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CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: powerpc/iommu: Fix the missing iommu_group_put() during platform domain attach The function spapr_tce_platform_iommu_attach_dev() is missing to call iommu_group_put() when the domain is already set. This refcount leak shows up with BUG_ON() during DLPAR remove operation as: KernelBug: Kernel bug in state 'None': kernel BUG at arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/iommu.c:100! Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5 [#1] LE PAGE_SIZE=64K MMU=Radix SMP NR_CPUS=8192 NUMA pSeries <snip> Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX POWER10 (raw) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NH1060_016) hv:phyp pSeries NIP: c0000000000ff4d4 LR: c0000000000ff4cc CTR: 0000000000000000 REGS: c0000013aed5f840 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G I (6.8.0-rc3-autotest-g99bd3cb0d12e) MSR: 8000000000029033 <SF,EE,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 44002402 XER: 20040000 CFAR: c000000000a0d170 IRQMASK: 0 ... NIP iommu_reconfig_notifier+0x94/0x200 LR iommu_reconfig_notifier+0x8c/0x200 Call Trace: iommu_reconfig_notifier+0x8c/0x200 (unreliable) notifier_call_chain+0xb8/0x19c blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x64/0x98 of_reconfig_notify+0x44/0xdc of_detach_node+0x78/0xb0 ofdt_write.part.0+0x86c/0xbb8 proc_reg_write+0xf4/0x150 vfs_write+0xf8/0x488 ksys_write+0x84/0x140 system_call_exception+0x138/0x330 system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec The patch adds the missing iommu_group_put() call. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: powerpc/iommu: corrige el iommu_group_put() que falta durante la conexión del dominio de la plataforma. Falta la función spapr_tce_platform_iommu_attach_dev() para llamar a iommu_group_put() cuando el dominio ya está configurado. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8ca9fc9134c1a43e6d4db7ff59496bbd7075def https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c90fdea9cac9eb419fc266e75d625cb60c8f7f6c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0846dd77c8349ec92ca0079c9c71d130f34cb192 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: really cope with fastopen race Fastopen and PM-trigger subflow shutdown can race, as reported by syzkaller. In my first attempt to close such race, I missed the fact that the subflow status can change again before the subflow_state_change callback is invoked. Address the issue additionally copying with all the states directly reachable from TCP_FIN_WAIT1. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: mptcp: realmente se adapta a la ejecución fastopen. El cierre del subflujo Fastopen y PM-trigger puede correr, según lo informado por syzkaller. En mi primer intento de cerrar dicha ejecución, me perdí el hecho de que el estado del subflujo puede cambiar nuevamente antes de que se invoque la devolución de llamada subflow_state_change. Solucione el problema copiando adicionalmente todos los estados a los que se puede acceder directamente desde TCP_FIN_WAIT1. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e777f39b4d75e599a3aac8e0f67d739474f198c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4bfe217e075d04e63c092df9d40c608e598c2ef2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e158fb9679d15a2317ec13b4f6301bd26265df2f https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/337cebbd850f94147cee05252778f8f78b8c337f •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 6EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: hsr: remove WARN_ONCE() in send_hsr_supervision_frame() Syzkaller reported [1] hitting a warning after failing to allocate resources for skb in hsr_init_skb(). Since a WARN_ONCE() call will not help much in this case, it might be prudent to switch to netdev_warn_once(). At the very least it will suppress syzkaller reports such as [1]. Just in case, use netdev_warn_once() in send_prp_supervision_frame() for similar reasons. [1] HSR: Could not send supervision frame WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 85 at net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294 send_hsr_supervision_frame+0x60a/0x810 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294 RIP: 0010:send_hsr_supervision_frame+0x60a/0x810 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:294 ... Call Trace: <IRQ> hsr_announce+0x114/0x370 net/hsr/hsr_device.c:382 call_timer_fn+0x193/0x590 kernel/time/timer.c:1700 expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1751 [inline] __run_timers+0x764/0xb20 kernel/time/timer.c:2022 run_timer_softirq+0x58/0xd0 kernel/time/timer.c:2035 __do_softirq+0x21a/0x8de kernel/softirq.c:553 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:427 [inline] __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:632 [inline] irq_exit_rcu+0xb7/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:644 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x95/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1076 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:649 ... This issue is also found in older kernels (at least up to 5.10). En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: net: hsr: eliminar WARN_ONCE() en send_hsr_supervision_frame() Syzkaller informó [1] que apareció una advertencia después de no poder asignar recursos para skb en hsr_init_skb(). Dado que una llamada WARN_ONCE() no ayudará mucho en este caso, podría ser prudente cambiar a netdev_warn_once(). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/121c33b07b3127f501b366bc23d2a590e2f2b8ef https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d8011a878fdf96123bc0d6a12e2fe7ced5fddfb https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de769423b2f053182a41317c4db5a927e90622a0 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56440799fc4621c279df16176f83a995d056023a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/923dea2a7ea9e1ef5ac4031fba461c1cc92e32b8 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/547545e50c913861219947ce490c68a1776b9b51 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37e8c97e539015637cb920d3e6f1e404f707a06e https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/ •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: parisc: Fix random data corruption from exception handler The current exception handler implementation, which assists when accessing user space memory, may exhibit random data corruption if the compiler decides to use a different register than the specified register %r29 (defined in ASM_EXCEPTIONTABLE_REG) for the error code. If the compiler choose another register, the fault handler will nevertheless store -EFAULT into %r29 and thus trash whatever this register is used for. Looking at the assembly I found that this happens sometimes in emulate_ldd(). To solve the issue, the easiest solution would be if it somehow is possible to tell the fault handler which register is used to hold the error code. Using %0 or %1 in the inline assembly is not posssible as it will show up as e.g. %r29 (with the "%r" prefix), which the GNU assembler can not convert to an integer. This patch takes another, better and more flexible approach: We extend the __ex_table (which is out of the execution path) by one 32-word. In this word we tell the compiler to insert the assembler instruction "or %r0,%r0,%reg", where %reg references the register which the compiler choosed for the error return code. In case of an access failure, the fault handler finds the __ex_table entry and can examine the opcode. The used register is encoded in the lowest 5 bits, and the fault handler can then store -EFAULT into this register. Since we extend the __ex_table to 3 words we can't use the BUILDTIME_TABLE_SORT config option any longer. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23027309b099ffc4efca5477009a11dccbdae592 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fa69a8063f8b27f3c7434a0d4f464a76a62f24d2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ce31d79aa1f13a2345791f84935281a2c194e003 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b1d72395635af45410b66cc4c4ab37a12c4a831 •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: parisc: BTLB: Fix crash when setting up BTLB at CPU bringup When using hotplug and bringing up a 32-bit CPU, ask the firmware about the BTLB information to set up the static (block) TLB entries. For that write access to the static btlb_info struct is needed, but since it is marked __ro_after_init the kernel segfaults with missing write permissions. Fix the crash by dropping the __ro_after_init annotation. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: parisc: BTLB: soluciona el problema al configurar BTLB al iniciar la CPU. Al usar hotplug y activar una CPU de 32 bits, solicite al firmware la información de BTLB para configurar la estática ( bloque) Entradas TLB. Para eso se necesita acceso de escritura a la estructura estática btlb_info, pero como está marcada como __ro_after_init, el kernel falla por defecto y faltan permisos de escritura. Solucione el problema eliminando la anotación __ro_after_init. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5ef93d02d6c9cc3a14e7348481c9e41a528caa1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54944f45470af5965fb9c28cf962ec30f38a8f5b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/aa52be55276614d33f22fbe7da36c40d6432d10b https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/913b9d443a0180cf0de3548f1ab3149378998486 •