] packet_xmit+0x9c/0x6c0 net/packet/af_packet.c:276 packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3081 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x8bb0/0x9ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x685/0x830 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 Uninit was created at: slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3804 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3845 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_node+0x613/0xc50 mm/slub.c:3888 kmalloc_reserve+0x13d/0x4a0 net/core/skbuff.c:577 __alloc_skb+0x35b/0x7a0 net/core/skbuff.c:668 alloc_skb include/linux/skbuff.h:1318 [inline] alloc_skb_with_frags+0xc8/0xbf0 net/core/skbuff.c:6504 sock_alloc_send_pskb+0xa81/0xbf0 net/core/sock.c:2795 packet_alloc_skb net/packet/af_packet.c:2930 [inline] packet_snd net/packet/af_packet.c:3024 [inline] packet_sendmsg+0x722d/0x9ef0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3113 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0x30f/0x380 net/socket.c:745 __sys_sendto+0x685/0x830 net/socket.c:2191 __do_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2203 [inline] __se_sys_sendto net/socket.c:2199 [inline] __x64_sys_sendto+0x125/0x1d0 net/socket.c:2199 do_syscall_64+0xd5/0x1f0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6d/0x75 CPU: 0 PID: 5033 Comm: syz-executor346 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc1-syzkaller-00005-g928a87efa423 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 02/29/2024 En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: geneve: corrige la validación del encabezado en geneve[6]_xmit_skb syzbot puede activar un valor uninit en geneve_xmit() [1] Problema: mientras que la mayoría de los asistentes de túnel IP (como ip_tunnel_get_dsfield( )) usa skb_protocol(skb, true), pskb_inet_may_pull() solo usa skb->protocol. Si se encuentra algo más que ETH_P_IPV6 o ETH_P_IP en skb->protocol, pskb_inet_may_pull() no hace nada en absoluto. Si la persona que llama proporcionó una etiqueta vlan (af_packet en el caso de syzbot), es posible que el encabezado de la red no apunte a la ubicación correcta y que la parte lineal de skb sea más pequeña de lo esperado. Agregue skb_vlan_inet_prepare() para realizar una validación completa de Mac. Utilice esto en Ginebra por el momento. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35385daa8db320d2d9664930c28e732578b0d7de https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6f92124d74419797fadfbcd5b7a72c384a6413ad https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71ad9260c001b217d704cda88ecea251b2d367da https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d13f048dd40e8577260cd43faea8ec9b77520197 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a51e36ebf433adf59c051bec33f5aa54640bb4d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21815f28af8081b258552c111774ff320cf38d38 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43be590456e1f3566054ce78ae2dbb68cbe1a536 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3adf11d7993518a39bd02b383cfe657c •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ks8851: Handle softirqs at the end of IRQ thread to fix hang The ks8851_irq() thread may call ks8851_rx_pkts() in case there are any packets in the MAC FIFO, which calls netif_rx(). This netif_rx() implementation is guarded by local_bh_disable() and local_bh_enable(). The local_bh_enable() may call do_softirq() to run softirqs in case any are pending. One of the softirqs is net_rx_action, which ultimately reaches the driver .start_xmit callback. If that happens, the system hangs. The entire call chain is below: ks8851_start_xmit_par from netdev_start_xmit netdev_start_xmit from dev_hard_start_xmit dev_hard_start_xmit from sch_direct_xmit sch_direct_xmit from __dev_queue_xmit __dev_queue_xmit from __neigh_update __neigh_update from neigh_update neigh_update from arp_process.constprop.0 arp_process.constprop.0 from __netif_receive_skb_one_core __netif_receive_skb_one_core from process_backlog process_backlog from __napi_poll.constprop.0 __napi_poll.constprop.0 from net_rx_action net_rx_action from __do_softirq __do_softirq from call_with_stack call_with_stack from do_softirq do_softirq from __local_bh_enable_ip __local_bh_enable_ip from netif_rx netif_rx from ks8851_irq ks8851_irq from irq_thread_fn irq_thread_fn from irq_thread irq_thread from kthread kthread from ret_from_fork The hang happens because ks8851_irq() first locks a spinlock in ks8851_par.c ks8851_lock_par() spin_lock_irqsave(&ksp->lock, ...) and with that spinlock locked, calls netif_rx(). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/797047f875b5463719cc70ba213eb691d453c946 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/492337a4fbd1421b42df684ee9b34be2a2722540 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cba376eb036c2c20077b41d47b317d8218fe754f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49d5d70538b6b8f2a3f8f1ac30c1f921d4a0929b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be0384bf599cf1eb8d337517feeb732d71f75a6f http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/30/1 http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/05/30/2 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Clear stale u->oob_skb. syzkaller started to report deadlock of unix_gc_lock after commit 4090fa373f0e ("af_unix: Replace garbage collection algorithm."), but it just uncovers the bug that has been there since commit 314001f0bf92 ("af_unix: Add OOB support"). The repro basically does the following. from socket import * from array import array c1, c2 = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM) c1.sendmsg([b'a'], [(SOL_SOCKET, SCM_RIGHTS, array("i", [c2.fileno()]))], MSG_OOB) c2.recv(1) # blocked as no normal data in recv queue c2.close() # done async and unblock recv() c1.close() # done async and trigger GC A socket sends its file descriptor to itself as OOB data and tries to receive normal data, but finally recv() fails due to async close(). The problem here is wrong handling of OOB skb in manage_oob(). When recvmsg() is called without MSG_OOB, manage_oob() is called to check if the peeked skb is OOB skb. In such a case, manage_oob() pops it out of the receive queue but does not clear unix_sock(sk)->oob_skb. This is wrong in terms of uAPI. Let's say we send "hello" with MSG_OOB, and "world" without MSG_OOB. The 'o' is handled as OOB data. When recv() is called twice without MSG_OOB, the OOB data should be lost. >>> from socket import * >>> c1, c2 = socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0) >>> c1.send(b'hello', MSG_OOB) # 'o' is OOB data 5 >>> c1.send(b'world') 5 >>> c2.recv(5) # OOB data is not received b'hell' >>> c2.recv(5) # OOB date is skipped b'world' >>> c2.recv(5, MSG_OOB) # This should return an error b'o' In the same situation, TCP actually returns -EINVAL for the last recv(). Also, if we do not clear unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb, unix_poll() always set EPOLLPRI even though the data has passed through by previous recv(). To avoid these issues, we must clear unix_sk(sk)->oob_skb when dequeuing it from recv queue. The reason why the old GC did not trigger the deadlock is because the old GC relied on the receive queue to detect the loop. When it is triggered, the socket with OOB data is marked as GC candidate because file refcount == inflight count (1). However, after traversing all inflight sockets, the socket still has a positive inflight count (1), thus the socket is excluded from candidates. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/314001f0bf927015e459c9d387d62a231fe93af3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4bc99d04c689b5652665394ae8d3e02fb754153 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84a352b7eba1142a95441380058985ff19f25ec9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/601a89ea24d05089debfa2dc896ea9f5937ac7a6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/698a95ade1a00e6494482046902b986dfffd1caf https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b46f4eaa4f0ec38909fb0072eea3aeddb32f954e •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: fix race condition between ipv6_get_ifaddr and ipv6_del_addr Although ipv6_get_ifaddr walks inet6_addr_lst under the RCU lock, it still means hlist_for_each_entry_rcu can return an item that got removed from the list. The memory itself of such item is not freed thanks to RCU but nothing guarantees the actual content of the memory is sane. In particular, the reference count can be zero. This can happen if ipv6_del_addr is called in parallel. ipv6_del_addr removes the entry from inet6_addr_lst (hlist_del_init_rcu(&ifp->addr_lst)) and drops all references (__in6_ifa_put(ifp) + in6_ifa_put(ifp)). With bad enough timing, this can happen: 1. In ipv6_get_ifaddr, hlist_for_each_entry_rcu returns an entry. 2. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c578aedcb21d79eeb4e9cf04ca5b276ac82614c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b4b3b69a19016d4e7fbdbd1dbcc184915eb862e1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cca606e14264098cba65efa82790825dbf69e903 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3fb02ec57ead2891a2306af8c51a306bc5945e70 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b19e9507c275de0cfe61c24db69179dc52cf9fb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de76ae9ea1a6cf9e77fcec4f2df2904e26c23ceb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01b11a0566670612bd464a932e5ac2eae53d8652 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6cdb20c342cd0193d3e956e3d83981d0f •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: SCO: Fix not validating setsockopt user input syzbot reported sco_sock_setsockopt() is copying data without checking user input length. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in sco_sock_setsockopt+0xc0b/0xf90 net/bluetooth/sco.c:893 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88805f7b15a3 by task syz-executor.5/12578 En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: Bluetooth: SCO: la solución no valida la entrada del usuario de setsockopt. syzbot informó que sco_sock_setsockopt() está copiando datos sin verificar la longitud de la entrada del usuario. BUG: KASAN: slab fuera de los límites en copy_from_sockptr_offset include/linux/sockptr.h:49 [en línea] BUG: KASAN: slab fuera de los límites en copy_from_sockptr include/linux/sockptr.h:55 [en línea] BUG: KASAN: slab fuera de los límites en sco_sock_setsockopt+0xc0b/0xf90 net/bluetooth/sco.c:893 Lectura de tamaño 4 en la dirección ffff88805f7b15a3 mediante la tarea syz-executor.5/12578 • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b96e9c671b05f95126753a22145d4509d45ca197 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b0e30c37695b614bee69187f86eaf250e36606ce https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7bc65d23ba20dcd7ecc094a12c181e594e5eb315 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72473db90900da970a16ee50ad23c2c38d107d8c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/419a0ffca7010216f0fc265b08558d7394fa0ba7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/51eda36d33e43201e7a4fd35232e069b2c850b01 https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html •