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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_scmi: Check mailbox/SMT channel for consistency On reception of a completion interrupt the shared memory area is accessed to retrieve the message header at first and then, if the message sequence number identifies a transaction which is still pending, the related payload is fetched too. When an SCMI command times out the channel ownership remains with the platform until eventually a late reply is received and, as a consequence, any further transmission attempt remains pending, waiting for the channel to be relinquished by the platform. Once that late reply is received the channel ownership is given back to the agent and any pending request is then allowed to proceed and overwrite the SMT area of the just delivered late reply; then the wait for the reply to the new request starts. It has been observed that the spurious IRQ related to the late reply can be wrongly associated with the freshly enqueued request: when that happens the SCMI stack in-flight lookup procedure is fooled by the fact that the message header now present in the SMT area is related to the new pending transaction, even though the real reply has still to arrive. This race-condition on the A2P channel can be detected by looking at the channel status bits: a genuine reply from the platform will have set the channel free bit before triggering the completion IRQ. Add a consistency check to validate such condition in the A2P ISR. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: firmware: arm_scmi: comprueba la coherencia del buzón/canal SMT Al recibir una interrupción de finalización, se accede al área de memoria compartida para recuperar el encabezado del mensaje al principio y luego, si el número de secuencia del mensaje identifica una transacción que aún está pendiente, el payload relacionado también se recupera. Cuando se agota el tiempo de espera de un comando SCMI, la propiedad del canal permanece en la plataforma hasta que finalmente se recibe una respuesta tardía y, como consecuencia, cualquier intento de transmisión adicional permanece pendiente, esperando que la plataforma abandone el canal. Una vez que se recibe esa respuesta tardía, la propiedad del canal se devuelve al agente y cualquier solicitud pendiente puede continuar y sobrescribir el área SMT de la respuesta tardía recién entregada; luego comienza la espera de la respuesta a la nueva solicitud. Se ha observado que la IRQ espuria relacionada con la respuesta tardía puede asociarse erróneamente con la solicitud recién puesta en cola: cuando eso sucede, el procedimiento de búsqueda en curso de la pila SCMI se ve engañado por el hecho de que el encabezado del mensaje ahora presente en el área SMT es relacionado con la nueva transacción pendiente, aunque la respuesta real aún no ha llegado. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5c8a47a5a91d4d6e185f758d61997613d9c5d6ac https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/614cc65032dcb0b64d23f5c5e338a8a04b12be5d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f95f6997f4fdd17abec3200cae45420a5489350 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b5e1b93c83ee5fc9f5d7bd2d45b421bd87774a2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/12dc4217f16551d6dee9cbefc23fdb5659558cda https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/437a310b22244d4e0b78665c3042e5d1c0f45306 •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: core: Move scsi_host_busy() out of host lock for waking up EH handler Inside scsi_eh_wakeup(), scsi_host_busy() is called & checked with host lock every time for deciding if error handler kthread needs to be waken up. This can be too heavy in case of recovery, such as: - N hardware queues - queue depth is M for each hardware queue - each scsi_host_busy() iterates over (N * M) tag/requests If recovery is triggered in case that all requests are in-flight, each scsi_eh_wakeup() is strictly serialized, when scsi_eh_wakeup() is called for the last in-flight request, scsi_host_busy() has been run for (N * M - 1) times, and request has been iterated for (N*M - 1) * (N * M) times. If both N and M are big enough, hard lockup can be triggered on acquiring host lock, and it is observed on mpi3mr(128 hw queues, queue depth 8169). Fix the issue by calling scsi_host_busy() outside the host lock. We don't need the host lock for getting busy count because host the lock never covers that. [mkp: Drop unnecessary 'busy' variables pointed out by Bart] En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: scsi: core: Saque scsi_host_busy() del bloqueo del host para activar el controlador EH Dentro de scsi_eh_wakeup(), se llama a scsi_host_busy() y se verifica con el bloqueo del host cada vez para decidir si se produce un error. Es necesario activar el controlador kthread. Esto puede ser demasiado pesado en caso de recuperación, como por ejemplo: - N colas de hardware - la profundidad de la cola es M para cada cola de hardware - cada scsi_host_busy() itera sobre (N * M) etiquetas/solicitudes Si la recuperación se activa en caso de que todas las solicitudes están en curso, cada scsi_eh_wakeup() está estrictamente serializado, cuando se llama a scsi_eh_wakeup() para la última solicitud en curso, scsi_host_busy() se ha ejecutado (N * M - 1) veces y la solicitud se ha iterado durante ( N*M - 1) * (N * M) veces. Si tanto N como M son lo suficientemente grandes, se puede activar un bloqueo duro al adquirir el bloqueo del host, y se observa en mpi3mr (128 colas hw, profundidad de cola 8169). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6eb045e092efefafc6687409a6fa6d1dabf0fb69 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f5944853f7a961fedc1227dc8f60393f8936d37c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d37c1c81419fdef66ebd0747cf76fb8b7d979059 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db6338f45971b4285ea368432a84033690eaf53c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/65ead8468c21c2676d4d06f50b46beffdea69df1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07e3ca0f17f579491b5f54e9ed05173d6c1d6fcb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4373534a9850627a2695317944898eb1283a2db0 https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/ •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipmr: fix kernel panic when forwarding mcast packets The stacktrace was: [ 86.305548] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000092 [ 86.306815] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 86.307717] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 86.308624] PGD 0 P4D 0 [ 86.309091] Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 86.309883] CPU: 2 PID: 3139 Comm: pimd Tainted: G U 6.8.0-6wind-knet #1 [ 86.311027] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.11.1-0-g0551a4be2c-prebuilt.qemu-project.org 04/01/2014 [ 86.312728] RIP: 0010:ip_mr_forward (/build/work/knet/net/ipv4/ipmr.c:1985) [ 86.313399] Code: f9 1f 0f 87 85 03 00 00 48 8d 04 5b 48 8d 04 83 49 8d 44 c5 00 48 8b 40 70 48 39 c2 0f 84 d9 00 00 00 49 8b 46 58 48 83 e0 fe <80> b8 92 00 00 00 00 0f 84 55 ff ff ff 49 83 47 38 01 45 85 e4 0f [ 86.316565] RSP: 0018:ffffad21c0583ae0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 86.317497] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 86.318596] RDX: ffff9559cb46c000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 86.319627] RBP: ffffad21c0583b30 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 86.320650] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000001 [ 86.321672] R13: ffff9559c093a000 R14: ffff9559cc00b800 R15: ffff9559c09c1d80 [ 86.322873] FS: 00007f85db661980(0000) GS:ffff955a79d00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 86.324291] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 86.325314] CR2: 0000000000000092 CR3: 000000002f13a000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 [ 86.326589] Call Trace: [ 86.327036] <TASK> [ 86.327434] ? show_regs (/build/work/knet/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:479) [ 86.328049] ? __die (/build/work/knet/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:421 /build/work/knet/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c:434) [ 86.328508] ? page_fault_oops (/build/work/knet/arch/x86/mm/fault.c:707) [ 86.329107] ? do_user_addr_fault (/build/work/knet/arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1264) [ 86.329756] ? • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f69365e3a7cab819099249c50b39f4450fdddc60 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b32e63f881432bf30f282328b8e64c6aa494ba2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d97858e21fbc472acda7d908357c5fe54a8e439 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d2f1b7fe74afd66298dbb3c7b39e7b62e4df1724 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dcaafdba6c6162bb49f1192850bc3bbc3707738c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e8c9ae40adda2be1ba41c05fd3cd1e61cce3207 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e622502c310f1069fd9f41cd38210553115f610a •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: llc: call sock_orphan() at release time syzbot reported an interesting trace [1] caused by a stale sk->sk_wq pointer in a closed llc socket. In commit ff7b11aa481f ("net: socket: set sock->sk to NULL after calling proto_ops::release()") Eric Biggers hinted that some protocols are missing a sock_orphan(), we need to perform a full audit. In net-next, I plan to clear sock->sk from sock_orphan() and amend Eric patch to add a warning. [1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in list_empty include/linux/list.h:373 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:127 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_def_write_space_wfree net/core/sock.c:3384 [inline] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sock_wfree+0x9a8/0x9d0 net/core/sock.c:2468 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88802f4fc880 by task ksoftirqd/1/27 CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00049-g6098d87eaf31 #0 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack.c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0xc4/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601 list_empty include/linux/list.h:373 [inline] waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:127 [inline] sock_def_write_space_wfree net/core/sock.c:3384 [inline] sock_wfree+0x9a8/0x9d0 net/core/sock.c:2468 skb_release_head_state+0xa3/0x2b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1080 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1092 [inline] napi_consume_skb+0x119/0x2b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1404 e1000_unmap_and_free_tx_resource+0x144/0x200 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:1970 e1000_clean_tx_irq drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3860 [inline] e1000_clean+0x4a1/0x26e0 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3801 __napi_poll.constprop.0+0xb4/0x540 net/core/dev.c:6576 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6645 [inline] net_rx_action+0x956/0xe90 net/core/dev.c:6778 __do_softirq+0x21a/0x8de kernel/softirq.c:553 run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:921 [inline] run_ksoftirqd+0x31/0x60 kernel/softirq.c:913 smpboot_thread_fn+0x660/0xa10 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x2c6/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:388 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242 </TASK> Allocated by task 5167: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:314 [inline] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x81/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:340 kasan_slab_alloc include/linux/kasan.h:201 [inline] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3813 [inline] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [inline] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x142/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3879 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/fs.h:3019 [inline] sock_alloc_inode+0x25/0x1c0 net/socket.c:308 alloc_inode+0x5d/0x220 fs/inode.c:260 new_inode_pseudo+0x16/0x80 fs/inode.c:1005 sock_alloc+0x40/0x270 net/socket.c:634 __sock_create+0xbc/0x800 net/socket.c:1535 sock_create net/socket.c:1622 [inline] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1659 [inline] __sys_socket+0x14c/0x260 net/socket.c:1706 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1720 [inline] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1718 [inline] __x64_sys_socket+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1718 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Freed by task 0: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:640 poison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:241 [inline] __kasan_slab_free+0x121/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:257 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:184 [inline] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [inlin ---truncated--- En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: llc: llame a sock_orphan() en el momento del lanzamiento syzbot informó un rastro interesante [1] causado por un puntero sk-&gt;sk_wq obsoleto en un socket llc cerrado. En El commit ff7b11aa481f ("net: socket: set sock-&gt;sk to NULL after call proto_ops::release()") Eric Biggers insinuó que a algunos protocolos les falta un sock_orphan(), necesitamos realizar una auditoría completa. En net-next, planeo borrar sock-&gt;sk de sock_orphan() y modificar el parche de Eric para agregar una advertencia. [1] ERROR: KASAN: slab-use-after-free en list_empty include/linux/list.h:373 [en línea] ERROR: KASAN: slab-use-after-free en waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:127 [en línea] ERROR: KASAN: slab-use-after-free en sock_def_write_space_wfree net/core/sock.c:3384 [en línea] ERROR: KASAN: slab-use-after-free en sock_wfree+0x9a8/0x9d0 net/core/sock .c:2468 Lectura del tamaño 8 en la dirección ffff88802f4fc880 por tarea ksoftirqd/1/27 CPU: 1 PID: 27 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 6.8.0-rc1-syzkaller-00049-g6098d87eaf31 #0 Nombre de hardware: PC estándar QEMU (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 01/04/2014 Seguimiento de llamadas: __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [en línea] dump_stack_lvl+0xd9/0x1b0 lib/dump_stack .c:106 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [en línea] print_report+0xc4/0x620 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0xda/0x110 mm/kasan/report.c:601 list_empty include/linux/ list.h:373 [en línea] waitqueue_active include/linux/wait.h:127 [en línea] sock_def_write_space_wfree net/core/sock.c:3384 [en línea] sock_wfree+0x9a8/0x9d0 net/core/sock.c:2468 skb_release_head_state+ 0xa3/0x2b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1080 skb_release_all net/core/skbuff.c:1092 [en línea] napi_consume_skb+0x119/0x2b0 net/core/skbuff.c:1404 e1000_unmap_and_free_tx_resource+0x144/0x200 drivers/net/ethernet/ intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:1970 e1000_clean_tx_irq controladores/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3860 [en línea] e1000_clean+0x4a1/0x26e0 controladores/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3801 __ napi_poll. constprop.0+0xb4/0x540 net/core/dev.c:6576 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6645 [en línea] net_rx_action+0x956/0xe90 net/core/dev.c:6778 __do_softirq+0x21a/0x8de kernel/ softirq.c:553 run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:921 [en línea] run_ksoftirqd+0x31/0x60 kernel/softirq.c:913 smpboot_thread_fn+0x660/0xa10 kernel/smpboot.c:164 kthread+0x2c6/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c :388 ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147 ret_from_fork_asm+0x11/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:242 Asignado por tarea 5167: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/ kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/common.c:68 unpoison_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:314 [en línea] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x81/0x90 mm/kasan/common.c:340 kasan_slab_alloc incluir /linux/kasan.h:201 [en línea] slab_post_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3813 [en línea] slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3860 [en línea] kmem_cache_alloc_lru+0x142/0x6f0 mm/slub.c:3879 alloc_inode_sb include/linux/ fs.h:3019 [en línea] sock_alloc_inode+0x25/0x1c0 net/socket.c:308 alloc_inode+0x5d/0x220 fs/inode.c:260 new_inode_pseudo+0x16/0x80 fs/inode.c:1005 sock_alloc+0x40/0x270 net /socket.c:634 __sock_create+0xbc/0x800 net/socket.c:1535 sock_create net/socket.c:1622 [en línea] __sys_socket_create net/socket.c:1659 [en línea] __sys_socket+0x14c/0x260 net/socket.c :1706 __do_sys_socket net/socket.c:1720 [en línea] __se_sys_socket net/socket.c:1718 [en línea] __x64_sys_socket+0x72/0xb0 net/socket.c:1718 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [en línea ] do_syscall_64+0xd3/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 Entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b Liberado por la tarea 0: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x50 mm/kasan/common.c:47 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 mm/kasan/ common.c:68 kasan_save_free_info+0x3f/0x60 mm/kasan/generic.c:640 veneno_slab_object mm/kasan/common.c:241 [en línea] __kasan_slab_free+0x121/0x1b0 mm/kasan/common.c:257 kasan_slab_free include/linux /kasan.h:184 [en línea] slab_free_hook mm/slub.c:2121 [en línea ---truncado--- • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/43815482370c510c569fd18edb57afcb0fa8cab6 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b950c712a9a05cdda4aea7fcb2848766576c11b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/64babb17e8150771c58575d8f93a35c5296b499f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0b5b1f12429df3cd9751ab8b2f53729b77733b7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dbc1b89981f9c5360277071d33d7f04a43ffda4a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9c333d9891f34cea8af1b229dc754552304c8eee https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3151051b787f7cd7e3329ea0016eb9113c248812 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8e51f084b5716653f19e291ed5f026791 •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 8EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/mm: Fix null-pointer dereference in pgtable_cache_add kasprintf() returns a pointer to dynamically allocated memory which can be NULL upon failure. Ensure the allocation was successful by checking the pointer validity. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: powerpc/mm: corrige la desreferencia del puntero nulo en pgtable_cache_add kasprintf() devuelve un puntero a la memoria asignada dinámicamente que puede ser NULL en caso de falla. Asegúrese de que la asignación se haya realizado correctamente comprobando la validez del puntero. A possible null-pointer dereference was found in pgtable_cache_add in the Linux kernel. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21e45a7b08d7cd98d6a53c5fc5111879f2d96611 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6781add1c311c17eff43e14c786004bbacf901e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa28eecb43cac6e20ef14dfc50b8892c1fbcda5b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac3ed969a40357b0542d20f096a6d43acdfa6cc7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d482d61025e303a2bef3733a011b6b740215cfa1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/145febd85c3bcc5c74d87ef9a598fc7d9122d532 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ffd29dc45bc0355393859049f6becddc3ed08f74 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f46c8a75263f97bda13c739ba1c90aced • CWE-395: Use of NullPointerException Catch to Detect NULL Pointer Dereference CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference •