CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-45008 – Input: MT - limit max slots
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-45008
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: MT - limit max slots syzbot is reporting too large allocation at input_mt_init_slots(), for num_slots is supplied from userspace using ioctl(UI_DEV_CREATE). Since nobody knows possible max slots, this patch chose 1024. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2829c80614890624456337e47320289112785f3e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87f610a1a7fbdb1f2e3d90b54c955bd3b8a0c322 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/05dd9aabd04f9b5eb04dab9bb83d8c3e982d7549 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/95f73d01f547dfc67fda3022c51e377a0454b505 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94736334b8a25e4fae8daa6934e54a31f099be43 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f04edd554d191834e9e1349ef030318ea6b11ba https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cd19f1799c32ba7b874474b1b968815ce5364f73 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/99d3bf5f7377d42f8be60a6b9cb60fb0b •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0CVE-2024-45007 – char: xillybus: Don't destroy workqueue from work item running on it
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-45007
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: char: xillybus: Don't destroy workqueue from work item running on it Triggered by a kref decrement, destroy_workqueue() may be called from within a work item for destroying its own workqueue. This illegal situation is averted by adding a module-global workqueue for exclusive use of the offending work item. Other work items continue to be queued on per-device workqueues to ensure performance. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/409b495f8e3300d5fba08bc817fa8825dae48cc9 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5d3567caff2a1d678aa40cc74a54e1318941fad3 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7ad105b12256ec7fb6d6d1a0e2e60f00b7da157 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa1a19724fa2c31e97a9be48baedd4692b265157 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ccbde4b128ef9c73d14d0d7817d68ef795f6d131 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0CVE-2024-45006 – xhci: Fix Panther point NULL pointer deref at full-speed re-enumeration
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-45006
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xhci: Fix Panther point NULL pointer deref at full-speed re-enumeration re-enumerating full-speed devices after a failed address device command can trigger a NULL pointer dereference. Full-speed devices may need to reconfigure the endpoint 0 Max Packet Size value during enumeration. Usb core calls usb_ep0_reinit() in this case, which ends up calling xhci_configure_endpoint(). On Panther point xHC the xhci_configure_endpoint() function will additionally check and reserve bandwidth in software. Other hosts do this in hardware If xHC address device command fails then a new xhci_virt_device structure is allocated as part of re-enabling the slot, but the bandwidth table pointers are not set up properly here. This triggers the NULL pointer dereference the next time usb_ep0_reinit() is called and xhci_configure_endpoint() tries to check and reserve bandwidth [46710.713538] usb 3-1: new full-speed USB device number 5 using xhci_hcd [46710.713699] usb 3-1: Device not responding to setup address. [46710.917684] usb 3-1: Device not responding to setup address. [46711.125536] usb 3-1: device not accepting address 5, error -71 [46711.125594] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 [46711.125600] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [46711.125603] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [46711.125606] PGD 0 P4D 0 [46711.125610] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI [46711.125615] CPU: 1 PID: 25760 Comm: kworker/1:2 Not tainted 6.10.3_2 #1 [46711.125620] Hardware name: Gigabyte Technology Co., Ltd. [46711.125623] Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event [usbcore] [46711.125668] RIP: 0010:xhci_reserve_bandwidth (drivers/usb/host/xhci.c Fix this by making sure bandwidth table pointers are set up correctly after a failed address device command, and additionally by avoiding checking for bandwidth in cases like this where no actual endpoints are added or removed, i.e. only context for default control endpoint 0 is evaluated. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/651aaf36a7d7b36a58980e70133f9437d4f6d312 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef0a0e616b2789bb804a0ce5e161db03170a85b6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a57b0ebabe6862dce0a2e0f13e17941ad72fc56b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f0654318e25b2c185e245ba4a591e42fabb5e59 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/365ef7c4277fdd781a695c3553fa157d622d805d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ad898ae82412f8a689d59829804bff2999dd0ea https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b99de301d78e1f5249e57ef2c32e1dec3df2bb1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fb9d412ebe2f245f13481e4624b40e65 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0CVE-2024-45005 – KVM: s390: fix validity interception issue when gisa is switched off
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-45005
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: s390: fix validity interception issue when gisa is switched off We might run into a SIE validity if gisa has been disabled either via using kernel parameter "kvm.use_gisa=0" or by setting the related sysfs attribute to N (echo N >/sys/module/kvm/parameters/use_gisa). The validity is caused by an invalid value in the SIE control block's gisa designation. That happens because we pass the uninitialized gisa origin to virt_to_phys() before writing it to the gisa designation. To fix this we return 0 in kvm_s390_get_gisa_desc() if the origin is 0. kvm_s390_get_gisa_desc() is used to determine which gisa designation to set in the SIE control block. A value of 0 in the gisa designation disables gisa usage. The issue surfaces in the host kernel with the following kernel message as soon a new kvm guest start is attemted. kvm: unhandled validity intercept 0x1011 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 781237 at arch/s390/kvm/intercept.c:101 kvm_handle_sie_intercept+0x42e/0x4d0 [kvm] Modules linked in: vhost_net tap tun xt_CHECKSUM xt_MASQUERADE xt_conntrack ipt_REJECT xt_tcpudp nft_compat x_tables nf_nat_tftp nf_conntrack_tftp vfio_pci_core irqbypass vhost_vsock vmw_vsock_virtio_transport_common vsock vhost vhost_iotlb kvm nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nft_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_chain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set nf_tables sunrpc mlx5_ib ib_uverbs ib_core mlx5_core uvdevice s390_trng eadm_sch vfio_ccw zcrypt_cex4 mdev vfio_iommu_type1 vfio sch_fq_codel drm i2c_core loop drm_panel_orientation_quirks configfs nfnetlink lcs ctcm fsm dm_service_time ghash_s390 prng chacha_s390 libchacha aes_s390 des_s390 libdes sha3_512_s390 sha3_256_s390 sha512_s390 sha256_s390 sha1_s390 sha_common dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log zfcp scsi_transport_fc scsi_dh_rdac scsi_dh_emc scsi_dh_alua pkey zcrypt dm_multipath rng_core autofs4 [last unloaded: vfio_pci] CPU: 0 PID: 781237 Comm: CPU 0/KVM Not tainted 6.10.0-08682-gcad9f11498ea #6 Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 701 (LPAR) Krnl PSW : 0704c00180000000 000003d93deb0122 (kvm_handle_sie_intercept+0x432/0x4d0 [kvm]) R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:0 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3 Krnl GPRS: 000003d900000027 000003d900000023 0000000000000028 000002cd00000000 000002d063a00900 00000359c6daf708 00000000000bebb5 0000000000001eff 000002cfd82e9000 000002cfd80bc000 0000000000001011 000003d93deda412 000003ff8962df98 000003d93de77ce0 000003d93deb011e 00000359c6daf960 Krnl Code: 000003d93deb0112: c020fffe7259 larl %r2,000003d93de7e5c4 000003d93deb0118: c0e53fa8beac brasl %r14,000003d9bd3c7e70 #000003d93deb011e: af000000 mc 0,0 >000003d93deb0122: a728ffea lhi %r2,-22 000003d93deb0126: a7f4fe24 brc 15,000003d93deafd6e 000003d93deb012a: 9101f0b0 tm 176(%r15),1 000003d93deb012e: a774fe48 brc 7,000003d93deafdbe 000003d93deb0132: 40a0f0ae sth %r10,174(%r15) Call Trace: [<000003d93deb0122>] kvm_handle_sie_intercept+0x432/0x4d0 [kvm] ([<000003d93deb011e>] kvm_handle_sie_intercept+0x42e/0x4d0 [kvm]) [<000003d93deacc10>] vcpu_post_run+0x1d0/0x3b0 [kvm] [<000003d93deaceda>] __vcpu_run+0xea/0x2d0 [kvm] [<000003d93dead9da>] kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x16a/0x430 [kvm] [<000003d93de93ee0>] kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x190/0x7c0 [kvm] [<000003d9bd728b4e>] vfs_ioctl+0x2e/0x70 [<000003d9bd72a092>] __s390x_sys_ioctl+0xc2/0xd0 [<000003d9be0e9222>] __do_syscall+0x1f2/0x2e0 [<000003d9be0f9a90>] system_call+0x70/0x98 Last Breaking-Event-Address: [<000003d9bd3c7f58>] __warn_printk+0xe8/0xf0 • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe0ef00304639cae82df7c9ad6a15286bd5f876e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/051c0a558154174cfcea301a386e4c91ade83ce1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/027ac3c5092561bccce09b314a73a1c167117ef6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5a44bb061d04b0306f2aa8add761d86d152b9377 •
CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0CVE-2024-45004 – KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key
https://notcve.org/view.php?id=CVE-2024-45004
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: trusted: dcp: fix leak of blob encryption key Trusted keys unseal the key blob on load, but keep the sealed payload in the blob field so that every subsequent read (export) will simply convert this field to hex and send it to userspace. With DCP-based trusted keys, we decrypt the blob encryption key (BEK) in the Kernel due hardware limitations and then decrypt the blob payload. BEK decryption is done in-place which means that the trusted key blob field is modified and it consequently holds the BEK in plain text. Every subsequent read of that key thus send the plain text BEK instead of the encrypted BEK to userspace. This issue only occurs when importing a trusted DCP-based key and then exporting it again. This should rarely happen as the common use cases are to either create a new trusted key and export it, or import a key blob and then just use it without exporting it again. Fix this by performing BEK decryption and encryption in a dedicated buffer. Further always wipe the plain text BEK buffer to prevent leaking the key via uninitialized memory. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e8a0f40a39cc253002f21c54e1b5b995e5ec510 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e3b266afcfe4294e84496f50f006f029d3100db https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e28bf61a5f9ab30be3f3b4eafb8d097e39446bb •