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CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 2EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: Pass AT_GETATTR_NOSEC flag to getattr interface function When vfs_getattr_nosec() calls a filesystem's getattr interface function then the 'nosec' should propagate into this function so that vfs_getattr_nosec() can again be called from the filesystem's gettattr rather than vfs_getattr(). The latter would add unnecessary security checks that the initial vfs_getattr_nosec() call wanted to avoid. Therefore, introduce the getattr flag GETATTR_NOSEC and allow to pass with the new getattr_flags parameter to the getattr interface function. In overlayfs and ecryptfs use this flag to determine which one of the two functions to call. In a recent code change introduced to IMA vfs_getattr_nosec() ended up calling vfs_getattr() in overlayfs, which in turn called security_inode_getattr() on an exiting process that did not have current->fs set anymore, which then caused a kernel NULL pointer dereference. With this change the call to security_inode_getattr() can be avoided, thus avoiding the NULL pointer dereference. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: fs: pasar el indicador AT_GETATTR_NOSEC a la función de interfaz getattr. Cuando vfs_getattr_nosec() llama a la función de interfaz getattr de un sistema de archivos, entonces 'nosec' debe propagarse a esta función para que se pueda volver a llamar a vfs_getattr_nosec() desde gettattr del sistema de archivos en lugar de vfs_getattr(). • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/db1d1e8b9867aae5c3e61ad7859abfcc4a6fd6c7 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3fb0fa08641903304b9d81d52a379ff031dc41d4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8a924db2d7b5eb69ba08b1a0af46e9f1359a9bdf •

CVSS: -EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: deal with large GSO size After the blamed commit below, the TCP sockets (and the MPTCP subflows) can build egress packets larger than 64K. That exceeds the maximum DSS data size, the length being misrepresent on the wire and the stream being corrupted, as later observed on the receiver: WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 9696 at net/mptcp/protocol.c:705 __mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow+0x2604/0x26e0 CPU: 0 PID: 9696 Comm: syz-executor.7 Not tainted 6.6.0-rc5-gcd8bdf563d46 #45 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01/2014 netlink: 8 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process `syz-executor.4'. RIP: 0010:__mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow+0x2604/0x26e0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:705 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000006e80 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: ffffffff83e9f674 RBX: ffff88802f45d870 RCX: ffff888102ad0000 netlink: 8 bytes leftover after parsing attributes in process `syz-executor.4'. RDX: 0000000080000303 RSI: 0000000000013908 RDI: 0000000000003908 RBP: ffffc90000007110 R08: ffffffff83e9e078 R09: 1ffff1100e548c8a R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100e548c8b R12: 0000000000013908 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000003908 R15: 000000000031cf29 FS: 00007f239c47e700(0000) GS:ffff88811b200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f239c45cd78 CR3: 000000006a66c006 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> mptcp_data_ready+0x263/0xac0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:819 subflow_data_ready+0x268/0x6d0 net/mptcp/subflow.c:1409 tcp_data_queue+0x21a1/0x7a60 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:5151 tcp_rcv_established+0x950/0x1d90 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6098 tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x554/0x12f0 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1483 tcp_v6_rcv+0x2e26/0x3810 net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1749 ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xd6b/0x1ae0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438 ip6_input+0x1c5/0x470 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:483 ipv6_rcv+0xef/0x2c0 include/linux/netfilter.h:304 __netif_receive_skb+0x1ea/0x6a0 net/core/dev.c:5532 process_backlog+0x353/0x660 net/core/dev.c:5974 __napi_poll+0xc6/0x5a0 net/core/dev.c:6536 net_rx_action+0x6a0/0xfd0 net/core/dev.c:6603 __do_softirq+0x184/0x524 kernel/softirq.c:553 do_softirq+0xdd/0x130 kernel/softirq.c:454 Address the issue explicitly bounding the maximum GSO size to what MPTCP actually allows. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: mptcp: trata con un tamaño GSO grande. Después del compromiso culpable a continuación, los sockets TCP (y los subflujos MPTCP) pueden generar paquetes de salida de más de 64 KB. Eso excede el tamaño máximo de datos DSS, la longitud se tergiversa en el cable y la transmisión se corrompe, como se observó más tarde en el receptor: ADVERTENCIA: CPU: 0 PID: 9696 en net/mptcp/protocol.c:705 __mptcp_move_skbs_from_subflow+0x2604/ 0x26e0 CPU: 0 PID: 9696 Comm: syz-executor.7 No contaminado 6.6.0-rc5-gcd8bdf563d46 #45 Nombre del hardware: PC estándar QEMU (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.11.0-2.el7 04/01 /2014 netlink: 8 bytes sobrantes después de analizar los atributos en el proceso `syz-executor.4'. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c4e983c4f3cf94fcd879730c6caa877e0768a4d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70ff9b65a72885b3a2dfde6709da1f19b85fa696 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/342b528c0e849bed9def76dadaa470d3af678e94 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/57ced2eb77343a91d28f4a73675b05fe7b555def https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9fce92f050f448a0d1ddd9083ef967d9930f1e52 •

CVSS: 5.2EPSS: 0%CPEs: 4EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: fix gtk offload status event locking The ath11k active pdevs are protected by RCU but the gtk offload status event handling code calling ath11k_mac_get_arvif_by_vdev_id() was not marked as a read-side critical section. Mark the code in question as an RCU read-side critical section to avoid any potential use-after-free issues. Compile tested only. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: wifi: ath11k: corrige el bloqueo de eventos de estado de descarga de gtk. Los pdevs activos de ath11k están protegidos por RCU, pero el código de manejo de eventos de estado de descarga de gtk que llama a ath11k_mac_get_arvif_by_vdev_id() no se marcó como lado de lectura sección crítica. Marque el código en cuestión como una sección crítica del lado de lectura de RCU para evitar posibles problemas de use after free. Compilación probada únicamente. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a16d9b50cfbaf112401b8e5ccfa852709f498cd4 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0cf7577b6b3153b4b49deea9719fe43f96469c6d https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cf9c7d783a2bf9305df4ef5b93d9063a52e18fca https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e83246ecd3b193f8d91fce778e8a5ba747fc7d8a https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1dea3c0720a146bd7193969f2847ccfed5be2221 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-52777 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2282642 • CWE-416: Use After Free •

CVSS: 5.9EPSS: 0%CPEs: 3EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath12k: fix dfs-radar and temperature event locking The ath12k active pdevs are protected by RCU but the DFS-radar and temperature event handling code calling ath12k_mac_get_ar_by_pdev_id() was not marked as a read-side critical section. Mark the code in question as RCU read-side critical sections to avoid any potential use-after-free issues. Note that the temperature event handler looks like a place holder currently but would still trigger an RCU lockdep splat. Compile tested only. En el kernel de Linux, se ha resuelto la siguiente vulnerabilidad: wifi: ath12k: corrige el bloqueo de eventos de temperatura y radar dfs. Los pdev activos de ath12k están protegidos por RCU, pero el código de manejo de eventos de temperatura y radar DFS que llama a ath12k_mac_get_ar_by_pdev_id() no estaba marcado como una sección crítica del lado de lectura. Marque el código en cuestión como secciones críticas del lado de lectura de RCU para evitar posibles problemas de use after free. Tenga en cuenta que el controlador de eventos de temperatura actualmente parece un marcador de posición, pero aún así activaría un bloqueo de bloqueo de RCU. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d889913205cf7ebda905b1e62c5867ed4e39f6c2 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/774de37c147fea81f2c2e4be5082304f4f71d535 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d7a5f7f76568e48869916d769e28b9f3ca70c78e https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69bd216e049349886405b1c87a55dce3d35d1ba7 •

CVSS: 5.5EPSS: 0%CPEs: 5EXPL: 0

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: avoid data corruption caused by decline We found a data corruption issue during testing of SMC-R on Redis applications. The benchmark has a low probability of reporting a strange error as shown below. "Error: Protocol error, got "\xe2" as reply type byte" Finally, we found that the retrieved error data was as follows: 0xE2 0xD4 0xC3 0xD9 0x04 0x00 0x2C 0x20 0xA6 0x56 0x00 0x16 0x3E 0x0C 0xCB 0x04 0x02 0x01 0x00 0x00 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0xE2 It is quite obvious that this is a SMC DECLINE message, which means that the applications received SMC protocol message. We found that this was caused by the following situations: client server ¦ clc proposal -------------> ¦ clc accept <------------- ¦ clc confirm -------------> wait llc confirm send llc confirm ¦failed llc confirm ¦ x------ (after 2s)timeout wait llc confirm rsp wait decline (after 1s) timeout (after 2s) timeout ¦ decline --------------> ¦ decline <-------------- As a result, a decline message was sent in the implementation, and this message was read from TCP by the already-fallback connection. This patch double the client timeout as 2x of the server value, With this simple change, the Decline messages should never cross or collide (during Confirm link timeout). This issue requires an immediate solution, since the protocol updates involve a more long-term solution. En el kernel de Linux, se resolvió la siguiente vulnerabilidad: net/smc: evita la corrupción de datos causada por el rechazo. Encontramos un problema de corrupción de datos durante las pruebas de SMC-R en aplicaciones Redis. El punto de referencia tiene una baja probabilidad de informar un error extraño, como se muestra a continuación. "Error: Error de protocolo, obtuve "\xe2" como byte de tipo de respuesta" Finalmente, encontramos que los datos de error recuperados eran los siguientes: 0xE2 0xD4 0xC3 0xD9 0x04 0x00 0x2C 0x20 0xA6 0x56 0x00 0x16 0x3E 0x0C 0xCB 0x04 0x02 1 0x00 0x00 0x20 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x00 0xE2 Es bastante obvio que este es un mensaje SMC DECLINE, lo que significa que las aplicaciones recibieron un mensaje de protocolo SMC. • https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fb0b02bd6fd26cba38002be4a6bbcae2228fd44 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ada292b5c504720a0acef8cae9acc62a694d19c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/90072af9efe8c7bd7d086709014ddd44cebd5e7c https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/94a0ae698b4d5d5bb598e23228002a1491c50add https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7234d2b5dffa5af77fd4e0deaebab509e130c6b1 https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e6d71b437abc2f249e3b6a1ae1a7228e09c6e563 https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2023-52775 https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2282690 • CWE-20: Improper Input Validation •